Essays on the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy by Dastgir, Shabbir
ESSAYS ON THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF MONETARY 
POLICY 
Shabbir Dastgir 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
The University of Leeds 
Leeds University Business School 
April 2009 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that 
appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work 
of others. 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without 
proper acknowledgement. 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express deep gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor Malcolm 
Sawyer, for guiding me to completion of this study. I am enormously grateful to 
him, for his patience, his gentle encouragement and his expert commentary on my 
work. It has been a huge privilege for me to learn from him and to benefit from 
his knowledge of monetary economics. 
I am also most grateful to Zahid Sharif for advice on econometric analysis, 
assistance with data entry and proof reading of earlier drafts. To Tauqeer Asghar 
and Tahir Bashir for IT support, and to Rahila Bashir for her help and 
encouragement. 
ABSTRACT 
This study presents coverage of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
in the UK. It shows that historically, monetary policy has evolved through several 
distinct phases and frameworks over the last quarter of a century. A "new 
consensus" has emerged as a key theoretical construct of this process, with 
implications for the nature and role of money in an endogenous framework. It is 
argued that this is the essential basis for the current mode of economic analysis at 
the Bank of England. A further series of implications of this are the outcomes of 
Inflation Targeting as an objective of monetary policy. The stance can be shown 
to underpin thinking on monetary policy rules and these are used to perform an 
initial econometric analysis of a monetary policy reaction function. It is argued 
that the essential time series properties of such rules are generally overlooked in 
the empirical literature. Tentative analysis suggests that Taylor-type monetary 
policy reaction functions may not necessarily fit with an Inflation Targeting 
policy. In addition, the extent of pass through from official to retail bank interest 
rates is considered and shown to be incomplete. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE PLAN OF STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two begins with an overview of monetary policy in the UK between 1975 
and 2008. This covers the periods of boom and bust, rising unemployment and 
also the oil price shocks of the early 1970s. The analysis then moves on to a 
coverage of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy measures and also 
competition and credit control. Coverage then continues to look at the theoretical 
origins of monetary policy targets and to this end Friedman's (1960) early analysis 
is considered. As is Poole's (1970) approach to the IS/LM model. This is 
followed by a coverage of work by Simons (1936), Lucas (1972) and also 
Kydland and Prescott (1977). We also refer to Cobham (2002) to identify various 
types of monetary policy targets. In section 2.3, Svensson (1999) is referred to as 
in a description of monetary policy rules and an illustration of these is provided 
with reference to McCallum (1988). More specifically, coverage of monetary 
policy in the UK looks at monetary targeting in the early 1970s followed by boom 
and bust as previously mentioned. The analysis then moves on to a look at 
inflation targeting and also instrument independence at the Bank of England. This 
is followed by the final and current phase of UK monetary policy which is an 
operationally independent central bank. The next part of the second chapter 
considers the role of the policy instrument, competition and credit control. This is 
followed by chapter three which developed the theoretical basis for this thesis. 
namely an introduction to monetary policy when money is endogenous. This third 
8 
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chapter presents the operation of monetary policy in terms of a framework where credit 
money is endogenously created by the banking system. This chapter covers the new 
consensus as illustrated by Meyer (2001) as well as a look at transmission channels of 
monetary policy. This is followed by another section on monetary policy and aggregate 
demand where we make reference to authors such as Arestis and Sawyer (2003). A 
further section considers the role of monetary policy and the exchange rate followed by, a 
development of the endogenous money framework from a Keynesian perspective. 
Monetary policy in an endogenous money framework considers liquidity preference. the 
exchange rate, the role of fiscal policy and also the objectives of monetary policy. The 
analysis also includes coverage of fine tuning with monetary policy and monetary policy 
instruments before rounding up with a conclusion of material discussed. 
In chapter four, we introduce monetary policy rules as a prelude to forthcoming chapters 
which will seek to estimate Taylor type monetary policy reaction functions. These 
include a look at some of the preliminary modelling issues such as types of variables to be 
used in a potential Taylor rule together with some of the issues. They monetary policy 
rule of Taylor and others is also presented in this chapter. The second part of this chapter 
on monetary policy rules considers optimal monetary policy rules and how these might be 
used in practice and also their relevance to monetary policy transmission. The chapter 
also offers a consideration of trade-offs and shocks from demand and supply, rule 
specifications and proposed parameters, the role of the exchange rate and also addresses 
the issues of stability and the output gap. The chapter concludes with a summary of key, 
issues discussed. Chapter five introduces inflation targeting and considers the role of 
inflation targeting in a new consensus framework. Some of the theoretical aspects of 
inflation targeting are also considered including the nominal anchor, real and monetary 
9 
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factors, the causes of inflation and also inflation and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. The chapter then introduces some empirical evidence on inflation targeting 
including inflation targeting and macro-econometric modelling and inflation targeting in 
the context of single equation techniques before rounding off with a conclusion on key 
insights. Chapter six introduces the data and research method for this study. It considers 
some of the variables to be used for the purposes of estimating Taylor type monetary, 
policy rules. It also considers the important issue of periodisation or how to break the 
data into manageable regimes. This has been a key issue since there is some debate over 
how to determine the appropriate time periods. Generally there are two approaches to 
this; one is using descriptions from the academic literature and the second is to use 
econometric techniques such as structural break analysis. This section also makes 
reference to the actual appendix used for this study containing some of the data estimates. 
In chapter seven we present the results of an initial econometric analysis and this consists 
of tests for the order of integration, which include common unit root approaches. The 
results from unit root tests are used to determine how the data should be modelled and 
whether or not cointegration analysis should be conducted. This chapter also considers 
the determination of appropriate lag lengths for cointegration testing, the use of 
deterministic trends for model selection or in other words the Pantula (1989) principle, 
the Johansen approach to cointegration testing and also further statistical tests such as 
weak exogeneity, linear restrictions and parameter stability. Chapter eight discusses the 
results of these preceding chapter in terms of implications for monetary policy. On the 
whole it has been shown that the according to the data used in this study it is difficult to 
estimate reliable Taylor type monetary policy rules for the sub-periods under 
consideration. In chapter nine we move on to another area in the transmission of 
10 
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monetary policy, namely interest-rate pass through in the UK. This chapter begins with 
presentation of some theory on interest-rate pass through as well as a review of the 
empirical literature. Both of these suggest that interest-rate pass through is not complete 
in the UK. This chapter then introduces some data and specifies a model for estimating 
interest-rate pass through in the UK. The results are presented towards the end of the 
chapter and employ a similar econometric approach as described for chapters seven and 
eight. The essential insight of chapter nine is that interest-rate pass through is incomplete 
for the UK. Finally chapter ten concludes this thesis with a summary of some of the 
issues considered. 
CHAPTER TWO 
UK MONETARY POLICY 1975-2008: AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, UK economic policy was being framed by a recent economic boom and 
rising unemployment in the domestic economy, as well as the first world oil price 
shock. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policy measures had been pursued as a 
means of stimulating aggregate demand, and broad money was growing on the 
back of Competition and Credit Control. On the balance of payments side, 
deficits in the current account had seen the float of sterling which continued to 
depreciate. Economic growth continued to stagnate and an existing incomes 
policy had done little to curb rising inflation. Government spending was 
subsequently reduced, official interest rates increased and bank lending controlled 
through the Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme. The previous year had seen 
the election of a new Labour government, and the beginnings of the miners' 
strike. The economic record of the Labour government is well documented by 
Artis and Cobham (1991: Chapters 1 and 16) and also by Allsopp (1991) amongst 
others, who point to largely unsuccessful outcomes in terms of fiscal deficits, 
monetary growth, rising inflation and reduction in GDP growth. Tighter controls 
over incomes policy and public expenditure were adopted in 1975, though sterling 
continued to depreciate, inducing large increases in official interest rates, followed 
by limits on domestic credit expansion. By 1977, recent sterling depreciations 
allowed for increased foreign reserves and lower interest rates. Incomes growth 
was at trend rate, inflation was beginning to subside and sterling M3 became a 
1? 
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target for broad money growth. The following year saw a breakdown of 
negotiations between the government and the trade unions, resulting in the 1978 
`Winter of Discontent'. In May 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected to the office 
of Prime Minister and signaled a concern for inflation control over unemployment 
by focusing on monetary targets rather than fiscal policy. Reductions in income 
tax and increases in VAT however, induced further increases in inflation, leading 
to a contractionary monetary policy, which was followed by the second world oil 
price shock. The result was an increase in official interest rates, an appreciation of 
sterling, and an increase in unemployment. By 1981, official interest rates were 
reduced and fiscal policy tightened in the introduction of the Medium Term 
Financial Strategy, which lead to a move away from monetary targeting in 1985. 
The exchange rate however, had continued to fall prompting large increases in 
official interest rates. In January 1985 for example, sterling was almost at parity 
with the dollar. Though economic growth and output were both stimulated 
somewhat with the ending of the miners' strike in 1985, it was not sufficient to 
curb rising unemployment. 1987 saw the introduction of Deutschemark 
shadowing under Chancellor Lamont as a means of achieving greater exchange 
rate stability, and preparation for membership of the exchange rate mechanism. 
Such measures coupled with Competition and Credit Control, and the depreciation 
of sterling, were followed by the `Lawson boom' in which inflation saw double 
digits by the early 1990s. UK entry into the ERM in October 1990 was short 
lived, itself subject to the economic strains of German reunification and 
speculation over sterling. The exit in September 1990 initiated falls in official 
interest rates, a sterling depreciation and a shift in monetary policy which 
consisted of a move towards inflation targeting and a restructuring of the roles of 
13 
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HM Treasury and the Bank of England. In May 1997, a new Labour government 
granted operational independence to the Bank of England, making it responsible 
for managing official interest rates in order to pursue a government determined 
target for the rate of inflation. In the period since, inflation was brought under 
control and economic growth moved largely at trend rate. 
This chapter presents an overview of UK monetary policy between 1975 and 2008 
as a prelude to forthcoming chapters. In section two, the development of 
monetary policy is traced through five different regimes. This is followed in 
section three by the various instruments used to implement monetary policy. The 
chapter concludes with a summary in section four. To this end, the theoretical 
origins of monetary policy targets are outlined in brief so that the rationale for 
monetary policy rules and targets might be understood. This is followed by the 
frameworks within which such rules and targets have been adopted. It is 
suggested that the theoretical origins of monetary policy targets can be associated 
with the literature on targets and instruments and on rules versus discretion, and 
that these origins support thinking on monetary, nominal income, exchange rate 
and inflation targets. 
The latter of these, namely inflation targets, have spawned a large literature on 
monetary policy rules, in which Taylor (1993) has revived a long-standing theme 
1 
in economic policy. 
The section overleaf, considers the theoretical origins of monetary policy targets. 
' Johnson (1972: 233): "the tradition of British central banking and monetary theory... identified 
monetary policy with the fixing of the 
level of interest rates". 
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2.2 THEORETICAL ORIGINS OF MONETARY POLICY TARGETS 
According to Friedman's (1960) early analysis, the rate of growth of the money 
supply is constant and equal to the underlying rate of productivity growth. At the 
same time, a stable demand for money removes any need for discretionary 
monetary policy. This results in price stability and in money, growth during 
recession being greater than nominal income. In Poole (1970) however. the 
emphasis is on income stability and not inflation control. The rate of interest is 
fixed in an IS-LM model with a constant money supply and horizontal LM curve. 
Income is determined in terms of random shocks to expenditure and also the 
demand for money, with policy assumed to respond slowly to shocks. When the 
LM curve is upward sloping in the Friedman (1960) sense, and the IS curve is 
shifted by expenditure shocks, monetary policy results in a smaller income 
variance. Conversely, when the LM curve is shifted by money demand shocks, 
income varies but is constant when the interest rate is fixed, since changes in 
money demand are met with changes in money supply. The appropriate rule 
under the presence of both types of shocks depends on their relative variances and 
covariances, but in general is a combination of both rules in which the money 
supply and rate of interest both vary with one another, and in a specific way with 
income, as opposed to a fixed money supply. In Friedman (1975), the supply of 
money is not directly controlled by the authorities but influenced towards some 
preferred level via changes in the rate of interest and the level of bank reserves. 
The desired level of the policy target is determined by ex ante assumptions about 
possible shocks to the economic system. The policy instruments of interest rates 
and bank reserves are then set to achieve the desired level, with the actual level of 
the policy target determined by actual ex post shocks to the economy. Here, the 
15 
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money supply is an information indicator in the optimal rule, providing an insight 
into the magnitude of economic shocks. This information is then used to set the 
interest rate and bank reserves with the level of the policy target in mind. Thus in 
terms of short-run stabilisation, an intermediate target as implied by Friedman 
(1960) is not justified. Poole (1970) however, leaves open the question of policy 
rule responses to different shocks. An alternative early perspective is offered by 
Simons (1936), in which rules ought to prevent against discretionary monetary 
policy being subject to bias from political decisions. This is furthered by 
Friedman (1948,1953) in which policy lags are destabilising for discretionary 
policy, and by Phelps (1967) then Friedman (1968) in which monetary policy 
affects real income only in the short run. In the rational expectations hypothesis 
of Lucas (1972), policy is not effective, even in the short run, though in the time- 
inconsistency approach of Kydland and Prescott (1977), a strong case for 
monetary policy rules or targets is advocated. A private-sector supported and 
public policy preference for low inflation and unemployment below the natural 
rate, results in relatively higher inflation expectations. 2 Only at a relatively high 
rate of inflation and a natural rate of output will a long-run equilibrium exist 
where the authorities do not have a preference for stimulating output. 3 Both the 
public and private-sector preference is for the natural rate with a lower level of 
inflation, but this is dependent on the presence of some `precommitment device' 
such as an intermediate monetary policy target which penalises against high 
inflation. For example, failure to meet a pre-announced target has an adverse 
2 Bean (1998) offers a similar point. The monetary authorities do not pursue above natural rate output 
because of shocks which lower the natural rate below an optimum Walrasian equilibrium rate. They do 
however, prefer higher output in general and this is partly because of political considerations. 
3 The authorities are assumed to follow a quadratic loss function for inflation in which a strong 
preference to avoid inflation is present for high levels of inflation. At this level, output can only be 
increased at the expense of higher inflation. 
16 
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impact on economic credibility. Alternatively, a monetary -constitution' allowing 
monetary policy decisions to be made without an incentive to increase output. For 
example, an operationally independent central bank mandated with price stability. 
That said, the analysis above applies largely to monetary authorities with specific 
preferences over the level of output, but which are not independent. For an 
operationally independent central bank, the role of a target is more to do with 
indicating monetary policy intentions. Incidentally, Bean (1998) argues that an 
operationally independent central bank is of itself a solution to the time- 
inconsistency problem. 
Cobham (2002: 3), identifies three types of pre-announced monetary policy target 
adopted in the UK over the last thirty years; monetary (growth rate for some 
monetary aggregate), exchange rate (central parity with a degree of fluctuation) 
and inflation rate (currently a CPI of 2%). 4 Monetary targets were operational 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, exchange rate targets as part of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the early 1990s, and inflation targets since 
the early 1990s. Operational details are pertinent to the implementation of each 
target, and these include ensuring correct definition, time period and numeric 
form, as well action to be taken and announced in the event a target is not met. In 
terms of the studies highlighted above, this means good short-run stabilisation 
properties, and transparency, acocuntability and credibility of policy decisions. 
These are summarised by Cobham (2002: 8), together with a note on the 
importance of monetary authority control over a target as follows. Monetary 
targets responded well to domestic and foreign expenditure shocks but not to asset 
' Nominal income growth is discussed by Brittan (1982) but has not been adopted in the UK. 
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market and supply shocks. They were difficult to control and intepret. though 
easier to verify. Nominal income targets are considered to respond well to 
demand but not supply shocks, and better (worse) than monetary targets on 
interpretation (verification), with nominal income even harder to control than 
monetary targets. Exchange rate targets absorb money demand shocks and 
perhaps also supply shocks, but not so for open economy expenditure and 
exchange risk premium shocks. Though easier to verify than they are to interpret. 
control of an exchange rate target is subject to much volatility. Lastly, inflation 
targeting does well in terms of absorbing demand shocks and being easy to 
interpret and verify, but poorly on supply shocks and control. 
2.3 MONETARY POLICY RULES 
In Svensson (1999), monetary policy rules are `instrument rules' which specify 
changes in the monetary policy instrument in response to economic events. An 
example of such rules is McCallum (1988) in which monetary base (MO) growth 
adjustments are used to achieve a target nominal income level: 
th =k*- v+, Z(x *- x) 
where quarterly monetary base (MO) growth (m) responds to a constant (k *). a 
trend change in velocity (v ), actual (x) and target (x *) levels of the log of nominal 
GDP, and a weighted deviation from target (A), of actual nominal GDP. This is 
similar to Friedman (1960), but modified to include changes in velocity and 
greater counter-cyclical effect in the final term. A shortcoming of this rule 
is the 
need to control the monetary base -a policy not adopted in the UK. 
but also 
is 
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according to Goodhart (1994), a risky policy prescription. Perhaps the most 
popular monetary rule of recent times, is that of Taylor (1993) in which changes 
in the policy interest rate respond to deviations of inflation from target and of 
output from trend: 
r=r *+ Tr_, +a, (7r-7r*)+ay, y-* (2) 
v* 
where the federal funds rate (r) responds to the `equilibrium' interest rate assumed 
close to the steady-state growth rate (r*), expected inflation proxied by the four- 
quarter rate of inflation an inflation reaction coefficient of 0.5 (a, ), the 
current rate of inflation (71), the target rate of inflation (71*), an output reaction 
coefficient of 0.5 (ay), current output (y) and the trend level of output (y* ). Rather 
than a mechanical rule, equation (2) is a stylised representation of monetary policy 
intended as a yardstick from which other monetary policy decisions can be 
assessed. As Taylor (1998) notes, the rule is an intermediate target in the sense 
that it represents pre-commitment without political interest. The empirical 
literature is replete with Taylor (1993) and Taylor-type rules estimated under a 
variety of different settings. In Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for example, the 
response of the policy instrument to inflation, in which a positive coefficient on 
the deviation of output from trend is required for long-run inflation stability, since 
an increase in inflation is met with a rise in the real rate of interest. In Ball 
(1999), a `monetary conditions index' is constructed in which a weighted average 
of the rate of interest and the exchange rate respond to changes in inflation, the 
output gap and lagged exchange rate terms. In Svensson (2000), a forward- 
looking rule is presented in which the policy instrument responds to the real 
19 
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exchange rate, the foreign interest rate and the foreign exchange risk premium. 
inflation and the output gap. In Nelson (2000), Taylor-type rules are estimated for 
different phases of UK monetary policy. 
2.4 UK MONETARY POLICY 1975-2008 
This section considers the main frameworks of monetary policy adopted in the UK 
since 1975. These include monetary targeting, the `Lawson boom'. Deutschemark 
shadowing and the ERM, and inflation targeting. In addition, it considers the 
significance of operational and instrumental independence of monetary policy. 
2.4.1 Monetary Targets 
At the beginning of the period under consideration, UK monetary policy saw a 
shift in focus. A largely defunct Bretton Woods system was abandoned for 
greater inflation control, and targeting of broad money growth as indicated by the 
then Governor of the Bank of England, (1978: 33), who stated, "I think it is not 
therefore entirely accidental that during each of the three years 1974-76, the 
growth of sterling M3 was about 10%, well below the rate of expansion of 
national income in current prices. " In Kynaston (1995: 31-37), the emphasis on 
sterling M3 in the Medium Term Financial Strategy, as well as greater power over 
monetary policy making for HM Treasury is noted. The academic literature does 
include discussion of monetary targets in terms of Friedman (1960) and Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) monetary policy rules, with Lane (1985) countering against 
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this idea. 5 However Cobham (2002: 16) offers some thought on the rationale for 
monetary targeting from a policy perspective, arguing it offered greater stability in 
the public and private sectors. In this regard, Cobham (2002: 16) cites the 
following statement by the Bank of England (1984: 4), in which, 
"The Bank has consistently felt the need for a financial anchor, whether it be a fixed exchange rate or a monetary target, which needs to be both 
publicly announced and vigorously defended, in order to give a confident 
basis for private sector decision makers to plan forward. But it has never, 
on the other hand, felt that economic relationships were sufficiently, 
predictable, or the financial system so static, that the conduct of policy 
could be safely placed on a quasi-automatic basis with the adoption of 
constant rules. " 
Further evidence from the Bank of England (1978: 31-37) seems to suggest that 
broad money was considered an appropriate indicator of inflationary pressure. 
Furthermore, in Fforde (1983: 201-202) it also seems that broad money targets 
were part of an overall economic strategy that included the use of fiscal policy 
operating alongside monetary policy. Nevertheless, the Financial Statement and 
Budget Report of 1984-1985 (Cobham, 2002: 17), shows that monetary targets 
were proving "difficult to interpret" and that other, "more satisfactory indicators 
of financial conditions" were being sought by the authorities. An example of this 
as reported by the Bank of England (1989), is the conversion of the Abbey 
National from building society to bank which would have had a significant impact 
on broad money targeting. However the authorities did not report this, opting 
instead to move to another broad money target. Monetary targeting might also be 
noted for a lack of transparency and accountability. In the Financial Statement 
5 The intention here is to consider monetary developments in an economic policy context. For 
examples of academic issues, see Davis and Meek (1983), Foot (1981) and Summer (1980) amongst 
others. 
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and Budget Report of 1984-1985 (Cobham, 2002: 17) for example, decisions are 
made on "assumptions about the growth of money GDP. " 
In Llewellyn (1991), the role of financial innovation in monetary targeting is also 
documented. In the banking sector, this consisted of increased competition 
between banks and building societies, which resulted in lower transaction and 
intermediation costs for customers. Building societies themselves became more 
competitive, moving to provide products conventionally associated with retail 
banks, and this meant that the distinction between banks and building societies 
was becoming less clear. In the wholesale markets, competition resulted in a 
wider choice of financial instruments for individuals as well as greater 
transparency in the aftermath of the 1986 big bang, also providing lower 
transaction costs. In Cobham (2002: 37-39), financial innovation during the 
monetary targeting framework is said to have been aided by volatile financial 
markets, and non-monetary aspects of economic policy. In addition, deregulation 
increased competition in the financial sector and was followed by technological 
advances such as electronic transactions through computers and automated teller 
machines. Such developments had the effect of reducing transaction costs. 
Furthermore, "increased competition was in nearly every sphere both a cause and 
an effect of financial innovation. " 
2.4.2 Boom and Bust 
Overshoot was a major problem with monetary targeting and this seems to have 
prompted Chancellor Lawson (1992) to seek entry into the ERM on the grounds 
that it would provide monetary policy with the credible framework that it was 
ýý 
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lacking. In the first year of informal Deutschemark shadowing however. the UK 
experienced much interest and exchange rate volatility. followed by a float of 
sterling and rising inflation. Formally, UK membership of the ERM lasted only 
from October 1990 to September 1992, following a speculative sterling crisis or 
`Black Wednesday', which resulted in a suspension. 
According to Congdon (1992: 156), monetary and credit growth were major 
determinants of the boom, and the result of both, "the change in policy approach" 
and the lack of attention given to "credit and broad money. " Cobham (2002: 54) 
however, argues that there is little evidence to support this assertion in terms of an 
increase in monetary growth, and that it ignores the role of competition between 
banks and building societies, as well as the unreliability of monetary growth 
statistics. Another issue relates to the problem of causality. Cobham (2002: 55) 
argues monetary targeting resulted in control of broad money growth during the 
short term. In the aftermath of overfunding, monetary growth was not subject to 
control by the authorities and subsequently increased slightly. This resulted in a 
weak and heavily lagged influence of official interest rates on the demand for 
bank credit. Asa result, 
"monetary growth was much more obviously endogenous from 1985, that 
is responsive to, and determined by, changes in economic activity and 
other factors. It is therefore difficult to talk of an exogenous increase in 
monetary growth initiating a rise in aggregate demand. " 
A second explanation of the boom in the academic literature, is based on the role 
of financial liberalisation and deregulation which resulted in increased 
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competition in the financial markets. 6 In this view, the removal of interest rate 
cartels amongst banks and building societies. the entry of banks into mortgage 
markets and building societies into banking markets, as well as greater 
transparency in the wholesale markets, generated increased borrowing in both the 
public and private sectors. According to Miles (1992: 70) for instance, equity 
withdrawal in the housing market became a sustained trend. Sargent (1991: 79) 
however, questions the `consensus' that financial liberalisation induced the boom, 
by arguing that large increases in borrowing were the result of increased debtor 
confidence in ability to repay. In addition, the "climate of over-optimistic 
expectations which developed in the 1980s about the economy's performance" is 
argued to be the result of increased productivity. In reference to the economic 
conditions underpinning such developments, Lawson (1992: 631), notes that, the 
exceptional duration of the upswing, led too many borrowers and lenders to 
believe that it would go on forever. " Nelson and Nikolov (2001) however, argue 
that official demand and output statistics during this period had been subject to 
much revision and that this resulted in poor growth forecasts. Nevertheless, the 
Bank of England (1990: 215-220) suggests expectations, financial liberalisation 
and official interest rate reductions all contributed to increased consumer demand. 
The role of consumer expenditure in the housing market has also been considered 
as an important factor in this context. In particular, the increase in borrowing and 
equity withdrawal on the back of financial liberalisation has been the subject of 
academic enquiry by authors including Aoki et al. (2001), Miles (1994), 
Bayoumi 
(1993) and Carruth and Henley (1992). In these studies, it seems feasible that 
6 See for example, Lawson (1992), Sargent (1991), and Muellbauer and Murphy (1989) 
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financial liberalisation may have contributed to increased borrowing, though the 
causes of falling savings ratios are less clear. 
2.4.3 Inflation Targeting 
The UK failure with the ERM paved the way for the introduction of an inflation 
target for monetary policy. In addition, the Bank of England was to make 
inflation projections, forecasts and official interest rate recommendations for 11\1 
Treasury, which would in turn make the final decision over short term nominal 
interest rates. Furthermore, details of discussions between HM Treasury and the 
Bank of England were minuted as a means of developing greater transparency, 
accountability and credibility in the policy making process. Though well 
intentioned, it remained subject to political bias. For example, prior to the 
election of the new Labour government in May 1997, the then Conservative 
Chancellor failed to increases official interest rates when the economics would 
have supported such a move. The inflation target thus followed previous 
monetary and exchange rate targets for monetary policy in the 1980s and ERM 
periods respectively. An inflation rate of between 1% and 4% was set out and 
monetary policy would aim for a rate of 1% to 2.5% of the 12-month increase in 
the retail price index excluding mortgage interest payments, or RPIX. In 1995. 
the government reset the target to 2.5% or less, with a time lag of two years 
between monetary policy decisions and their effects on the rate of inflation. The 
inflation target was also coupled with a monitoring range for the monetary base, 
MO, which had been targeted since the mid-1980s, and the broad money aggregate 
M4. The exchange rate was not explicitly monitored, but was nevertheless subject 
to "regard" by the authorities. (Cobham, 2002: 94). The new setup for monetary 
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policy is described in terms of the following characteristics by Cobham (2002: 
94). 
First, was a quarterly inflation report produced by the Bank of England. which 
would include forecasts of expected inflation for the next two years. This ran 
alongside the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin and according to King (1994). 
was only presented to HM Treasury in final form so that it could not be censored. 
Second, regular and formal meetings between the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and the Governor of the Bank of England were adopted as a basis for arriving at 
monetary policy decisions - which the Chancellor would make. Third, the Bank 
of England was given some discretion over the timing with which it implemented 
the interest rate decisions that the Chancellor had made. This was largely 
intended to increase policy credibility by removing doubts of political bias. 
Fourth and from 1994, monetary policy meetings were officially recorded with the 
minutes released some six weeks thereafter. These typically included an account 
of prevailing economic conditions, the views of the Governor and Chancellor, 
followed by an explanation of the appropriate monetary policy decision. Fifth, a 
Monetary Report by HM Treasury was also published to include the monetary and 
economic data used for making policy decisions. The move to inflation targeting 
might be considered indicative of a shift in monetary policy among small open 
economies as identified by Bernanke et al. (1999) amongst others. The rationale 
seems to be an ability to absorb changes in money demand as well as being more 
transparent, which feed into greater influence over inflation expectations and 
commitment to achieving the target. The relative difficulty in managing inflation 
targets compared to monetary aggregates however. implies difficulties over the 
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effective operation of the inflation target. It might also be argued that inflation 
targeting produces greater variability of real output in response to negative supply 
shocks, compared to say nominal income targets. Interestingly however, King 
(1994) argues that when the inflation target is stated in terms of a range. it 
becomes possible to bypass the effects of negative supply shocks. 
Official sources might be used to suggest that the new setup between the 
government and the Bank of England was to some extent the result of Black 
Wednesday which caused the government to suffer a loss of credibilit}'. For 
example, HM Treasury (1992: 3) notes that the changes were intended as "steps 
to improve the credibility of anti inflation strategy. " Similarly King (1994: 123) 
notes that these were "institutional changes designed to bolster the credibility of 
the commitment to low inflation. " Although both these quotes suggest a 
preference for greater credibility and transparency, it is argued that these could 
have been achieved without a separation of the institutional roles of government 
and Bank of England. Cobham (2002: 95) for example, argues that, 
"It therefore seems obvious that what was happening was that in order to 
regain credibility the Treasury felt obliged, not merely to undertake to 
explain its policies and actions more clearly, but also to concede some 
limited and informal (and therefore reversible) autonomy in monetary 
policy to the Bank of England, whose reputation had been less adversely 
affected by the events of September 1992. However, it should also be 
noted that the shift had the effect of strengthening the Chancellor against 
pressure from the Prime Minister (Stephens, (1996: 292-293). and of 
forcing the Bank's views out into the open in a way that could weaken, as 
well as strengthen, the Bank. " 
It might also be argued that the time inconsistency problem was officially 
recognised in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (1992: 441-448) and that 
77 
Chapter Iwo: UK Monetary Policy 1975-2008: An Overview. 
this contrasts with the earlier position of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
(1990: 482-486) concerning UK entry into the ERM. A possible solution to time 
inconsistency at the time was Bank of England independence as recommended by 
the OECD (1993: 43) but this was not adopted. Also, according to Hansard, the 
authorities were presented with the option of Bank of England independence on 
the grounds that it would ensure greater policy credibility, but refused citing lack 
of accountability to Parliament of an independent central bank. Similarly 
according to Lawson (1992: 867-873), Bank of England independence had also 
been proposed in the late 1980s but not considered by then Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher. 
Official statistics on the target measure of inflation - the 12-month retail price 
index excluding mortgage interest payments - of 4% show a fall from a previous 
peak of 9.2% in 1990. The trend continues to 2% in 1994 before rising to 2.8% 
and 3.3% in 1996, after which falls to 3.1 % and 2.9% are followed by another fall 
to the inflation target of 2.5% in April and May 1997. Additional indications are 
contained in the Bank of England Inflation Report, which suggests increased 
inflation expectations after Black Wednesday, a reduction over 1993, a general 
downward trend over 1994 followed by a rise over 1995. In the latter part of 
1995, inflation expectations were 3%, followed by 2.9% for 1997 and 3.3% for 
1998. According to Breedon (1995), short term inflation expectations fell after 
Black Wednesday, before rising during 1994, and falling again over 1995 and 
1996. Medium and long term inflation expectations rose in late 1992, falling in 
1993 before rising again in 1995 and 1996. In practice, monetary policy decisions 
under inflation targeting were taken by the Chancellor, though the views of the 
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Governor of the Bank of England were also published to aid credibility. Both 
parties were thus seen to be pursuing an inflation target. though Cobham 
102) suggests that this brought additional objectives for each, citing five examples 
of supporting developments in monetary policy over the same period. For the 
government, this meant retention of the political power still associated with 
monetary policy making, of particular importance given the events of Black 
Wednesday. For the Bank of England, the limited degree of autonom- was to be 
maintained, if only to increase monetary policy effectiveness in the long run. 
The first concerns the willingness by the Chancellor to raise the minimum lending 
rate in 1994 and 1995. This was well before a possible general election and 
signaled some degree of credibility in policy. The second concerns an 
unwillingness to raise interest rates in mid 1995 against market and Bank 
recommendations, which represented a deliberate undermining of the Bank of 
England by the Chancellor. The third example concerns four interest rate cuts 
between December 1995 and June 1996. It might be argued that this was partly 
influenced as much by a forthcoming election as they were by a slowdown of 
growth. The fourth concerns the Bank of England being willing to support the 
Chancellor in cutting interest rates in December 1995. It is suggested that this 
was the result of the strategic failure earlier in the year in which the Bank 
disagreed with the Chancellor and lost credibility. The decision to agree the cut is 
thus considered an opportunity for the Bank to regain leverage in the wholesale 
markets. The fifth example concerns the Chancellor's continued rejection of Bank 
of England recommendations to increase interest rates between December 1996 
and April 1997. This might be interpreted as intended to induce a significant 
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consumption-led expansion of the economy in time for a forthcoming election. 
even if this risked an overshoot of the inflation target. As it happened. inflation 
did overshoot target after the election. Regardless of the correctness of these 
interpretations, Cobham (2002: 103) argues that, 
"there seems little doubt that the Bank of England made efforts (mostly 
not observable) to protect and strengthen its autonomy and to further the 
case for central bank independence. In particular, it worked to improve its 
monetary expertise (notably its inflation forecasting capacity) and made 
use of the mechanisms of accountability such as the Inflation Report and 
the Governor's contributions to the minutes of the monthly Monetary 
Meetings (as well as speeches by the Governor and other officials) to 
establish its technical reputation; and while talking about monetary policy 
mainly in terms of what central banks should do and how, and without 
referring explicitly to political decision making, it also made small but 
persistent references to the concept of central bank independence. " 
In King (1997), the new framework is analysed in terms of four rules. namely a 
state-contingent rule, a time consistent non-contingent rule, discretion and a 
conservative rule. It is argued that an optimal state contingent rule is not 
appropriate since it is time inconsistent, and thus preference is given to the 
conservative rule. A further argument is that the new inflation targeting 
framework could be conducive to a more credible monetary policy and allow for a 
state contingent rule to be operated. The overall analysis seems supportive of the 
new framework and the giving of a "greater role to the Bank of England. " 
(King. 
1997: 97). Also, according to the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (1997: 
103), the new framework would deliver, "a decade of growth through stability. 
" 
The credibility of the new monetary policy framework has also 
been considered 
by Cobham et al. (2001) in which the Bank of England is assumed to be pursuing 
an inflation target and the Chancellor susceptible to political as well as economic 
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considerations. Another assumption is that any divergence of the Chancellor from 
the views and recommendations of the Bank of England. would be interpreted by 
the financial markets as political bias and evidence of the credibility of monetary 
policy being eroded. In a further study by Adam et al. (2001). a monetary policy 
reaction function covering the inflation targeting framework suggests policy «-as 
influenced by both domestic and international variables, particularly the pass 
through from exchange rates to prices. The authors conclude that a significant 
international aspect suggests an increased credibility of monetary policy. 
The inflation targeting period might thus be described in terms of greater 
monetary policy transparency compared to previous regimes, and some limited 
degree of independence for the Bank of England. Initially, inflation also remained 
within the 1% to 4% band before achieving the target of 2.5%. 
2.4.4 Instrument Independence 
In May 1997, instrument independence was granted to the Bank of England in the 
form of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), responsible for adjusting short 
term nominal interest rates to meet a government determined inflation target. This 
was, and is, supplemented with the publication of inflation reports, forecasts and 
the minutes of meetings set to decide the level of nominal interest rates. The 
arrangements of the current set up are included in the Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin (1998: 93-99), which relates a government determined inflation target 
against which the Bank of England is given an operational remit for setting 
official interest rates. Formally, this is stated as, "to maintain price stability and, 
subject to that objective, to support the government's economic policy, including 
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its objectives for growth and employment. " Similarly, exchange rate policy is 
also the responsibility of the government, with the Bank holding foreign exchange 
reserves to be used at discretion in support of monetary policy. This is in addition 
to operating government foreign exchange reserves if instructed to do so. In 
addition, Bank of England debt management and financial market supervision 
have been transferred to the Debt Management Office and the Financial Services 
Authority respectively. The three party relationship is now based on the 
Memorandum of Understanding as in Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995). Finally 
monetary policy is set by the Monetary Policy Committee. 
2.4.5 Operational Independence 
The discussion in this chapter identifies monetary targets, exchange rate targets 
and inflation targets as the objectives of UK monetary policy. At some points in 
time there existed no target at all. Interestingly, operational independence for the 
Bank of England only took place under the latter regime of inflation targeting. In 
terms of economic performance of macroeconomic variables such as inflation, 
growth, output and employment, it might be argued that monetary policy under 
inflation targeting with an operationally independent Bank of England making 
adjustments of short term nominal interest rates has been relatively more 
successful. On the other hand, it might also be said that the global economic 
climate in the 1990s has been more conducive to low inflation than were the 
1970s or 1980s. This completes the discussion on monetary targets, boom and 
bust, inflation targeting, instrument independence and operational independence. 
The chapter now looks at the policy instrument, which is introduced overleaf. 
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2.5 THE POLICY INSTRUMENT 
Given the variation in monetary policy frameworks during the period under 
consideration, the instrument of such policy has also changed substantially. 
Monetary targeting for instance saw the use of credit counterparts to control 
monetary aggregates. The emphasis on broad money rather than the monetary 
base or some other monetary aggregate is also indicative of a supply side v-ie«-. In 
contrast, inflation targeting required adjustments in the short term nominal interest 
rate to induce changes in the level of aggregate demand and the rate of inflation, 
rather than a monetary aggregate. 
2.6 COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL 
Towards the end of the 1960s there seemed greater official concern of the effect of 
ever more control over bank structure and competition. The Governor of the Bank 
of England (1971) objected to examples of direct control including 'requests'. 
`guideline' and `ceilings' on the grounds that such non-price approaches to 
rationing were not conducive to efficiency and equity. Examples of inefficiency 
included the allocation of funds below market clearing level prices, into export 
and manufacturing commitments relating to government policy preferences. but 
which returned less on the initial investment than other areas such as consumer 
goods. Inequity also resulted from regulations adversely affecting the very 
institutions they were designed to benefit, rather than those they were not. Non- 
bank financial intermediaries and newly created secondary banks whose remits 
kept them out of the controls benefited as the burden of control largely affected 
clearing banks. The development of new markets and institutions outside the 
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remit of controls, induced a black market non-price regulation effect, in which 
controls affecting banks and bank customers provide a market incentive for 
evasion. This is turn fuels new regulatory and enforcement costs, whilst also 
compromising the credibility of existing indicators and removing important 
information. This phase of `squeezing the balloon', in which controls imposed at 
one point were bypassed by financial innovations elsewhere. lead to further 
revision of operating procedure. 
Another development that was also taking shape through IMF pressure and also 
because of a shift in thinking towards the more direct linking of monetary 
aggregates to nominal income through a stable money demand function, was 
control over the volume of bank credit as a possible intermediate monetary policy 
target. This resulted after much discussion and debate in Competition and Credit 
Control aimed at fostering greater banking competition than monetary aggregate 
control. In the 1973 move towards monetarism, Competition and Credit Control 
which had officially been introduced in 1971, was already becoming obsolete. 
The move was aimed at removing all bank and financial house quantitative 
lending restrictions, and interest rate agreements. An official strategy of deposit 
creation and gilt market support through the purchase of all bonds with a maturity 
date of more than one year was also abolished, as was collective Treasury bill 
tendering by discount houses. 
Such measures left open the method of credit or monetary aggregate control, 
which subsequently resulted in an emphasis on market price. The rationale «-as 
largely to avoid possible collusion between borrowers and lenders through non- 
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market-clearing interest rate levels, by changing the price of credit between 
institutions. Thus short-term interest rates were to be varied as a means of 
influencing credit and deposit demand. A purpose of Competition and Credit 
Control here, was thus quick and predictable changes. 
In terms of financial innovations, cash and liquid asset ratios of 8% and -18% 
respectively were replaced with reserve asset ratios of 12.5% and 10% for banks 
and finance house respectively, where each had assets worth five million pounds 
or more. The Bank of England was also able to call `special deposits' - cash 
deposits at the Bank of England earning treasury bill rates of interest - from banks 
and finance houses. These reserve asset ratios and special deposits however, were 
not intended to help control the monetary base, where changes in the supply of 
Bank of England reserve assets would lead to a change in the quantity of deposits. 
According to the Governor of the Bank of England (1971), 
"It is not to be expected that the mechanism of minimum reserve asset 
ratio and special deposits can be used to achieve some precise multiple 
contraction or expansion of bank assets. Rather the intention is to use our 
control over liquidity, which these instruments will reinforce, to influence 
the structure of interest rates. The resulting change in relative rates of 
return will then induce shifts in the current portfolios of both the public 
and the banks. " 
This control over liquidity illustrates the Bank of England's role as lender of last 
resort, acting as monopoly supplier of funds in response to banking shortages. 
Though the Bank must supply the reserves, it is still able to determine their price 
which in turn determines market prices. This has been the mainstay of UK 
monetary control in the 1980s. In this manner, the Bank is able to speed up 
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interest rate movements through the reserve asset ratio and special deposit calls. 
The purpose of the reserve asset ratio was to induce banks suffering shortages to 
withdraw call money from the wholesale market which the Bank of England could 
shape through interest rate adjustments in response to discount house shortages. 
A wide range of liquid bank assets were classified as reserves by the government, 
hoping to prevent banks from responding to shortages with a disposal of assets. 
Inevitably, a significant offloading of bank assets would induce interest rate rises. 
The reserve asset ratio however, acted to manipulate interest rate changes more 
than it did the heart of the fractional reserve multiplier system. Thus less central, 
it was the Bank of England as lender of last resort, and manipulator of interest 
rates that took centre stage. According to, this gave a greater role to the 
management of debt in Competition and Credit Control. 
In general, debt management can be undertaken in two ways. It can be supported 
through a commitment to stable debt prices and market stability through the 
purchase and sale of debt, or the money supply can be subject to greater control by 
selling debt to ensure residual financing matches monetary targets. This leads to 
fluctuations in prices and yields. In the early 1970s, the Bank of England 
provided some degree of market support. By 1975, large public sector deficits 
and a preference for monetary growth control meant substantial selling of gilts. 
The Bank responded with the first in a series of `Duke of York' methods, by 
increasing official interest rates substantially in October 1975, before reducing 
them later as a signal to capital investors to enter the wholesale market. As such, 
the demand for gilts was determined by the level of official interest rates. When 
interest rates were reduced, the demand curve shifted out. Official debt was also 
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sold to the wholesale markets through new types of stock and issuing methods. 
Part-paid stock was first issued in March 1977, followed by stock bearing variable 
interest rate returns linked to the Treasury bill rate, which compensated to some 
degree for capital losses for investors when interest rates were high. Stock 
issuance was subject to much debate in 1975 and 1976 but a partial-tender issue 
did not take place until 1979. 
Another change resulted from Competition and Credit Control was the switch in 
the official interest rate from Bank Rate to Minimum Lending Rate. Though not 
formally a part of Competition and Credit Control itself, it might be seen as 
having been induced by the change in debt management which resulted in greater 
interest rate variations. The Bank Rate acted as the lender of last resort rate but 
also the yardstick for market interest rate mark-ups. The level of the Bank Rate 
for the week ahead was announced each Thursday, but was often stagnant during 
periods of interest rate smoothing. Since the Bank Rate set the level of market 
interest rate mark-ups, there existed some degree of inertia. For example when 
interest rates such as the Treasury bill rate at which the Bank of England was 
supplying liquidity, fluctuated more widely, the deviation of market interest rates 
from the Bank Rate became more likely. In October 1972, the Bank Rate was 
replaced by the Minimum Lending Rate, defined as the treasury bill rate plus 
0.5% rounded up to the nearest 25 basis points. 
It might be argued that monetary policy was largely expansionary in the early 
1970s. A series of budget tax cuts and easy credit induced a sharp increase in the 
PSBR, a substantial reduction in the balance of payments and increases in the 
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money supply not seen before. In 1972, M3 grew at a rate equivalent to 27'6 
year-on-year; 4.75%, 7.5%, 4.25% and 5% in each quarter. In the budget of the 
same year, Chancellor Barber indicated that recovery would not be secondary to 
sterling but take priority over it. This led to substantial difficulties in managing 
sterling, which was floated on 23rd June. It seems also. that monetary policy 
played to a Keynesian theme in the sense that unemployment was treated with 
greatest concern with a belief that monetary and fiscal policies could be used to 
induce sustainable changes in the level of output and unemployment. At the same 
time however, the role of monetary aggregates was being scrutinised. 
By mid 1973, unemployment had fallen by almost a quarter of a million from the 
previous year. At the same time, a small current account surplus of the balance of 
payments in 1972, had become a deficit. By the middle of 1973 it seemed to be 
heading towards a large deficit. Inflation was at nine per cent and rising, with the 
number of unfilled vacancies at record level. The official response was a rise in 
the minimum lending rate of 1.5% in July, and a call on special deposits equaling 
1% of eligible liabilities to be made in August. The minimum lending rate was 
again increased to 13% in November, together with an additional 2% call for 
special deposits. During this period an interest ceiling for the first time on 
deposits, further lending guidelines and return of hire purchase term controls were 
introduced. In addition, the Supplementary Special Deposit scheme (the `corset') 
was introduced to limit the quantitative growth of deposits. All of these measures, 
contributed to a general movement away from Competition and Credit Control. 
Under the SSD scheme, target rates of growth for bank interest bearing liabilities 
were set by the Bank of England, with growth rates exceeding target, subject to 
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progressive taxation in the sense that banks were made to make non-interest 
bearing SSDs with the Bank of England. The SSD operated for five periods 
between December 1973 and June 1980, with varying targets and penalties. The 
move away from Competition and Credit Control towards direct control monetary 
policy in the second half of 1973, might have several explanations. A sluggish or 
ineffective interest rate, or perhaps a hesitancy on the part of the authorities. 
Gowland (1982) suggests it was a case of "willing the end but fearing the means" 
and that circumstances relating to problems in the energy and industrial sectors 
pushed the government to pressure the Bank of England against interest rate 
increases. This view seems to be supported by Goodhart (1989) who also adds 
that liability management and the resulting need to create relative interest rate 
changes were also problems. Interestingly, the Corset and interest rate ceilings on 
deposits, were aimed at limiting rises in deposit interest rates while other rates of 
interest continued to rise. This had the effect of allowing the authorities some 
influence over key variables. M3 grew to 25% in 1972 and to 27% in the year 
after. The Corset acted to reduce this sharply to 6% by 1975, by which time the 
first oil price shock had induced an annual rate of inflation of 24%. 
A departure from Keynesian monetary policy was indicated by Prime Minister 
Callaghan in 1976, amidst sterling weakening ever more and expectations of 
public spending cuts. The Labour government posited that spending a path out of 
recession was not possible, and that this tactic was only temporary and followed 
by higher prices. Shortly afterwards, fiscal policy and monetary targets were 
abandoned. Though inflation was beginning to stabilise in 1976, a bigger concern 
was a ten billion pound PSBR, equating to almost 10% of GDP. Bet\\ een 
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February 1975 and September 1976, a thirty per cent depreciation in sterling 
resulted from constant speculation about cuts in public spending and a 
misunderstood exchange rate policy. By the end of the year. the government had 
to support sterling by negotiating an IMF loan of $4 billion over two years. which 
required substantial public spending cuts and revenue increases until 1978, as well 
as a limit on domestic credit expansion (DCE), the counterpart to sterling X13, to a 
target range of 9%-13%. 
From 1979 to 1985 economic policy was concerned primarily with monetary 
aggregate growth. This was followed by the exchange rate from 1985 to 1989 and 
by credit growth rates, the exchange rate and asset prices since 1989. Within 
these sub-periods, four themes can be identified. First, a preference for the rate of 
interest as monetary policy instrument over a secondary importance for fiscal 
policy. In effect, this makes the official interest rate the main instrument of 
macroeconomic policy in general. Towards the end of the 1980s, this method was 
being criticised as a `one-club approach'. Second, a stable monetary climate as 
the main objective of macroeconomic policy. Since monetary and fiscal policies 
could not have real effects in the long run, control over inflation was a priority. 
Though the Phillips curve might have been interpreted as vertical in the short-run, 
as between 1979 and 1982 for example, it was undoubtedly vertical in the ling- 
run. Third, a concern over exchange rates. The behaviour of exchange rates 
continued to be a key concern in deciding upon the level of interest rates, even 
during the `high-water mark of national monetarism' -a reference to the 1979-82 
period by Goodhart (1989). For example, in October 1981 a weak pound resulted 
in an increase in official interest rates from 13% to 15%. According to Goodhart 
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(1989), "It was no accident that the main occasions from 1981 through to 1986 on 
which interest rates were jerked upwards. . . all coincided with periods of pound 
weakness on the forex market". Fourth, the limitations of interest rates. These 
relate in particular to high interest rates being politically acceptable. and 
increasing levels of consumer debt as a result of government preferences for 
owner-occupiers. 
The Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) announced in the 1980 Budget, set 
reductions for growth rates of sterling M3, and for a declining proportion of GDP 
taken by the PSBR. A monetary growth target of 7%-11 % was ambitious given 
inflation at 21% and interest rates in November at 17%. Negative real interest 
rates lead to concerns over the ability of interest rates to control monetary growth 
and also over the relationship between monetary growth and nominal income. 
Targets were intrinsically linked to information availability. Pre-announced 
targets brought credibility for the authorities, providing greater financial stability 
and opportunities for planning in the private sector. Targets also signaled 
potential bankruptcy and unemployment in response to excessive price and wage 
rises, thus doing away with a steep and costly learning curve. In addition, pre- 
announced target growth rates for the years ahead restrained any political motives 
for deviating away from a counter inflationary position. 
The rate of unemployment saw a substantial increase in 1980 from 1.3 million to 
2.2 million, largely on the back of interest rates and the UK being a major oil 
producer pushing nominal and real exchange rates to new highs, which in turn 
induced further deflationary pressure. Though inflationary pressures began to 
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ease towards the end of the year and interest rates fell to 14%. the 1981 Budget 
was distinctly deflationary with inflation falling further, even though sharp 
monetary growth of 14.5% was stimulated by a Civil Servant's strike. Concerns 
over the exchange rate reversed the trend in interest rates late in the year. with 
rates falling even further during 1982. A strong preference for monetary targets 
and removal of direct credit controls as a result of the breakdown in Competition 
and Credit Control, lead to a major rethink of monetary policy, resulting in a 
departure from control of the monetary base. The new direction was a revised 
approach to Competition and Credit Control aimed predominantly at ensuring 
greater interest rate effectiveness compared to previous years. The process began 
with identification of institutions to whom the new measures would apply, which 
the Banking Act of 1987 referred to as the banking sector. This included all 
financial institutions recognised as banks in the Banking Act of 1979, as Nvell as 
`licensed deposit takers', TSBs, National Girobank and the Banking Department 
of the Bank of England. This resulted in the elimination of a previous two-tier 
structure under Competition and Credit Control. 
This arrangement resulted in 0.5% of banking sector eligible liabilities held as 
non-operational deposits at the Bank of England. In the wholesale markets too, 
the Bank of England increased influence over official interest rates by increasing 
the number of banking sector institutions' securities subject to discount. A 
minimum of 4% and an average of 6% of eligible liabilities were secured as call 
money, so that the Bank of England had the necessary supply of bills for open 
market operations. This allowed it to provide liquidity and thereby set 
interest 
rates. In addition, the Bank of England was able to influence a larger number of 
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banking sector assets through changes in official interest rates. A public 
announcement of the minimum lending rate was not generally adopted, though 
retained if the authorities were to judge a statement was warranted. Bank of 
England interest rates thus operated unannounced. with call deposits still 
available. The intention behind unpublished official interest rates was similar to 
that under Competition and Credit Control, whereby the authorities aimed to for a 
policy which reflected monetary economics rather than monetary politics. In the 
absence of publicly announced official interest rates, the banking sector was able 
to deposit bills at the Bank of England with discretion, though the Bank of 
England also reserved the right to reject these depending on the discount rate 
involved. A perception of market oriented interest rates was further promoted 
with a Bank of England move towards dealing in bills maturing within two weeks, 
allowing long-term interest rates to be determined by the market. The Bank also 
sought to curb monetary expansion through the purchase of bills at higher rates of 
discount than before and the rejection of banking sector bills to generate a 
shortage of liquidity. This prompted changes in the discount rates of the banking 
sector which the Bank then accepted. 
The velocity of sterling M3 and an official preference for monetary targets began 
to decline in 1982, resulting in an expansion of the number of indicators used. 
together with a public commitment to broad money targeting. Between 1982 and 
1985, deflationary policy was evident from employment, output, inflation and 
asset prices, together with two further monetary aggregates; narrow MI money 
and the broader PSL2. Bank lending on the other hand, continued growing at 
almost 20% per annum, with bank deposits set to grow similarly unless restrained. 
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Part of this growth came from the entry of many banks into the mortgage market. 
Though demand for bank loans seemed interest inelastic, demand for mortgages 
seemed especially interest inelastic, with property having been a safe hedge 
against the inflation rises of the 1970s, and with house prices rising quickly again 
at the beginning of the 1980s. With official interest rates above 10% by 1982, the 
official preference to avoid interest rate measures to control the housing market 
was partly political, since a general election was approaching. and so an 
`overfunding' of the PSBR through government stock issuance was adopted. This 
measure was of some use in reconciling the growth of private sector borrowing 
and low monetary targets, but resulted in regular liquidity shortages in the banking 
sector. The Bank responded by purchasing treasury bills from the bank 
institutions, followed by further large purchases of commercial bills. In this way', 
the Bank lent short to the private sector, funded through the sale of gilts. A 
common criticism of this approach was the fact that private corporations were able 
to borrow from wholesale markets themselves and independently of such Bank 
actions, which ended in 1985 amidst concerns over relative yield distortions and 
values of money stock targets.. Thus by the mid-1980s, an accurate targeting of 
broad money through interest rates was ineffective, while a sharp fall in money 
velocity undermined the rationale for monetary targeting. The Bank of England 
responded to this by abolishing formal monetary targets from 1986. 
In 1985, concerns over declining velocity and equilibrium in the foreign exchange 
markets, contributed to a move in monetary policy from monetary aggregate to 
exchange rate targets. On the international scene, the US dollar misalignment of 
1984/5 caused monetary policy in several countries to focus on exchange rate 
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stability. In the UK, Prime Minister Thatcher's opposition to British entry into the 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (E`MS) 
against Chancellor Lawson's wishes, meant UK monetary policy could not 
formally be aligned with exchange rate movements. By the autumn of 1985 
however, official UK interest rates were determined almost exclusively by the 
pound to Deutschemark exchange rate. In addition, 'guidelines' for MO growth 
were published in the UK, not in preparation for a move towards monetary base 
control, but rather because of the stable (relative to other aggregates) relationship 
with nominal GDP and the intended role as indicator of nominal GDP changes. 
During 1987, an exchange rate target was in operation though unofficially, with 
the pound operating against the Deutschemark within a narrow band consisting of 
an upper limit of 3.00 Deutschemarks. During this period, circumstances «ere 
conducive for interest rate cuts rather than rises, such as after the stock market 
crash of October, but further increases in banking and non-banking sector credit, a 
balance of payments deficit and higher house prices pointed to a return of 
inflationary pressure. Under the existing exchange rate policy, the interest 
differential between the pound and the Deutschemark resulted in increased capital 
inflows, to which the authorities responded by intervention and increases in broad 
money. In the second quarter of 1988, the response was an increase in official 
interest rates, and towards the end of the year exchange markets had caught up 
with the weakening UK position. Official interest rates had reached 13% in 
December as sterling weakened, followed by another peak to 15% in October 
1989. Rising levels of unemployment and indications of a recession in late 1990 
provided an opportunity for interest rate reductions, particularly since a `general 
election was close. During this period, mortgage repossessions. 
bad debt threats 
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to bank and building society solvencies as well as official statistics on output and 
employment, pointed to recession. Sterling however continued to suffer. as the 
authorities sought to maintain the pound at DM2.95. A slow improvement in the 
current account of the balance of payments and high wage settlements reflecting 
changes in a retail price index boosted by interest rate rises, caused problems for 
the exchange rate. In October 1990, the UK entered the ERM with a rate of 
DM2.95 in the 6% band. The authorities hoped to convince the foreign exchange 
markets of their long-term commitment to reducing inflation, strengthening the 
pound and reducing official interest rates. 
The primary rationale for UK entry into the ERM seems to have been a desire for 
credibility over inflation control, by aligning with the financial authority held by, 
Germany. Initially this seemed to be successful, with official interest rates 
reduced in a series of cuts through 1991, reaching 10.5% in September. and 
sterling only deviating slightly from DM2.95 to DM2.89. Between September 
1990 and 1991, the headline rate of inflation fell from 10.9% to 4%, contributing 
adversely to the problems for sterling in the ERM during 1992. In the same year, 
inflation rose to 4%, official interest rates to 10%, ex post real rates to 7% and 
sterling to DM: 2.85, posing further credibility questions. The situation was 
exacerbated by a series of falls in non-oil output to almost 5% below the peak of 
1990, including falls in service as well as manufacturing output. Unemployment 
increased from 5.6% in early 1990 to 10.1% in late 1992, affecting in particular 
London and the South East where the greatest incidence of debt accumulation had 
taken place during the housing market rises of the 1980s. In the second half of the 
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year, falling house prices gave rise to `negative equity' which threatened 
repossession for home owners and insolvency for banks and building societies. 
By the summer, the UK and other European authorities were faced with higher 
interest rates or an abandoning of the exchange rate. Possible realignments within 
or exits from, the ERM rested on German interest rate reductions but the 
Bundesbank, concerned with sharp monetary growth, domestic inflationary 
pressure and costs of reunification, responded independently of UK and other 
European concerns. This simply furthered its credibility. In September 1992 
ERM robustness was undermined with doubts over the Maastricht Treaty. An 
already weak pound was sold aggressively, and the Bank of England raised 
official interest rates from 10% to 12% on September 16th, with a statement that 
the MLR was to rise to 15% the day after. These measures however, did not 
prove successful and a UK exit from the ERM was announced. Shortly 
afterwards, official interest rates were reduced in the beginning of a series of cuts 
that continued until 1993, but financing of the PSBR remained a problem in the 
1990s as it had in the previous two decades. Part of this related to the possibility 
that bad debt residual financing may induce an overshoot of monetary growth 
targets. 
The UK convention of issuing governments bonds at a fixed price, with unsold 
stock bought and reintroduced into the wholesale market by the Bank of England 
`tap' ensured new issues did not adversely affect existing prices, but with sales 
volume acting as an equilibrating residual. Under a theme of monetary control in 
the 1970s, a tender system similar to the one already in operation for treasury bill 
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sales was considered where the volume of stock would be guaranteed with price 
becoming the residual. It was generally considered that price fluctuations would 
make long-term debt unattractive, or that tight control over monetary aggregates 
would ensure lower and less volatile inflation, interest rates and therefore long-run 
debt price stability. In March 1979, the Bank of England adopted a -partial- 
tender' system in which bid issues were subject to a minimum price. With bids 
ranked in descending order by price, the number of bids clearing the issue were 
those accepted. The `strike price' was then the price to be paid of the minimum 
bid accepted, with insufficient bids which do not clear the stock, released through 
the tap system. In 1987, this system incorporated gilt auctions, where a bid rather 
than strike price is paid, with there being no minimum price. The sale of such 
stock is limited however to small issues of new stock, with short dates to maturity 
and moderate price variations. The increased preference for monetary aggregates 
and sales of debt to the private sector led to the introduction of new types of stock. 
Conventionally, this had consisted of government bonds issued with fixed 
maturity dates and coupons, but from 1982 included short-dated stock with low 
coupons and substantially discounted relative to redemption value. This allowed 
for tax free capital gain on redemption for investors. Index linked gilts had also 
been introduced in 1981, but restricted to institutional investors only before being 
opened to the wider market in the following year. 
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MONETARY POLICY WITH ENDOGENOUS MONEY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the operation of monetary policy in a framework where 
credit money is endogenously created by the banking system. Under an 
exogenous money framework, the supply of money is indirectly controlled by the 
government through the Central Bank. During the 1980s, this was the thrust of 
UK monetary policy, under which the Bank of England targeted the rate of growth 
of the money stock. As chapter two shows, exogenous monetary policy 
experienced a breakdown in this period both in theory and practice. This resulted 
in a shift of monetary policy towards the targeting of a government determined 
inflation rate with a Bank of England interest rate employed as the primary 
instrument of policy. ' In this new framework, the supply of money is determined 
by the demand for money balances and the supply of bank loans. This chapter 
considers the role of monetary policy in controlling inflation from an endogenous 
money perspective. 
Endogenous money created by the banking system is important from a Keynesian 
standpoint, in that money is regarded as bank money rather than a stock which can 
be controlled exogenously. In addition, endogenous money closely reflects a 
current UK monetary policy stance of inflation targeting with an official interest 
rate as the policy instrument. In this approach the causal relationship between the 
This is currently the repo rate at which the Bank of England supplies reserves to wholesale markets. 
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money stock and price is the opposite of that under exogenous money. and the 
causal relationship between investment and savings implies that loan supply 
increases investment, resulting in a corresponding increase in savings and bank 
deposits. 
The "new consensus" and the Keynesian bank money approach represent two 
schools of thought where money is endogenous. As with many economic 
theories, there exist differences both within and between these two approaches but 
the main one is the endogeneity of money. In the "new consensus" money is 
endogenously created, the stock of money is a "residual" based on the demand for 
money, the money stock does not share a causal relationship with inflation and the 
rate of interest is Bank rather than market determined. In the Keynesian approach, 
money is determined by the banking sector in the sense that the Central Bank sets 
the discount rate and supplies reserves to commercial banks. Loans are then made 
available by commercial banks at rates of interest representing a mark-up over the 
discount rate. This mark-up is determined by a series of factors such as bank 
market power, liquidity preference and risk assessment. 
2 In contrast to the "new 
consensus", the Keynesian approach emphasises the process of loan and 
deposit 
creation and removal, and also causal relationships between investment spending 
and loan creation, and inflation and money creation. In addition, monetary policy 
is interest rate oriented in both schools of thought, but with substantial differences 
in interpretation between them. The rest of this chapter is presented as follows. 
The next section considers the "new consensus" model. 
interest rate monetary policy and the exchange rate. 
2 See Dueker and Thornton (1997) for a discussion of bank mark-ups. 
Section three looks at 
Section four presents 
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monetary policy from a Keynesian endogenous money, perspective. This is 
followed in section five by the effectiveness of monetary policy in a Keynesian 
set-up. Section six discusses monetary policy in a Keynesian endogenous money 
framework. Section seven concludes this chapter with a summary. 
3.2 THE "NEW CONSENSUS" 
In Meyer (2001), the "new consensus" macroeconomic model is presented as 
follows: 3 
Yt a0 + a1Y1-1 + a2Et (Yr+i) - a3 [Re - Er (pt+i)] + si (1) 
Pt = P1Yt + ß2P -i + 
ß3Er (pr+i) + S2 (? ) 
ri = R* + Er (pt+1) + IiYt-I + 72 (Pt-1 -P) (3) 
where yt represents the output gap at time period t, R the nominal rate of interest, 
pr the rate of inflation, pT the target rate of inflation, R* the "equilibrium" real rate 
of interest when the output gap is zero and a constant rate of inflation, s; (with i= 
1,2) and Et expectations. Equation (1) is an aggregate demand representation in 
which the output gap is a function of past and expected future output gap and the 
real rate of interest. Equation (2) is a Phillips (1958) curve in which inflation is a 
function of current output gap and past and future inflation, and where (b2+b3=1). 
Equation (3) is a Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function with sluggish 
adjustment, in which the nominal rate of interest is a function of expected 
inflation, output gap, the deviation of inflation from trend, and the "equilibrium" 
3 McCallum (2001) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) are similar, alternative examples. 
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real rate of interest. 4 Equation (3) has been variously modelled with a lagged 
interest rate term which represents interest rate smoothing by the Central Bank. ' 
The importance of equation (3) is that it represents an endogenously determined 
official interest rate in line with Taylor (1993), where interest rates are 
implemented in a closed economy without consideration of exchange rates or 
international interest rates. In addition, the official interest rate responds to 
changes in the output gap and to subsequent changes in the rate of inflation. 
Equation (2) illustrates constant inflation when the output gap is zero. In equation 
(3), the nominal interest rate represents a real interest rate equal to the 
"equilibrium" real rate of interest, consistent with zero output gap and constant 
inflation. In equation (1) the value of the real "equilibrium" rate of interest needs 
to be a0 / a3. If an accurate estimate of R* is available, a zero output gap and a 
constant rate of inflation equal to target can be achieved, in which case the level of 
aggregate demand in equation (1) is consistent with a zero output gap. In a private 
sector economy, R* implies equality between ex ante savings and investment, 
with the equilibrium interest rate akin to a Wicksellian "natural rate" of interest. 
6 
The model outlined above is based on the following assumptions. The money 
stock is not a model parameter, though its residual nature can be reflected by 
including an equation which relates the stock of money to output, interest rate and 
4 According to Fair (2001), the coefficient on inflation must be greater than unity for equation (3) to be 
stable. 
5 An example is McCallum (2001). The system of equations is not rigid; in Arestis and Sawyer 
(2003a) for example, interest rate smoothing is omitted since it does not affect the results of their 
analysis. Similarly lagged output is omitted in equation (1), since the emphasis is on expected 
future 
output gap. Also, in Arestis and Sawyer (2002b), it is shown that a fourth equation reflecting the stock 
of money as a function of income, price and the rate of interest, though indicative of the endogenous 
money approach where the money stock is demand driven, is not required because the money stock 
is a 
residual with no feedback effect on model parameters. 
6 Wicksell (1965: 102) defines this natural rate as "the rate of interest which would be determined by 
supply and demand if no use were made of money and all lending were effected 
in the form of real 
capital goods. " 
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inflation. This raises the question of how to address money in terms of the money 
stock having an effect on economic activity. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) 
consider reinstating money in terms of three assumptions. These include the idea 
that money is one of many assets in wholesale markets, that money has wealth 
effects and that money involves credit frictions. Monetary policy and the official 
interest rate are assumed to respond systematically to changes in economic 
activity and not to exogenous shocks. That said, the inflation targeting process is 
symmetric, in that above (below) target inflation induces interest rate rises (falls). 
A lagged price level in the Phillips-curve implying sticky prices, and long-run 
flexibility of prices, mean the model contains both lagged adjustment and 
forward-looking terms. 
Money is neutral in that equilibrium values of real variables are independent of 
the money supply, and inflation is determined by monetary policy where the 
instrument is the official interest rate. This outcome is to be expected since the 
money stock is not a model parameter, though if it had been a fourth equation 
representing money demand, money would still be treated as neutral. The effects 
of changes in the policy instrument are transmitted to aggregate demand in 
equation (1) and from aggregate demand to inflation in equation (2). 
In the long-run, inflation is constant and expectations are met. Here, the real rate 
of interest in equation (1) is derived as R-p= a0/a3. Similarly, equation is 
derived as R -p = R* + C2(pt_1 - pT). Therefore unless R* = ao/a3, then R* = ao/a3 
+ C2(pt_1 - p) and the long-run rate of inflation will deviate from the target rate of 
inflation. R* is the "natural rate" of interest after Wicksell (1965). corresponding 
5ý 
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to inflation and a zero output gap. In the model outline above, the inflation 
targeting process operates through equation (1), where interest rates which are 
determined by the monetary policy rule in equation (3) impact aggregate demand. 
Changes in aggregate demand then affect inflation through equation (2). The 
strength, timing and predictability of interest rates changes on aggregate demand 
are important considerations. Interest rate rises (falls) will tend to reduce 
(increase) aggregate demand, with an assumption that lower (increased) aggregate 
demand will reduce (increase) the rate of inflation. The effect of interest rates as 
firm costs which translate into higher consumer prices is not considered. In 
addition, monetary policy operates through a single interest rate and the 
transmission of short-term nominal interest rates to long-term interest is an 
important question. Furthermore, and as Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker 
(2002: 9) notes, this "new" approach to monetary policy since the 1980s, "relies 
upon direct influence on the short-term interest rate and a much more fluid market 
situation that allows policy to be transmitted through the markets by some 
mysterious or maybe not so mysterious process. " 
The fact that the stock of money does not appear in the model above is not to 
suggest that every monetarist proposition is to be rejected. Instead, it implies a 
rejection of a possible causal relationship between the money stock and the rate of 
inflation. The model does however, contain two key propositions in that monetary 
policy influences inflation to the extent that inflation converges towards a target, 
and also that monetary policy does not influence the level and rate of growth of 
potential output. As Meyer (2001: 3) notes with regard to 
inflation being 
controlled by the Central Bank one can, 
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"clearly see the influence of monetarism in the consensus model. Monetarism focused attention on the role of the central bank in determining inflation by emphasising the relation between money and inflation. The consensus model may bypass money, but it has retained the key conclusion that central banks may ultimately determine the inflation 
rate. " 
Meyer (2001) seeks to reinstate money into the "new consensus" model since it is 
based on the relation between money, output and inflation. The proposal is a 
fourth LM equation to supplement equations (1) to (3) above, together with the 
stock of money as the fourth variable: 7 
Mi=do+diR, +d2Yt+d3E, (pr+, )+S3 (4) 
Where M represents the money stock and s3 represents random shocks. Meyer 
(2001: 3) does however concede, that the addition of this fourth equation is not 
satisfactory since the "LM curve ... 
is not part of the simultaneous structure of the 
expanded model. " Rather, this set up solves for a money stock consistent with 
output, price and interest rate values which are simultaneously determined by the 
solutions of equations (1) to (3). The LM parameter therefore simply proxies the 
Central Bank money stock required under the existing monetary policy rule and 
economic shocks. In this case, Meyer (2001: 4) notes that "money supply has 
become a less interesting, minor endogenous variable in the story. " It might be 
said that concern over the stock of money provides grounds for monetary policy 
aimed at controlling sustained levels of inflation, but the empirical literature does 
not seem to offer any evidence as to whether this should include the role of money 
as a causal factor. Meyer (2001: 4) however argues that money can be reinstated 
Money here is defined as the money stock rather than the money supply, since it is determined by the 
demand for money; the context of this analysis. 
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in the model outline above on the grounds that if the money demand equation is 
stable, there will be a stable relationship between money and inflation in the long 
run. " Thus subject to a stable demand for money, the new "consensus" implies a 
long-run relationship between money and prices. As a result, Meyer (2001: 14) 
notes that, 
"monitoring money growth has value, even for central banks that follow a 
disciplined strategy of adjusting their policy rate to ongoing economic 
developments. The value may be particularly important at the extremes: 
during periods of very high inflation, as in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
in the United States, and when the policy rate is driven to zero in 
deflationary episodes, as in the case of Japan today. " 
However, there is no indication in the Meyer (2001) analysis of the value of 
monitoring monetary growth. The amount of money in circulation is determined 
by money demand, which in turn depends on past and contemporaneous values of 
prices, incomes and so forth. It appears therefore, that the stock of money is not 
significant unless money demand is a function of expected future price and 
income levels. If this is so, the money stock may contain information reflecting 
such expectations. 
If output, price and interest rates are stable in the demand for money equation, 
then growth of the money stock will move closely with the rate of inflation. This 
is because of the movement of money demand over time. However the demand 
for money equation also implies that changes in the money stock move , vith 
changes in price, either simultaneously or with a time lag. However, if expected 
price changes were of relevance to money demand then it is possible that actual 
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price changes lag behind money demand. The money stock is also a lead 
indicator of nominal expenditure, when loans are used to finance nominal 
expenditure and when increased loan supply increases bank deposits and the 
money stock. 
In McCallum (2001: 146), equation (4) is added to equations (1) and (3) but is 
insignificant since output gap, price and inflation rate do not respond to changes in 
the money stock. Instead, it simply reflects the volume of money required to 
implement the monetary policy rule in equation (3), with no requirement for 
equation (4) as a determinant of output gap, price and inflation. In McCallum 
(2001: 146) however, it is argued that equations (1) to (3) should be interpreted 
with the inclusion of a monetary aggregate because "the central bank's control 
over the one-period nominal interest rate ultimately stems from its ability to 
control the quantity of base money in existence. " This can be seen in equations 
(1) to (3) where yt = 0, c3 =0 and there is assumed to be no interest rate 
smoothing. From equation (1) this gives [R1 - Et(pt+l)] = a0/a3 and from equation 
(3) this gives: 
a0/a3=re +c2(pt-p T) (5) 
where re is the official equilibrium real rate of interest. If this is set at ao / a3, then 
actual inflation is equal to target, pT, with the rate of inflation determined by the 
Central Bank. Also, the Phillips curve is not relevant, with inflation a monetary, 
policy phenomenon rather than a non-monetary policy Phillips, or quantity of 
money stock phenomenon. This approach reflects conventional monetary policy 
in that official interest rates influence the rate of inflation via their influence on 
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the level of aggregate demand. Alternatively, fiscal policy could also be used in 
the same way, in which case monetary policy in equation (3) would be replaced 
by a fiscal policy parameter which is adjusted in response to deviations of 
inflation from target and of output from trend level. In this case, inflation 
becomes a fiscal policy phenomenon. 
In McCallum (2001) then, a four-equation system includes money in equation (1). 
a fourth money demand equation and some further modifications. These include 
government spending less expected government spending in equation (1). but 
exclude interest rate smoothing in equation (3) since c3 = 0. Overall, the system 
can be presented as follows: 
Yt = ao + ai(Yt-1) + a2E(Yt+1) - a3[Rt - 
Et(pt+l)] + a4[mt - 
(6) 
Et(mt+l)] + Si 
pt = bly, + b2(pr-1) + b3Et(pr+i) + S2 (7) 
Rt=re+Et(pt+i)+c1Yt-i+c2(1pT)+c3Rt-i (8) 
Mt mo - m] pt + m2yt + s3 (9) 
where m is the logarithm of the real value of the money stock, M, p is the 
logarithm of R, y is the logarithm of actual output, and c3 #0 represents interest 
rate smoothing. Equation (9) is an optimising identity, in the sense that the 
elasticity in terms of p is constant, with elasticity unity in terms of spending which 
proxies the output gap. The next question is to determine whether the [m, - 
Et(mt, l )] term in equation (6) represents the information set of an otherwise 
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omitted variable that would bias model results, since money balances impact 
transaction costs. Unanticipated increases (decreases) in money balances lower 
(increase) transaction costs, thus influencing expenditure. As a result, the sign of 
the coefficient on a4 will positive. Transaction costs as in McCallum (2001) are 
but one theoretical justification for the inclusion of the [m1 - E, (m, +1 )] term in 
equation (6). In Leahy (2001: 161-162), further possibilities include non- 
separable utility, utility constraints, cash-in-advance constraints, good and asset 
market segmentation and lending. McCallum (2001: 149-150) uses calibration 
analysis to show that "although it is theoretically incorrect to specify a model 
without money, the magnitude of the error thereby introduced is extremely small. " 
This observation is similar to that of Ireland (2001), in which a3 type parameter 
estimates are shown to have statistically insignificant coefficients. These findings 
seem to suggest that the [m, - E, (mt+l)] term is not empirically or theoretically 
robust when modelling aggregate expenditure, a point noted by King (2002). 
Overall, McCallum (2001: 157) argues that "policy analysis models without 
money, based on interest rate policy rules, is not fundamentally misguided. " 
However, such policy rules are not "preferable to ones based on a controllable 
monetary aggregate, such as total reserves or the monetary base. " 
An alternative view is that of Laidler (1999) in which endogenous money is 
distinguished from exogenous money, with endogenous money then further split 
into passive and active roles. In this analysis, passive money is consistent with 
equations (1) to (3) above, with the money stock a residual which does not 
determine output or inflation, and interest rates are the instrument of policy. 
Laidler (1999: 10) argues that the quantity of money is an endogenous variable in 
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the economic system, but it clearly plays an active role in the transmission 
mechanism. " However, it is uncertain what this process involves. As Laidler 
(1999: 11) acknowledges, "there seems virtually no limit to the possibilities. a 
sure sign of some deficiency in our theoretical understanding of the matters under 
discussion. " Hendry (1995) offers empirical evidence suggesting this approach to 
money is deficient, with Laidler (1999: 14) acknowledging a "non-trivial passive 
element to money's role in that mechanism. " 
Another approach is that of Bernanke and Gertler (1999: 87) based on the link 
between asset prices and real economic activity. This focuses on credit market 
frictions and operates through the balance sheet channel on the back of two 
assumptions. The first emphasises the importance of capital to assets and debt to 
assets ratios. Second, that credit markets exhibit friction in the form of "problems 
of information, incentives, and enforcement in credit relationships. " A key 
outcome of this approach is that borrowers with strong financial credentials are 
able to access credit more easily and at a lower cost than those who are not 
financial sound. Frictions in credit markets also imply that cash flow and balance 
sheet positions determine the ability of individuals to borrow and lend. In 
response to these frictions, borrowers supply collateral which results in external 
finance being more expensive to obtain than internal finance, when collateral is 
not available for the former. This phenomenon is the basis of an "external finance 
premium" which represents the difference between the cost of external borrowing 
and the opportunity cost of internal firm funds. This premium determines the cost 
of capital and thereby investment and aggregate demand. Bernanke et al. (1999: 
4) note that In short. when credit markets are characterised by asymmetric 
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information and agency problems, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem no 
longer applies. " 
3.2.1 Monetary Policy 
In the "new consensus" then, equation (2) represents monetary policy with an 
interest rate instrument to control demand inflation rather than cost inflation. 
Gordon (1997: 17) comments in a non "new consensus" but equally relevant 
context that, 
"in the long run inflation is always and everywhere an excess nominal 
GDP phenomenon. Supply shocks will come and go. What remains to 
sustain long-run inflation is steady growth of nominal GDP in excess of 
the growth of natural or potential real output. " 
Cost inflation is thus accommodated or unaffected by supply shocks that are on 
average zero. 8 In the "new consensus" inflation is controlled using interest rates 
to deflate demand, together with a "natural rate" of interest which achieves 
equilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. In addition, this 
results in a zero gap between actual and capacity output. 
In operational terms demand-led inflation poses three questions for monetary 
policy, and these are identified and answered by Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 4). 
First, the degree to which it is effective in influencing aggregate demand and thus 
inflation. The authors present evidence to suggest it is ineffective. Second, 
inflation being a "demand phenomenon" in the Phillips curve of equation (2) 
means monetary policy is again ineffective in influencing aggregate demand, with 
8 As indicated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). 
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fiscal policy suggested as an alternative instrument of monetary policy. Third. it 
is argued that potential, sustained, cost-push, and other non-demand led inflation 
is treated very lightly in the "new consensus". This is because the Phillips curve 
in equation (2) is in reduced form, without giving explicit consideration to wages. 
factor input costs, import prices or money wage pressure. The conduct of 
monetary policy under the "new consensus" is also criticised by Blinder (1998: 
20) who argues that it remains "tight for too long, thereby causing recessions, and 
remaining easy for too long, thereby allowing inflation to take root. " In addition, 
"a prominent institutional feature of some central banks (including the 
Federal Reserve) may also contribute to this problem. Specifically, in 
many countries monetary policy is made not by a single individual but by 
a committee.... who laboriously aggregate individual preferences; that 
they need to be led; that they tend to adopt compromise positions on 
different questions; and - perhaps because of all of the above - that they 
tend to be inertial. " 
Also, "decision-making by committee may contribute to ... systematic policy 
errors ... 
by inducing the central bank to maintain its policy stance too long. ' In 
terms of the degree to which the "new consensus" monetary policy as presently 
implemented has helped to reduce and control inflation, Arestis and Sawyer 
(2003a: 5) argue that the argument in principle seems correct and inflation has 
indeed become stable, but the notion that this is entirely because of monetary 
policy, is "both theoretically weak and empirically unfounded. " 
There exists empirical evidence that endogenous money leaves little room for 
monetary policy in terms of inflation. 
9 For example, Bank of England (2000: 16- 
9 Including Angeloni et al. (2002) and Van Els et al. (2001). 
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17) estimates for the UK involving simulations of Taylor-type rules in which the 
coefficient on inflation-from-target are successively increased from 0.5 to 1.0 to 
1.5, representing aggressive monetary policy responses, are summarised as 
follows: 
"The maximum effect of the temporary interest rate increase on real 
activity occurs after about one year, and the maximum effect on inflation 
occurs after about two years. For the benchmark simulation, where the 
Taylor rule with a weight of 0.5 on the deviation of inflation from target is 
adopted, the level of GDP falls by about 0.3 per cent at the end of the first 
year, recovering to base after three years. Inflation remains broadly 
unchanged during the first year, reflecting the degree of nominal inertia in 
the economy, but by the beginning of the third year has fallen by just over 
0.3 percentage points. Thereafter, it returns slowly to base. " 
Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 5) argue the global decline in inflation has been due to 
falling commodity prices over the last twenty years, in countries which target 
inflation but also in countries that do not. In Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) 
and Barro (1986) it is argued that inflation targeting depends largely on 
"reputation. " In Kydland and Prescott (1977) it is based on an inherent inflation 
bias in discretionary monetary policy. However, these views are countered by 
Blinder (1998: 40) who argues that, 
"In fact, the history of much of the industrial world since roughly 1980 
has been one of disinflation - sometimes sharp disinflation, and 
sometimes at high social cost. Furthermore, the monetary authorities of 
many countries, especially in Europe, have displayed a willingness to 
maintain their tough anti-inflation stances to this very day, despite low 
inflation and persistently high unemployment. Whether or not you 
applaud these policies, they hardly look like grabbing for short-term 
employment gains at the expense of inflation. " 
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Incidentally, Campillo and Miron (1997) and also Posen (1993), suggest that there 
exists a weak negative correlation between central bank independence and actual 
inflation. These studies are based on large samples that include developing 
countries, with no causal relationship between the two. Fuhrer (1997: 34) notes 
that "the only significant correlations developed in the specifications examined 
here suggests a negative correlation between CBI and real growth, and a positive 
correlation between CBI and unemployment. " 
3.2.2 Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy 
In the simple three-equation model presented above, monetary policy affects the 
real economy through the real interest rate in equation (1). In the "new 
consensus" however, monetary policy transmission occurs through many different 
channels. At least six of these channels are identified by Arestis and Sawyer 
(2003a: 5). Financial market imperfections affect the real economy through the 
interaction of borrowers and lenders under an assumption of credit market 
frictions, in what Hall (2001) defines as the narrow credit or bank lending 
channel. The emphasis here, is on the role of banks as lenders as explained by 
Roosa (1951) and also Bernanke and Blinder (1988). In Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989,1999) and Bernanke et al. (1999) the financial position of borrowers in the 
broad credit or balance sheet channel, determines the level of aggregate demand 
through the supply of loans. In the interest rate channel and the monetarist 
channel, the ability to substitute between money and other assets is the main 
assumption. Asset price changes are also present in the wealth effect channel 
where consumption is a function of household wealth, and in the exchange rate 
channel, monetary policy operates through import prices and net external demand. 
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Commenting on these channels, Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 6) suggest they ought 
to be considered as more than an elaboration of the effect of the policy instrument 
on the level of aggregate demand. In particular, monetary policy is presented as a 
function of the expectations and actions of numerous agents, resulting in a "loose" 
effect of monetary policy rather than the precise effect implied by equation (1). In 
addition, there is also an implication that monetary policy may affect variables of 
interest in their own right, such as credit availability, investment spending. asset 
prices and the exchange rate. This raises the question of whether, and to what 
extent, monetary policy should take into account these variables in addition to the 
rate inflation. 
3.3 MONETARY POLICY AND AGGREGATE DEMAND 
In equation (1) of the "new consensus" above, the level of aggregate demand is 
assumed to be stable and subject to random and serially uncorrelated shocks. In 
addition, the response of monetary policy to changes in aggregate demand is 
captured in equation (3). Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 6) consider the response of 
monetary policy in this set up to a "significant and sustained" change in the 
level 
of aggregate demand, by examining whether monetary policy can restore 
aggregate demand after a fall in autonomous demand. Their closed economy 
model is presented after Arestis and Sawyer (2003b) as follows: 
Cr = di + d2Yr-i -a [Rr - El (pr+i)] 
(10) 
Ir=d3+d4E(Y, +, )-b[Rr-Er(pr+i)] (11) 
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where equation (10) is a consumption function in which 1' represents output. and 
equation (11) is an investment function. These give: 
Yr=(d1 +d3)+d2 Yr-1 -a [R, -Er(p1+i)] +d4E(YY+1)-b 
( 
[R, -El (pr+i)] 
1') 
Equation (12) is re-written to include the output gap below: 
(Yc-Y*)=(di+d3)+(d2+d4-1)Y*+d2(Yt-1-Y*) 
+ d4 [E(Yr-1) - Y*] - (a + b) [R1- Er (pc+i)] 
(13) 
The "equilibrium" rate of interest for a zero output gap is then: 
[Rr-E1(pr+t)] =(di + d3) / (a + b) + [(d2+ d4- 1)1(a+ 
(14) 
b)] y* 
which implies no particular "natural rate" of interest. The "new consensus" 
approach underpins most empirical analysis of the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. This involves a wider specification, including a greater number of model 
parameters, lags and leads, but with a NAIRU type supply-side equilibrium 
equating to zero output gap and constant inflation. An outcome of the reaction 
function in Taylor (1993), is that monetary policy induces supply-side equilibrium 
with little movement from trend in output, resulting in a limited role for monetary 
policy. In addition, aggregate demand is thought to equate to capacity output 
which is itself akin to constant inflation, through a "feasible equilibrium rate of 
interest. "10 The impact of monetary policy decisions can be illustrated in terms of 
lo The "feasible equilibrium rate of interest" refers to a positive short-term interest rate that is 
compatible with the existing exchange rate. See Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 20: Note 6). 
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shifts in the coefficients of equations (13) and (14). As an example. in order 
offset a reduction in d3 so that demand remains at Y*, would require a change in 
the real rate of interest of -Dd3/(a+b). As illustrated by Arestis and Sawyer 
(2003a: 7), there is unlikely to be a corresponding change in the nominal rate of 
interest for the following reasons. For a fall in investment spending equivalent to 
one percent of GDP, and a percentage change in demand divided by the change in 
interest rates of (a+b) = 0.2, the real rate of interest must change by 5%. 11 In 
Arestis and Sawyer (2002c) it is noted that the ratio of percentage change in 
interest rate to investment is 1 to 3 and below. Since investment expenditure 
accounts for between 15% to 20% of GDP, a one percentage point change in the 
rate of interest leads to a change in GDP of between 0.45% and 0.6% at most. 
Thus a change in aggregate demand of say 2% would require a 6% reduction i ý7 
the rate of interest, indicating that relatively small interest rate changes do little to 
offset the reduction in autonomous demand. 
3.4 MONETARY POLICY AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 
An outcome of monetary policy, especially after the Taylor (1993) rule captured 
in equation (3), is that official interest rates are set in a closed economy. This is at 
odds with the monetary policy of previous UK frameworks such as the fixed 
exchange rate where official interest rates were used to serve sterling. In the 
interest rate parity theorem, the differential between domestic and foreign interest 
rates is equal to the expected rate of change in the exchange rate. This implies 
relatively high (low) domestic interest rates associated , N-ith expectations of a 
'' Investment and interest rate changes are also likely to have multiplier effects such as on the level of 
output. 
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currency depreciation (appreciation). Uncovered interest rate parity is not 
empirically robust, though there may still exist some relationship between 
domestic relative to international interest rates, and changes in the exchange rate. 
As Lavoie (2000: 175) notes, "Despite dozens of studies showing that uncovered 
interest parity is without empirical support, neoclassical authors still rely on it. 
because, they would say, a more attractive relationship has yet to be found. " The 
focus here however is more on the effect of interest rate changes on the exchange 
rate and thereby the effects of monetary policy on the exchange rate, rather than 
the empirical merits of interest rate parity. 
Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 8) offer a number of observations on this issue. First, 
a distinction between the Central Bank discount rate and the rate of return on 
foreign exchange transactions on the capital account. The latter is the expected 
rate of return on financial assets and includes an overall rate of return on equity in 
the form of interest rates on bonds, bank deposits and such like. Second, interest 
rate parity implies a relationship between high domestic interest rates and 
expectations of a currency depreciation, while in fact interest rate rises have often 
been used to lift a currency. This can be explained in terms of overshooting, 
where interest rate rises induce a currency appreciation as investment capital 
flows, before the exchange rate begins to decline against a sustained increase in 
interest rates. Third, two issues concerning the role of official interest rates for the 
purposes of targeting inflation. These are that short-run interest rates may present 
difficulties in prioritising between domestic economic requirements and currency 
requirements. In addition, the appropriate domestic "equilibrium" real rate of 
interest that induces a balance between aggregate demand and constant inflation 
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may differ from overseas interest rates. Thus in terms of interest rate parity. the 
value of the real exchange rate would vary depending on the interest rate 
differential. 
Keynes (1930: 192) cast doubt over the ability of interest rate parity to ensure 
sustained real exchange rate changes in the space of a few years, by arguing that, 
"the dilemma of modern banking is satisfactorily to combine the two 
functions. As a purveyor of representative money, it is the duty of the 
banking system to preserve the prescribed objective standard of money. 
As a purveyor of loans on terms and conditions of a particular type, it is 
the duty of the system to adjust, to the best of its ability, its supply of this 
type of lending to the demand for it at the equilibrium rate of interest, i. e. 
at the natural rate. " 
It appears that exchange rate considerations are important when interest rates are 
the instrument of monetary policy. As Neely and Sarno (2002: 51) indicate, when 
monetary policy operates in terms of money stock growth and flexible exchange 
rates, they are of less importance. "One of the most widely studied and still 
unanswered questions in this literature involves why monetary models of 
exchange rate determination cannot forecast much of the variation in exchange 
rates. " Where the rate of inflation is determined by the rate of money stock 
growth, and purchasing power parity ensures the exchange rate is equal to the 
differential inflation rate, then domestic inflation concerns can be prioritised, since 
the exchange rate is allowed to adjust through purchasing power parity. As a 
result, monetary policy ensures the real domestic exchange rate is unchanged. On 
the other hand, when monetary policy is driven by official interest rates, the real 
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exchange rate can be determined and assumed to have real and long-term effects 
on economic activity. 
3.5 ENDOGENOUS MONEY: A KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE 
In the Keynesian approach to endogenous money, the Central Bank interest rate is 
taken as given and official reserves are supplied to the banking sector at a price 
determined by the Central Bank. The banking sector responds to the demand for 
credit by supplying loans with an interest rate mark-up over the official interest 
rate. 12 This mark-up is also determined by bank liquidity preferences. market 
positions and risk assessments. The creation of bank deposits is ensured through a 
process of loan supply to meet credit demand. As these loans are repaid, money is 
destroyed with the remainder a function of the demand to hold money balances. 
Money is produced in the inflationary process with the rate of inflation 
influencing the rate of money stock growth. Money itself however, does not 
cause inflation. 
In the short-run, market interest rates such as those on loans and deposits, or 
mortgage repayments, are viewed as being determined by a constant Central Bank 
interest rate. Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 9) note that determination of the official 
interest rate in the long-run is also of importance to endogenous money analysis. 
but something largely ignored in the Keynesian endogenous money literature. 
Instead, the emphasis is more on Central Bank discretion and exchange rate 
concerns. This point is supported by Moore (1989: 27) who argues that. 
12 Subject to certain credit requirements being met. 
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"A central bank's key decision variable throughout the business cycle, and 
its central control instrument of monetary policy, is the nominal supply 
price at which it provides additional reserves. Over a wide range the 
central bank can determine exogenously the supply price at which it 
provides liquidity to the financial system. The upper and lower limits of 
this range are set by the size and openness of the economy and by the 
exchange rate regime in force. " 
There exists however, little empirical evidence on the determinants of official 
interest rates. If the policy instrument is set at some "equilibrium rate" where 
savings equal investment at the target rate of output, as in the "new consensus" 
model, above or at target employment, the problem of demand deficiency is made 
redundant. For example, the official interest rate is matched by market interest 
rates on financial products such as loans, deposits, mortgages or bonds. where 
savings and investment are equal, with employment at capacity output and with 
inflation assumed to be constant. In the Keynesian approach to endogenous 
money, the influence of the official interest rate on market interest rates is 
recognised in that it is set and enforced by the Central Bank. However, the 
official interest rate does not share a direct relationship with market interest rates, 
which may in some instances, vary only slightly. This is because other factors 
such as market power, position, liquidity preferences and risk assessments of the 
banking sector may also play an influential role. 
The availability of finance is a prerequisite for the causal relationship between 
investment spending and saving. Investment can be financed ex post with savings 
but not ex ante, and the level of income is assumed to change in line with changes 
in investment spending. This process of savings and income growth being driven 
by investment is based on endogenous bank money under which banks finance 
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investment by supplying loans. The rate of interest on loans however. is a market 
rate and subject to influence by the Central Bank interest rate and the determinants 
of this rate become important in determining the link between savings and 
investment. In theory, the Central Bank could eliminate deficient demand by 
adjusting official interest rates such that the level of savings and investment are 
constantly equal to a supply-side equilibrium such as full employment. 
Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 10) identify four factors that cast doubt on the ability 
of official interest rates to reduce an economy wide equilibrium where demand 
and supply are in balance and inflation on target. First, the "equilibrium" rate of 
interest may be either positive or negative, but still so low that it cannot be 
attained. 13 This is akin to the liquidity trap except that in the liquidity trap, market 
interest rates are low and prices high so as to dissuade bond purchases in case of 
capital loss. Negative interest rates are not considered here since cash balances 
also offer a zero rate of interest. Also, a negative real rate of interest can also be 
given by a0/a3, which amounts to savings and investment not intersecting when 
interest rates are positive. In the aggregate demand relation of equation (1). 
aggregate demand and thus investment, are interest rate sensitive with a3 greater 
than zero, and a significant autonomous demand component is implied by ao 
which would otherwise be non-positive. Thus I(r, Yf) = S(r, Yf), where Yf denotes 
an income level at which the output gap is zero, does not have an economically 
plausible solution. Second, and in addition to this, interest rates may exert only a 
minimal influence on the levels of saving and investment, making monetary 
policy ineffective in balancing the two. This is more so because of a lack of 
13 The analysis assumes a market interest rate in excess of the official interest rate, with investment 
spending a function of the former. Banks are also limited by loan default risk, in the level to which 
they are able to reduce interest rates. 
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consensus in the empirical literature, over the sign of the relationship between 
savings and the rate of interest. Moreover, the literature questions the effect of 
interest rates on investment, positing instead capacity utilisation and profits as 
important. For example, Bernanke et al. (1999: 1344) note that "In the 
investment literature, despite some recent rehabilitation of a role for neoclassical 
cost-of-capital effects ... there remains considerable evidence for the view that 
cash flow, leverage, and other balance-sheet factors also have a major influence 
on spending" and that "contemporary macro econometric forecasting models, such 
as the MPS model used by the Federal Reserve, typically do incorporate factors 
such as borrowing constraints and cash-flow effects. " 
In a third point, it is argued that domestic interest rates may be incompatible with 
international interest rates, or pose difficulties for the current account of the 
balance of payments. In terms of interest rate parity, the domestic to international 
interest rate differential will equal the expected rate of change of the exchange 
rate. The appropriate domestic interest rate required for international capital 
movements might be a market interest rate, set with reference to the Central Bank 
interest rate. Despite a lack of empirical robustness of interest rate parity, there 
may still exist some relationship between domestic relative to international 
interest rates, and changes in the exchange rate. Such effects as discussed earlier, 
are not considered in the Taylor (1993) rule. Fourth, it is difficult to ascertain or 
attain an official "equilibrium rate" of interest because of insufficient information, 
a constantly changing target or competence and credibility issues. In the 
equations outlined earlier, the "equilibrium rate" of interest is a function of a0/a; 
and these parameters are time varying. Also, and assuming the existence of an 
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equilibrium real rate of interest (R*), there still remains the problem of imperfect 
information, which may result in a target real rate other than a0la3. Another 
assumption of equation (3) is the absence of random decision making errors. and 
accurate information on lagged output and inflation. In terms of real economic 
activity, these are unlikely to hold. In addition, the UK experienced shifts in the 
propensity to save during the 1990s, and these, together with changes in 
investment, exports and fiscal policy may well influence shifts in the equivalent of 
a0/a3. Since accurate information on the "equilibrium rate" of interest is not easily 
available, attaining this rate may not be the objective of the authorities. In other 
words, a Taylor-type monetary policy rules may not be adopted for inflation 
and/or zero output gap targeting, but with the interest rate instrument being used 
instead, to target money stock growth or exchange rate targets. 
3.6 MONETARY POLICY IN ENDOGENOUS MONEY 
The Keynesian approach to endogenous money views the macro economy from a 
different standpoint than the "new consensus". In the former, inflation can result 
from several factors such as cost push considerations. These include wages and 
import prices, or income levels and productive capacity. In the latter, inflation is 
the result of excess demand and expected inflation. Also in the Keynesian 
approach, is a view that the macro economy is subject to demand and supply side 
shocks, as well as considerable fluctuations in the level of economic activity over 
the business cycle. Variations in the level of demand are often the result of 
changes in investment spending, which is in turn influenced by accelerator type 
mechanisms, liquidity preference and expectations. The supply of bank loans to 
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finance investment and expenditure, together with changes in liquidity positions 
and preferences of banks, means the banking sector is a major determinant of 
business cycle activity. Arestis and Sawyer (2003a), explain the role of monetary 
policy in the Keynesian approach to endogenous money, by considering liquidity 
preference, the exchange rate, fiscal policy, monetary policy objectives, fine 
tuning and monetary policy instruments. These are discussed below. 
3.6.1 Liquidity Preference 
Liquidity preference determines the allocation of wealth between different 
financial assets. A preference for more liquid assets changes asset demand, 
relative price and rate of return. When the nominal price of a financial asset such 
as bank deposits is fixed, then it obviously does not change. However, the rate of 
interest on such an asset can vary, for example by a bank reducing the rate of 
interest on deposits when demand for holding money balances increases. 
The influence of liquidity preference impacts monetary policy decisions through 
relative interest rates which affect aggregate demand, as well as impacting 
banking sector asset portfolios. Bank loans are relatively illiquid which means a 
shift in liquidity preference impacts the willingness of banks to supply loans. 
Although a single interest rate operates in the simple "new consensus" model 
outlined earlier, the existence of channels of monetary policy transmission implies 
credit rationing and interest rate changes. Credit rationing might be ever present 
in some form, but the question is whether it can be influenced in some way 
through changes in the official interest rate. High interest rates risk loan default 
since higher interest payments mean a higher risk of the borrower being unable to 
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repay. In addition, the composition of loan portfolios may shift from financing, 
low-risk, low expected return borrowers to high-risk, high expected return 
borrowers. With regard to low expected return projects. increases in interest rates 
may well exceed expected loan returns. As bank loans move from low- to high- 
risk projects, increases in bank interest rates may act to ration credit, instead of 
increasing the rate of interest. Thus the effects of changes in official interest rates 
are more uncertain than the simple model outlined earlier suggests. Changes in 
credit rationing, relative interest rates, and the role of imperfect information as 
discussed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for example, are thus of importance. The 
operation of monetary policy departs from the "new consensus", in that it impacts 
economic activity through credit channels. Changes in official interest rates 
indirectly affect these channels through changes in credit rationing. For example, 
increases in official interest rates may influence the willingness of banks to supply 
loans. Hence, not only does monetary policy operate through price effects on, 
say, investment spending, but also through credit rationing, the extent of which is 
determined by bank liquidity preference and credit availability. 
3.6.2 The Exchange Rate 
When money is regarded as exogenous and the objective of monetary policy is to 
control the money stock, the exchange rate is not considered. This is because the 
domestic inflation rate is determined by growth of the money stock, and the 
exchange rate is determined by purchasing power parity. The nominal exchange 
rate varies according to the domestic and international inflation rate differential. 
with no impact of monetary policy on the real rate. However when money is 
regarded as endogenous and interest rates are the policy instrument, transmission 
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runs from the discount rate to the capital account of the balance of payments 
followed by nominal and real exchange rates. In some studies. for example 
Church et al. (1997), the exchange rate is a transmission mechanism and the most 
important path through which official interest rates impact inflation. As discussed 
earlier, interest rate parity suggests a theoretical relationship between official 
interest rate differentials and the exchange rate, but there appears no firm 
empirical consensus on this. 
Nevertheless, there have been some indications to the contrary. In Eichenbaum 
and Evans (1995: 976) for example, VAR analysis of U. S. data suggests federal 
funds rate monetary policy has an impact on nominal and real exchange rates. 
The authors note that "we find the maximal effect of a contractionary monetary 
policy shock on U. S. exchange rate is not contemporaneous; instead the dollar 
continues to appreciate for a substantial period of time. " This finding supports 
covered interest rate parity and work on the "forward premium bias" as in Hodrick 
(1987) for example, but not uncovered interest rate parity. On the latter, 
McCallum (1994: 121) notes that "it is inconsistent not only with existing models 
but also with views that have been held by actual policy makers for many decades 
- indeed over a century. " Kim and Roubini (2000) on the other hand, provide 
evidence suggesting an initial exchange rate appreciation as official interest rates 
rise, but not any "forward discount bias". Engle (1996) notes in this regard, that 
the lack of empirical robustness in uncovered interest rate parity may be due to 
expectations that are not rational. Tight domestic monetary policy which 
increases the domestic and international interest rate differential, and induces a 
currency appreciation followed by a negative forward premium bias is considered 
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by Rogers (1999). In this VAR based study, monetary policy shocks result in 
almost a half of the forecast error of the real short run exchange rate between 
sterling and the dollar. Other simulations in the same study suggest a monetary 
policy effect of at least 20%. A shortcoming of such evidence though. is 
identified by Sarno and Taylor (2002) in terms of the identifying restrictions 
required in VAR analysis. A solution to this problem is proposed by Cushman 
and Zha (1997) in terms of a structural model for Canada, and by Kim and 
Roubini (2000) for G7 countries excluding the U. S. Contractionary monetary 
policy which induces an exchange rate appreciation, is considered to be 
substantial, and points to the existence of an exchange rate channel for the 
transmission of monetary policy. 
3.6.3 Fiscal Policy 
In an endogenous money framework where the policy instrument is the rate of 
interest, monetary policy has been shown to affect the exchange rate, asset prices 
and income distribution. The effect on inflation via aggregate demand however, is 
somewhat less which raises the obvious question of how to supplement this 
ineffectiveness. Fiscal policy with respect to aggregate demand is highlighted as 
an omission in the "new consensus" model and as a critical solution to the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy by Arestis and Sawyer (2003b). This is 
because fiscal policy is able to act as an automatic stabiliser in response to 
fluctuations in aggregate demand. Buti et al. (1997) provide evidence for this 
view by showing that the counter cyclical nature of government budget deficits 
results in a 0.5% change in the ratio between the budget deficit and GDP. when 
output relative to trend changes by 1 %. In the Phillips curve of equation (2) 
78 
>I 
er Three: Monetary Policy with Endogenous Money. 
above, the level of aggregate demand has a significant impact on the rate of 
inflation, the level of economic activity, employment and output. It is argued that 
fiscal policy might be an alternative and more effective instrument of monetary 
policy when inflation is targeted through the level of aggregate demand. In 
Arestis and Sawyer (2002c) it is that Central Bank estimates indicate that interest 
rate monetary policy does not have a significant impact on aggregate demand or 
inflation. In addition, monetary policy is suspect in terms of responding 
effectively to falls in aggregate demand and here it is only fiscal policy that is 
most appropriate. Since monetary policy and fiscal policy both influence the level 
of aggregate demand, with monetary policy also impacting variables other than 
inflation, there exist strong grounds for a combination of fiscal and monetary 
policies. This ensures a consistent policy approach to aggregate demand, rather 
than monetary policy and fiscal policy operating separately, which is the case for 
an operationally independent Central Bank pursuing a target rate of inflation as 
the primary monetary policy objective. 
3.6.4 Monetary Policy Objectives 
The essential rationale behind a monetary policy with the objective of targeting a 
rate of inflation is the notion that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
[policy] phenomenon. In this classical dichotomy, monetary policy also does not 
have any real effects on the level of economic activity. These propositions stem 
from monetarism under which money was treated as exogenous and controllable, 
and have been extended into current UK monetary policy which is based on 
inflation targeting through official interest rates. However, when inflation is 
considered a "demand phenomenon" then fiscal policy is an alternative or 
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complementary policy for targeting the rate of inflation. In general. monetarý- 
policy impacts real variables such as investment and the exchange rate. and 
therefore monetary policy ought at the very least, to give consideration to such 
real side effects. Even if these effects are relatively small in magnitude, the 
effects on inflation will also be small. If the effects of monetary policy on 
inflation are themselves small, as argued above, then there is little strength in an 
argument for using monetary policy. 
It is considered that an individual policy instrument will achieve an individual 
policy objective. Fiscal policy, which may indirectly influence exchange rates 
through trade position and market sentiment effects, does not have direct effects. 
On the other hand, interest are able to directly influence international capital flows 
and can be expected to influence exchange rates to some degree, even if this 
proves difficult to quantify. Here there are grounds for fiscal policy to target 
aggregate demand and for monetary policy to target exchange rates. In the "new 
consensus" model outlined above, the rate of inflation converges towards target, 
aided by expectations that it will be close to target, and that increases in inflation 
will be met with reductions in aggregate demand. The operation of monetary 
policy in this manner is made successful because there is an expectation of a 
credible inflation target, but this is nothing novel - any policy setting a credible 
target rate of inflation, including fiscal policy, is likely to have a similar outcome. 
It might therefore be argued that the information set used to make interest rate 
decisions for monetary policy, ought to be broadened to include factors such as 
exchange rates, investment and asset prices. Furthermore, the effects of monetary 
80 
A, 
Chapter Three: Monetary Policy with Endogenous . 
tionel'. 
policy on such variables may be long-term, and therefore monetary policy should 
consider long-term real effects as well as short-term inflation concerns. 
3.6.5 Fine Tuning with Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy decisions in major Central Banks are taken at frequent intervals. 
including every two weeks by the European Central Bank, every four weeks by 
the Bank of England and every six weeks by the Federal Reserve. In many 
instances, interest rates are either unchanged or adjusted by around 25 basis points 
which is very small, and monetary policy is also set to target the rate of inflation 
two years ahead. This frequency of change in monetary policy contrasts with 
fiscal policy where, say tax rates, cannot be changed so often. It might thus be 
argued that monetary policy is actually used to fine tune the level of economic 
activity towards an inflation target, even though it was noted earlier that the 
effects may be rather muted. Nevertheless, these decisions incur costs and further 
menu-type costs for implementing monetary policy decisions. These 
considerations support a less frequent decision making process for monetary 
policy. 
3.6.6 Monetary Policy Instruments 
It was noted earlier, that monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the level of 
economic activity through numerous channels, including "price effects" of interest 
rate changes or credit rationing. In the latter, this also depends on liquidity 
preferences, positions and market power of banking sector institutions, as well as 
their risk assessments. There seems a basis therefore, for some form of credit 
control policy, implemented by the Central Bank or the government, and 
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operating alongside monetary policy. Banks and building societies for example. 
often vary the terms and conditions under which loans are supplied. In the case of 
mortgages then, control over loan to income ratios may be well worth considering. 
On the other hand, the rationing of credit may adversely affect investment via 
changes in the quality of intermediation. This negative aspect of credit rationing 
is justified by Shaw (1973: 86) who argues that, 
"Rationing is expensive to administer. It is vulnerable to corruption and 
conspiracy in dividing between borrowers and officers of the intermediary 
monopoly rent that arises from the difference between low, regulated loan 
rate and the market-clearing rate. It can be frustrated by borrowers who 
simply do not repay loans and keep their place in the ration queue by 
extending maturities. The rationing process discriminates poorly among 
investment opportunities ... and the social cost of this misallocation is 
suggested by the high incremental ratios of investment to output that 
lagging economies report. " 
These arguments are perhaps more relevant to developing rather than developed 
economies, particularly in terms of the corruption and conspiracy issues referred 
to above, since it is these countries who most often suffer from weak institutional 
frameworks. In contrast, it might be argued that credit rationing can be ineffective 
and expensive in developed economies, given their highly sophisticated 
institutional frameworks. This provides opportunities for borrowers to effectively 
evade credit restrictions. Credit rationing policies might therefore be acceptable 
for the reasons discussed above, but an active credit rationing policy might not be 
so effective. 14 For example, the 1980s saw sharp credit growth which in turn 
generated a bubble that inevitably burst. However if the bubble is prevented to 
begin with, a boom can be sustained for a longer period of time by exercising 
14 See also Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
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control over the amount and direction of credit. It is not argued that credit control 
in itself would stimulate the level of economic activity since there are potential 
problems with this approach as identified above. Credit control ought not 
therefore to be an intrinsic element of monetary policy, but rather adopted in 
instances where it might be beneficial alongside monetary policy. as illustrated 
above. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
In an endogenous money framework, the Central Bank acts to set the official 
interest rate. This in turn influences market interest rates, with the stock of money 
determined endogenously and independently of the Central Bank. The role of 
interest rates as the instrument of monetary policy raises issues over the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Here there are limitations in the use of interest 
rates, particularly in that they cannot become negative and that they are 
constrained by the level of international interest rates. 
This chapter has presented the effectiveness of monetary policy from an 
endogenous money perspective. Within this view exist two schools of thought - 
the "new consensus" and the Keynesian approach. In the former, monetary policy 
effectiveness depends on whether monetary policy can effectively control 
inflation and successfully ensure deviations of the inflation rate return to target. 
In the "new consensus" framework outlined in the equations presented earlier, an 
assumed "equilibrium rate" of interest acts to generate a level of aggregate 
demand consistent with capacity output and thus constant inflation. Aggregate 
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demand and the rate of inflation are then stimulated through changes in the rate of 
interest in terms of the "equilibrium rate", so that inflation converges on target. It 
has been shown that empirical evidence in Arestis and Sawyer (2002c) indicates 
interest rates are ineffective as an instrument of monetary policy. in controlling 
the rate of inflation. The second challenge for monetary policy is whether it can 
successfully manage shocks to autonomous aggregate demand. Here, it has been 
shown that the interest rate changes required in response to a shift in aggregate 
demand, must be so large that they are impossible to implement in practice. 
In the Keynesian approach to endogenous money, liquidity preference plays an 
important role and because of this, the operation of monetary policy differs to that 
in the "new consensus". Here, fiscal policy is critical for managing aggregate 
demand, operating alongside monetary policy aimed at the exchange rate. In 
addition, there may be a case for some form of credit control acting in a 
supplementary manner as and when required, though it is by no means suggested 
this policy ought to be a cornerstone strategy. Overall then, the approach and 
therefore implications of monetary policy in the Keynesian framework are very 
different to those of the "new consensus" 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Quantifying the response of the Central Bank to changes in the level of economic 
activity has long been an important issue in monetary policy. Monetary policy 
reaction functions capture the behaviour of Central Bank policy instrument 
adjustments (changes in the short term nominal interest rate), in response to 
deviations of inflation from target and output from trend, on the back of demand 
or supply shocks. Reaction functions thus capture macroeconomic model 
dynamics and can be specified and modelled in a variety of ways. In recent years, 
Taylor (1993) type monetary policy rules have seen a resurgence of research 
interest, their simple and tractable nature capturing the behaviour of the Central 
Bank. 
The basic premise of the Taylor (1993) rule is that the official interest rate is 
adjusted in response to deviations of contemporaneous inflation from a pre- 
determined target rate, and deviations of contemporaneous real output from 
potential. Historically, macroeconomic model building and subsequent policy 
recommendations experienced a change in direction during the introduction of 
rational expectations during the 1970s. An outcome of the time-inconsistency 
debate involving Kydland and Prescott (1977) and also Calvo (1978), was that 
policy rules are superior than discretion. This is because of the problems of 
consistent but sub-optimal planning and economic instability problems associated 
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with discretion. As a result, the objective is to develop a practical rule, simple and 
easy to understand by economic agents, and one which captures monetary policy 
decisions and deviations from target. A specification of the Taylor (1993) rule is 
presented in chapter five, where the nominal Federal funds rate (i) responds to 
changes in the equilibrium real Federal funds rate (r *), the four-quarter rate of 
inflation (uzt), the target rate of inflation (z), and the percentage deviation of real 
deviation from target (yl ). For ease of exposition, it can also be rewritten as a 
Taylor (1999b) nominal interest rate rule: 
it =8+(1+a)7rr+ßYr 
where 8= r* - a7r*. In terms of the real interest rate rt = it - iz,, equation (1) can 
also be written as: 
rt= 8+ amt+ßY, (2) 
In Taylor (1993), both the inflation target ('r*) and the equilibrium real rate of 
interest (r*) assume values of 2, with inflation and the output gap assuming values 
of 0.5 each. This set up is shown to graphically track the U. S. Federal funds rate 
closely. The parameters in equation (2) capture Central Bank preferences, with a 
stability condition of a usually assumed to be greater than zero. A value of less 
than zero implies inflation increases induce falls in the real rate of interest, thereby 
stimulating positive output increases. A second implication is that the estimated 
inflation coefficient in equation (1) is greater than one for the stability condition to 
hold. Also, the assumed values of 0.5 each for the a and ß parameters are 
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considered reasonable approximations in Taylor (1993). though in practice. their 
optimal values will depend on the structure of the model being considered. Since 
Taylor (1993), many modified monetary policy rules have sought to explain 
various aspects of monetary policy. This has become an enormous literature in its 
own right. This chapter presents the essentials of such monetary policy reaction 
functions, their properties and specifications, as well as their theoretical and 
empirical foundations. It considers the design of such rules, draws a distinction 
between calibrated and estimated monetary policy rules, and also highlights the 
choice of optimal monetary policy rules. The aim is to emphasise the 
specification and estimation of monetary policy rules and to consider how the 
influence the dynamics of macroeconomic models. To this end, the rest of the 
chapter is structured as follows. Section two presents a review of the empirical 
modelling issues involved. Section three looks at some Taylor-type rules 
estimated in the empirical literature. Section four examines optimal instrument 
rules and section five concludes. 
4.2 PRELIMINARY MODELLING ISSUES 
Since Taylor (1993), various modifications known more generally as Taylor-type 
rules, have produced pertinent outcomes for the design of monetary policy 
reaction functions. Among these are the various ways of measuring inflation, and 
estimating the equilibrium real interest rate and also potential output. Inevitably 
then, the robustness of estimated rules is subject to data selection sensitivity. 
Another issue relates to the timing of data available to the Central Bank, which in 
turn may influence reaction function specifications and estimated outcomes. A 
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legitimate concern then is over the relevance of contemporaneous inflation and 
output gap observations in instrument rules, in contrast to the lagged data used by 
the Central Bank. Revised data is also a common ingredient of estimated 
historical policy rules, which is again in contrast to real time data observations 
used in Central Bank decision making. Structurally too, the Taylor (1993) implies 
instrument adjustments are based on current information, which contrasts with the 
forward looking nature of many Central Banks and hence forward looking policy 
rules. Lastly, lagged interest rate terms are also incorporated into many policy 
rules to reflect Central Bank interest rate smoothing. All of these issues are now 
considered in further detail. 
There is no consensus in the empirical literature on Taylor-type rules over which 
price variables and length of inflation periods to use. In the original specification, 
Taylor (1993) measures inflation with the change in the year-on-year GDP price 
deflator. Alternative price indices have however been used and these include 
Kozicki (1999), in which four alternative measures of U. S. inflation are 
considered. These include a CPI measure of year-on-year inflation, a core CPI 
measure, a GDP price deflator measure and a measure of expected inflation 
derived from an average of private-sector forecasts. Inflation and output are taken 
as given and an interest rate feedback effect is not considered. A Federal funds 
rate is then calculated using a Taylor-type rule representing monetary policy, for 
the four different measures of inflation. Inevitably perhaps, the estimated results 
differ markedly, with official interest rate differentials ranging from 0.6 
percentage points to 3.8 percentage points. The presence of an output gap in 
policy rules is given many empirical justifications, with the most common being 
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that it reflects a Central Bank preference for output stability. Alternatively, the 
output gap is used to proxy expected future inflation as in Favero and Rovelli 
(1999). In Levin et al. (1999), it is argued that the estimated output gap parameter 
should remain above a certain value. The authors calculate figures of 0.6 or 0.8 to 
support this. Rationale for output gaps in policy rules aside, the measurement of 
potential output remains subjective and this makes any accurate assessment an 
uncertain exercise. In Taylor (1993), potential output is measured with a time 
trend fitted to actual output. Other common methods in the empirical literature 
include regressions of actual output on segmented linear trends and quadratic 
filters, Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filters, and also structural methods as adopted by 
the U. S. Congressional Budget Office. ' As with inflation, different measures of 
potential output can produce quite different estimated policy rules. In Kozicki 
(1999) for example, robustness tests indicate monetary policy decisions based on 
different measures of potential output range from 0.9 percentage points to 2.4 
percentage points. 
The equilibrium real interest rate is perhaps the most difficult Taylor-type 
parameter to estimate, particularly because of the additive specification of Taylor- 
type rules. This means that measurement and estimation of equilibrium real 
interest rates has a direct influence on policy rule outcomes. Taylor-type rules are 
generally specified in terms of an unobserved equilibrium real interest rate and 
often, an unobserved target rate for inflation. A conventional solution to this 
problem is to assign a value for one of these parameters before estimating the 
other. Typical illustrations of this approach include Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
1 It might be noted that Woodford (2001) and also McCallum and Nelson (1999) have argued against 
estimating potential output using time trends since potential output is subject to exogenous shocks 
which are not captured in these exogenous estimates. 
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(2000), Kozicki (1999), and Judd and Rudebusch (1998), in which the equilibrium 
real interest rate is calculated as the differential between the average Federal funds 
rate and the average rate of inflation. With this measure of the equilibrium real 
interest rate, the inflation target is estimated and then extracted from the constant 
term in the estimated policy rule. Alternatively, estimation begins with an 
inflation target with the equilibrium real interest rate then calculated from the 
constant term. In Rudebusch (2001), a more involved approach is adopted in 
which the equilibrium real interest rate is derived from an IS equation as follows: 
v, =acv, -1 + a2Y, -2 - ß(1, -1 -ter - r*> +v() 
where the equilibrium real interest rate (r*) is estimated as 2.2 per cent - close to 
the original Taylor (1993) rule. This estimated equilibrium real interest rate is 
then included in the constant term of a Taylor-type policy rule. 
A constant equilibrium real interest rate however, is a controversial assumption 
that raises questions regarding the issue of measurement. In Kozicki (1999), U. S. 
equilibrium real interest rate estimates show a variation over the sample period, 
indicating implying that the equilibrium real interest rate may not be constant. In 
Rapach and Weber (2004), real interest rate estimates for several economies also 
point to the existence of structural breaks. 
When the Central Bank implements monetary policy decisions, it does so on the 
basis of lagged rather than current data. Inevitably, this has led to the question of 
whether current or lagged data should be used 
in estimated policy rules. 
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Empirically, it does not seem that monetary policy reaction functions estimated 
using lagged data, suffer a significant reduction in performance compared to those 
using current data. Illustrative studies in this regard include Levin et al. (1999). 
McCallum and Nelson (1999) and also Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). In these 
studies, it appears that the loss is small because inflation and output persistence 
ensure lagged inflation rate and output gap values proxy current values ,, N-ell. In 
addition, Batini and Haldane (1999) suggest that the Central Bank has a greater 
amount of information on the level of economic activity at the point of instrument 
adjustment, than is available through inflation and the output gap alone. On this 
basis, it has been argued in Kozicki (1999) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), 
that contemporaneous rather than lagged data implicitly includes information not 
otherwise captured in measures of inflation and the output gap. 
In general, Central Banks adjust the policy instrument on the basis of expected 
future economic activity. As a result, forward looking or forecast based interest 
rate rules are preferred over contemporaneous data rules in some studies. The 
arguments concerning the relevance of forward looking rules are similar to those 
associated with contemporaneous versus current data. However, there do not 
appear to be any empirical indications suggesting forward looking rules perform 
significantly better than contemporaneous or backward looking rules. Owing 
perhaps, to inflation and output persistence. This issue is considered in further 
detail in the rest of this chapter. 
The numerous revision of economic data, often long after release is well known. 
To this end, it appears that estimates of Taylor-type policy rules based on real 
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time data produce substantially different results from those based on current time 
data. In Taylor (1999b), current time data indicates the inflationary- experience of 
the U. S. in the 1970s might have been avoided had Federal Reserve monetary 
policy followed the Taylor (1993) rule. Orphanides (1998) however. contradicts 
this position with estimates of Taylor (1993) rules using data available to the 
Central Bank at the point of instrument adjustment. The results suggest that any 
attempt to follow a Taylor (1993) rule would not have succeeded in averting 
inflation. 
Instrument adjustments by Central Banks tend to be smooth, slow and in the same 
direction with little change. Thus Taylor-type rules often incorporate lagged 
interest rate terms to reflect interest rate smoothing. Sack and Wieland (1999) 
consider if interest rate smoothing is a deliberate Central Bank policy or simply 
the result of reactions of monetary policy to persistent macroeconomic conditions. 
A small or insignificant lagged interest rate coefficient would indicate this latter 
point. Empirically however, estimated Taylor-type rules with lagged interest rate 
terms generally produce large and significant coefficients, implying that interest 
rate smoothing is a deliberate Central Bank policy. The main reason for interest 
rate smoothing appears to be a reluctance by Central Banks to engage in frequent 
reversals in the direction of instrument adjustments. Williams (1999) suggests 
that frequent reversals might be interpreted by the public as policy mistakes and 
that any momentum in interest rate adjustments gives confidence to the Central 
Bank. Also in Sack and Wieland (1999), interest rate smoothing is considered to 
be the result of a lack of accurate economic information and uncertainties over the 
real state of affairs in the economy associated with the transmission mechanism of 
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monetary policy. As a result, Central Banks may prefer to adjust the policy 
instrument slowly towards target. 
4.3 MONETARY POLICY RULES 
Empirical estimates of Taylor-type rules are extensively documented in the 
research literature. The main emphasis is on capturing the shift in macroeconomic 
policy towards inflation targeting, as experienced by many economies in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The findings of such studies however, differ substantially 
depending on the types of data and models used. Three studies in particular are 
indicative of the issues affecting empirical Taylor-type estimates, as discussed 
above. 
The generalised monetary policy rule of Taylor (1999b) in equation (1) above, is 
modified by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) to include an error correction mechanism 
which captures interest rate smoothing by the Central Bank. The modified rule is: 
i; =r * +z, +a(Tr, -z*)+ßY +ß2Y -l 
(4) 
with the adjustment process given as: 
Ait = y(i: - i, -, 
) + pAir-I (5) 
where the error in interest rate setting is corrected with the ' parameter, and the 
`momentum' of the previous period's instrument adjustment is measured with the 
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p parameter. Equations (4) and (5) are combined to give an estimated Taylor-type 
monetary policy rule with interest rate smoothing: 
+Y(l+a)7r, +vß1 , +Yßz. v1-1 +POir-1 (6) 
where 4=r*- aTr *. In Judd and Rudebusch (1998), measures of the rate of 
inflation include the GDP price deflator, core CPI and a personal consumption 
expenditure deflator. Inflation is also defined as the four quarter average of the 
quarter-over-quarter change in the price level. Potential output is also proxied 
with several measures and these include the Congressional Budget Office 
measure, plus segmented linear and quadratic trends fitted to actual output. The 
sample period corresponds to three U. S. monetary policy regimes, namely Burns 
between 1970Q3 and 1978Q2, Volcker between 1970Q3 and 1987Q2, and 
Greenspan between 1987Q3 and 1997Q4. Estimation is based on the non-linear 
least squares method. In Judd and Rudebusch (2000), the problem of estimating 
Taylor-type monetary policy rules where the results are sensitive to measures of 
inflation and the output gap are illustrated. Rearranging equation (6) so that the 
nominal interest rate appears on the left hand side of the equation, simplifies the 
problem: 
it = v[ + (1 +a) r, +ßß. v1 +A, y1 I +(1-Y)li-1 +pAil-I (7) 
The results of Taylor-type rules for different measures of inflation and potential 
output for the various frameworks of Federal Reserve monetary policy are 
presented in Table 2. It can be seen that the size of policy instrument adjustments 
varies significantly. depending on the measure of inflation or potential output 
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being used. Generally speaking, the variation across monetary polic\ framework 
for inflation measures is less than those of potential output measures. with 
statistically insignificant model parameters omitted in the final estimations. Of 
interest is the estimated coefficient on inflation for the Bums period. This is 
statistically insignificant and suggests no response of the policy instrument to 
inflation. In this same period, the estimated coefficient on the error correction 
term is consistently greater than the estimated coefficient for momentum in 
interest rate adjustments. This suggests policy makers preferred to adjust official 
interest rates towards a desired level more than they did to maintaining the 
momentum of monetary policy. During the Greenspan regime, this relationship 
operated in reverse. 
The authors note, though do not substantiate with empirical evidence, that 
monetary policy is more responsive to the change in, rather than the level of, the 
output gap during the Volcker period. To this end, the estimated coefficients on 
current and lagged output gap are restricted to sum to zero. In addition, the 
estimated coefficient on inflation is positive, indicating a non-accommodative 
monetary policy stance during this period. For the Greenspan period, the 
estimated policy parameters are less robust for different measures of inflation and 
potential output, compared to the Burns and Volcker periods. As the parameters 
vary, monetary policy responses to the output gap vary modestly but substantially 
in response to inflation. Furthermore, the gradual adjustment of the policy 
instrument produces estimated interest rate responses that are smaller in 
magnitude to those of the Taylor (1993) rule in equation (1) above. It is also 
evident that the estimated coefficient on the interest rate response to inflation 
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(1+a) is reduced by the error correction parameter (7) implying a policy 
instrument response of less than one. 
In Clarida et al. (2000,1998), a Taylor-type rule is modelled with a partial 
adjustment parameter commonly used in studies such as McCallum (2001) and 
Kozicki (1999), but also modified to reflect a forward looking Central Bank. The 
estimated policy rule is: 
11=1* +O(E[? ltk IQ, 
]-7*)+ßEý 
t, q 
c, J (8) 
where the target nominal interest rate (i, ) responds to changes in the required 
nominal interest rate (i ) when inflation and output reach their respective target 
values, the change between time period t and t+k in inflation (lr, k )'the average 
output gap between time period t and t+q, (y, q 
), and the information set available 
to the Central Bank when the policy instrument is adjusted. Interest rate 
smoothing is captured with a partial adjustment mechanism of the form: 
i= P(L)i, + (1- P)i, p(L) = pý + PZ L+... + pn L-I p =P(I) (9) 
where the current policy instrument of the Central Bank is it. Equations (7) and 
(8) are combined to give the following estimated policy rule: 
1, =(1-P)Lr *-(ý-1)i *+q ,, k +ß,, 9]+P(L)l, -1 
+e, (10) 
where the long run real equilibrium interest rate is r* = i* - i'` and 
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10 
t 
]) +'8 (y 
i, 9 - 
E[}'i. 
9 
lot D1 
-01 
The rate of inflation is measured by the annualised quarterly growth rate of the 
GDP deflator, and potential output by the Congressional Budget Office definition. 
This forward looking specification proxies expected inflation with future actual 
values of inflation. Other measures of potential output and inflation in the same 
study include the CPI for the latter and a quadratic output trend rather than 
potential Congressional Budget Office output, and the gap between actual and 
trend unemployment rather than the output gap, for the former. In addition, the 
equilibrium real rate of interest is the average of the real interest rate over the 
sample period, with the target rate of inflation then estimated jointly with the 
remaining instrument rule parameters. The monetary policy regimes considered 
in this study are pre-Volcker between 1960Q I and 1979Q2, and Volcker to 
Greenspan between 1979Q3 and 1996Q4. The estimation approach in this study 
is the generalised method of moments (GMM) and the error term in equation (11) 
is a linear sum of forecast errors. As such, it is orthogonal to the information set 
parameter ()t) and this allows for a set of instruments to be obtained from the 
information set parameter (Qt) for use in with GMM. The instruments include a 
lagged policy instrument, inflation, the output gap, commodity price inflation, and 
the spread between the long-term bond rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate. 
The monetary authority instrument is represented by the nominal Federal funds 
rate in all three of the studies discussed in this section. For the U. K. a similar 
study is that of Nelson (2000), in which seven separate policy regimes are 
considered, and for a broader set of economies, Clarida et al. (1998), in -which 
Germany, Japan, France and Italy are also considered in addition to the U. K. The 
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estimated policy rule in Clarida et al. (2000), requires estimates of the real 
equilibrium interest rate (r*) and the target rate of inflation (; T*). The former is 
proxied by the sample average of the observed real interest rate. which varies from 
one subsample to another. Given r*, the target rate of inflation (; r*) is then jointly 
estimated with the remaining variables in equation (10). The estimation results 
are presented in Table 3, using one-quarter-ahead expectations of the inflation and 
output gaps. In other words k=q=1 in equation (10). Both GDP and CPI 
deflator measures of inflation, and quadratic trend and Congressional Budget 
Office potential output measures of the output gap are used to check the results for 
robustness. The output gap is also replaced with a measure of the unemployment 
rate deviating from trend. Furthermore, a backward looking version where k=q= 
-1, together with one-year-ahead (k=4) and one-quarter-ahead (q=1) expectations 
for inflation and the output gap respectively, are also estimated. In the main, these 
estimates are similar to one-quarter-ahead results and suggest the policy rule is 
reasonably robust to measurement over different time periods. 2 
The approach in Clarida et al. (2000) is also adopted by Cao et al. (2000) for the 
1988 to 1998 period, with the results indicating an interest rate smoothing 
parameter of 0.8. In contrast to Clarida et al. (2000) however, the estimated 
coefficient on the output gap parameter is statistically significant and close to 
unity. The results in Clarida et al. (2000) however, are also sensitive to the 
measure of inflation and potential output being adopted. The estimated 
coefficients on both inflation and the output gap fall when potential output as 
2 Note however, that the Clarida et al. (2000) policy rule of equation (9) cannot be directly compared to 
equation (5) since the real interest rate is not an explicit model parameter. Also, the 0 term is 
qualitatively equivalent to (1+ (x) in equation (9). 
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defined by the Congressional Budget Office is replaced with a quadratic trend of 
output and a trend unemployment rate. In some instances. definitions of potential 
output produce statistically insignificant parameters. Furthermore, CPI measures 
of the inflation rate do not substantially alter the results, though the magnitude of 
the output gap increases considerably. In contrast to Judd and Rudebusch (1998). 
Clarida et al. (2000) report a larger interest rate smoothing parameter, indicating 
smaller responses of the policy instrument to changes in the rate of inflation and 
the output gap. It is important to note however, that the sluggish response of 
monetary policy under rules with interest rate smoothing is a common 
characteristic and cannot be used for direct comparisons with original Taylor-type 
rules as in equation (1). 
In Taylor (1999b), inflation is defined as the four quarter average of the quarter- 
over-quarter change in the GDP price deflator. In addition, a Hodrick-Prescott 
(1997) filter of real GDP is used to measure potential output. The estimation 
periods for the policy rule include the Gold Standard between 1879Q I and 
1914Q4, Bretton Woods between 1960Q I and 1979Q4, and the post-Bretton 
Woods period between 1987Q 1 and 1997Q3. The estimation method used in this 
study is OLS and the results are summarised in Table 1. The estimated value of k 
in equation (1) (where k=1+ a) for the 1960Q 1 to 1979Q4 period is less than 1, 
implying that the coefficient on inflation is negative and that therefore monetary 
policy was accommodative. In the post 1987Q I period however, the estimated 
value of k is greater than 1, implying a monetary policy preference for stable 
inflation. This seems consistent with the high levels of inflation in the 1970s and 
subsequent policy measures aimed at inflation control from the 1980s. The last of 
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the sample periods covers a time of increasing concern over output stabilisation 
and this seems to be captured by an increase in the value of the estimated output 
gap coefficient. 
The findings in Taylor (1999b) are similar in some sense to those of Clarida et al. 
(2000). Both studies report larger estimated inflation and output gap coefficients 
for the Volcker-Greenspan periods of 1979Q3 to 1996Q4, compared to the pre- 
Volcker period of 1960Q I to 1979Q2. For the inflation rate, the estimated 
coefficient in the pre-Volcker period is less than one but greater than one for the 
Volcker-Greenspan period. In contrast to Taylor (1999b) and Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998) however, the estimated output gap parameter becomes 
statistically insignificant for the Volcker-Greenspan period. The magnitude of 
interest rate smoothing however increases in the latter of these periods, in line 
with the findings of Judd and Rudebusch (1998). 
In each of these studies, the overall policy rule specification is similar but the 
variables and methods used to represent the rate of inflation and potential output 
parameters are somewhat different. As noted earlier, these differences in 
parameter measurement have produced widely varying empirical estimates. In the 
studies cited above, there are substantial differences in the estimated policy rules. 
In general however, it can be noted that they all reflect a common shift in 
monetary policy towards inflation control. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
estimated coefficient on the inflation parameter has consistently increased over the 
studies considered, during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
100 
Chapter Four: Alonetarv Policy Rules. 
4.4 OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY RULES 
The studies cited above estimate Taylor-type rules for monetary policy using, 
single equation techniques. The results of these are not generally very robust 
since small changes in their underlying assumptions, such as the measures of 
inflation or potential output, lead to widely varying policy recommendations. 
This in turn raises questions over the relevance of estimated rules as guides for 
monetary policy. On a positive note, such rules are useful general descriptions of 
the behaviour of monetary policy. They also play an important role in 
macroeconomic models which require policy rules to be specified. since they offer 
a useful representation of Central Bank response to changes in the level of 
economic activity. In this sense, the role of relative weights on inflation and 
output gap parameters in Taylor-type monetary policy rules is less dependent on 
the estimated results produced by such functions, and more on the interaction of 
such rules within the wider macroeconomic models which they make up. In 
addition, studies by Taylor (1999a), Muscatelli et al. (1999), Clarida et al. (1998) 
and Ball (1997) to name but a few, argue that policy makers preferences also 
determine the relative weights of monetary policy rules in addition to the 
specifications of such equations. Such preferences are conventionally represented 
by loss functions defined as the deviation of inflation from target, output from 
trend and sometimes deviation of the nominal interest rate itself. Thus given 
policy maker preferences and particular policy rule types, relative weights which 
minimise the loss function are used. 
The relative weights in such models are generally obtained through random 
simulations of macroeconomic models using different monetary policy reaction 
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functions, with the objective of minimising a pre-determined policy maker loss 
function. Large variations in inflation and output parameters are penalised in such 
policy rules. Often the loss function is used to derive policy parameters which 
produce the most favoured combinations of unconditional variances in inflation 
and the output gap. The points on such parameters represent different policy 
maker preferences for the variables included in the loss function. Each instrument 
rule on the policy frontier is considered efficient in that it minimises the loss 
function, and thus the variance or deviation from target of inflation, the output 
gap, or even the nominal rate of interest. When variability in the policy 
instrument is not explicitly specified in the loss function, it is captured in terms of 
the frontiers where the variance of the policy instrument is restricted to equal to 
some specific value. Since the construction of such rules is model-consistent, they 
are often termed optimal rules in the empirical literature. 
It was noted earlier, that the robustness properties of specific Taylor-type rules 
vary over different models and measures of parameters. Though Levin et al. 
(1999) and Taylor (1999a) regard such models to be robust in the terms of model 
uncertainty, their results are questioned on the basis that the models specified are 
too similar to one another. In Cote et al. (2002a, 2002b) for example, several 
Taylor-type rules are compared using a variety of economic models. In contrast to 
Levin et al. (1999) and Taylor (1999a), these indicate that Taylor-type rules are 
not robust to model uncertainty. In particular, the importance of model 
specification when constructing a policy rule, is emphasised. Additionally, issues 
such as interest rate smoothing, forward looking or backward looking models and 
expectations, which are important in historical Taylor-type rules. are also 
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important in the estimation of optimal policy rules. Many of these issues 
discussed above, become equally important when taken in the context of wider 
macroeconomic models. The next section considers the empirical methods of 
generating optimal policy rules. 
4.4.1 Monetary Policy Transmission and Optimal Policy Rules 
Central to the construction of optimal policy rules, is the channel of monetary 
policy transmission specified in the model. Since the parameters of an optimal 
rule are subject to influence from price and output persistence, interest rate 
elasticity of demand, the degree of transparency and expectations, the 
identification of the channels of monetary policy transmission is a pre-requisite of 
efficient instrument rule design. The models discussed in this chapter might be 
classified in terms of the financial market price view of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. In other words, monetary policy influences 
aggregate demand and inflation through market prices and rates of return on 
financial assets. The specification of this view might be represented in a simple 
three equation system consisting of aggregate demand, price adjustment and the 
instrument rule. Alternatively, it might include more detail on aggregate demand 
and the adjustment of prices. 
The role of aggregate demand in the transmission mechanism might also be 
considered to differ across models in three particular ways. First, the response of 
aggregate demand to changes in the policy instrument across models. In some 
models, it is assumed that aggregate demand responds to short run nominal 
interest rate changes, and in others, to long rates. Second the persistence of output 
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which varies from model to model, and which has a partial influence on the 
magnitude of instrument adjustments required to achieve output stability. Third. 
if open economy components of aggregate demand are included, then an 
additional channel of monetary policy transmission can have a significant 
influence on the time lags of monetary policy. In some macroeconomic models. 
an external component is not included which means optimal interest rate rules in 
some models may not be relevant for others which incorporate an open economy. 
The specification of inflation can also vary from model to models and this 
influences the effects of monetary policy on real model parameters. In some 
models, price setting behaviour is entirely backward looking, whilst in others it is 
a descriptive adjustment of the price mechanism. In such instances, staggered 
prices or wage setting are common assumptions, allowing the rate of inflation to 
be either forward looking, or a combination of expected future and past inflation. 
Models in which rational expectations are explicit assumptions, introduce further 
channels of monetary policy transmission. As a result, inflation expectations 
induce price movements which in turn enter the transmission mechanism through 
a subsequent influence on short term real interest rates. Taken with an 
expectations approach to the term structure of interest rates, this combination will 
influence the level of aggregate demand via movements in current long term 
interest rates. However, the effects of expectations on real interest rates also 
depends on the assumptions of wage and price setting behaviour inherent in 
models by Taylor (1995) or Svensson (2000). As Smets (1998) notes, a credible 
inflation target will result in low expected inflation, with less need for a large 
coefficient on the inflation parameter in the instrument rule. A simple empirical 
example of the relationship between the transmission mechanism of monetary 
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policy and the choice of an optimal instrument rule, is the backward looking 
structural model of Ball (1997). This defines the economy in terms of a dynamic 
IS equation and a Phillips (1958) curve. These appear as equations (1'-) and (13) 
respectively: 
Y1 =-w?, [-1 + 6l w>0,0<_0<1 (1: ) 
; Tt =-YJ t-l + r-1 +77 w>O, 0>o (13) 
where the output gap (y) responds to changes in the difference between the real 
interest rate and the equilibrium interest rate level (r, ). the difference between 
inflation and the average inflation level (; cr ), and white-noise error terms (e, , q, 
The Central Bank is assumed to set real interest rates after observing 
contemporaneous shocks (. c,, q, ), with changes in interest rates only affecting 
expected output in the following period. It is assumed that (ei) cannot be 
forecast, with expected output thus determined as: 
E[jý+, ]_- arý + oyt (14) 
The required level of expected output can be set by selecting an appropriate level 
of the real interest rate. In doing so however, expected inflation is taken as given 
since real interest rates impact inflation with a lag of two periods. Expected 
output therefore, is determined as a function of expected inflation: 
E[ 
11 1]=-q 
ELF,.,, 
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=-gE[yrýF, +ýP , +71, +, 
] 
=-q'Vic1 -q(PY1 (15) 
The monetary policy rule is then derived from equations (14) and (15) as follows: 
ww 
a7Zr + ß. Y r (16) 
Equation (16) is exactly the same as the Taylor (1993) rule in equation (1), and the 
parameter q in this model is determined by minimising the Central Bank loss 
function. Thus for a loss function of the form: 
L= 6y+, u . 6Ir (17) 
(6? ) represents the variance of the output gap, (6n) the variance of the inflation 
gap, and dc is the weight assigned to the rule by policy makers. The solution to 
this minimisation problem is: 3 
V/' + p(p') ++ p(p') 
2+ 4Cp 2V2, u 
ýi g) 
q 2V/(p 
Hence q is a function of model parameters and the weight assigned to inflation 
and output variance in the loss function by policy makers. The relative weights in 
the instrument rule of equation (16) are given by: 
3 If yi is set equal to 1, then the solution for q is exactly the same as that of Ball (1997). In this chapter. 
the general form of Ball (1997) is presented. 
106 
Chapter Four: Monetary Policy Rules. 
a=yiqß= 
w (19) 
The q term can also be shown as an increasing function of µ. Because of this, as 
the Central Bank gives more weight to the variance of inflation, both the , -eight 
on the inflation gap (a) and the weight on the output gap (ß) in the policy rule 
will increase. This implies that for any random shock, changes in the policy- 
instrument will need to be larger in order to stabilise the economy. 
The relative persistence of inflation and output can be illustrated as follows. If 
inflation persistence, given by the value of yr increases, relative to the persistence 
of output, given by the value of 0, then a will increase relative to '8.4 
The 
reverse is true when 0 increases relative to cr . In other words, the optimal 
parameter values in the instrument rule are positively related to the relative 
persistence of the corresponding variables in the model. 5 In addition, they are also 
influenced by changes in the level of aggregate demand in response to changes in 
the policy instrument. This can be illustrated by an increase in the gradient of the 
IS function, indicated by an increase in the size of V. This leads to a fall in a 
and 8 because as aggregate demand becomes more responsive to changes in the 
rate of interest, the policy instrument will need to deviate less from their 
equilibrium values in order to stabilise the economy. 
4q is also a function of y/ . However, 
it can also be shown that Vq increases with c. 
5 Empirical evidence for this is presented by Rudebusch (2001), Peersman and Smets (1999), and 
Smets (1998). 
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4.4.2 Trade-Offs and Shocks from Demand and Supply 
In the model outlined above, inflation and output move in the same direction with 
output increases in the previous period leading to inflation increases in the current 
period. An increase in the value of inflation or output coefficients reduces the 
variance of both inflation and output. However, this is not the case in every 
macroeconomic model because the price adjustment process will vary from one to 
another. As a result, there may exist a trade off in inflation and output variability, 
as the relative weights assigned to the inflation and output gap parameters in the 
policy rule change. 
This issue is taken up in McCallum and Nelson (1999), in the form of two 
alternative price adjustment mechanisms in a simple IS/LM model. The first 
specification is a Calvo-Rotemberg model of price adjusment, in which gradual 
adjustments in price are assumed and the costs of adjustment are quadratic. 6 The 
second specification is a P-bar model of price adjustment, in which price is 
assumed to be determined one period in advance. 7 As a result, output adjusts in 
response to any change in the level of aggregate demand, and adjustment costs 
represent the costs involved in changing production levels. This leads to a short 
run trade off between inflation and output variability. When prices are determined 
in advance, increases in the level of aggregate demand are met with increases in 
output. Large policy instrument responses to output result in a quick return of 
output to equilibrium, but at the expense of adjustment costs of output changes 
leading to a higher degree of variation in inflation. Empirical estimates by 
McCallum and Nelson (1999) for the Calvo-Rotemberg model indicate that 
6 See Roberts (1995) for an exposition of the Calvo-Rotemberg model. 
See McCallum (1994) for an exposition of the P-bar model. 
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increased weights on either inflation or output, while the other is held constant. 
leads to a reduction in the variance of both inflation and output in the policy rule. 
In the P-bar model this relationship does not hold. Instead, increased weights on 
output for given weights of inflation, lead to a decrease in the variance of output. 
but an increase in the variance of inflation. The authors point to the role of 
assumed price adjustment in the model, introducing an additional element of 
decision making in the design of an optimal policy rule. In other words, the 
Central Bank may have to decide which variable to stabilise, at a potential cost to 
the other. 
A second issue relates to the response of Taylor-type rules to demand and supply 
shocks, namely that different models produce different responses. When 
aggregate demand is subject to a positive shock, both output and prices will 
increase and move in the same direction. If the Central Bank is following a 
Taylor-type reaction function, the response will be to increase official interest 
rates in order to induce falls in output and inflation. Supply shocks such as oil 
price increases on the other hand produce different outcomes. The transmission of 
such shocks into the general price level will raise the rate of inflation above target, 
inducing an increase in Central Bank interest rates. This in turn causes output to 
fall below potential, and this negative pressure further leads to inflation falling 
back to target level. Inflation responds with a lag, allowing prices and output to 
respond to shocks by simultaneously pushing interest rates in opposite directions. 
In the course of such shocks, it becomes more difficult to reduce interest rates to 
the levels required for offsetting increases in the rate of inflation. whilst 
simultaneously avoiding undue downward pressure on output. 
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4.4.3 Rule Specifications and Parameters 
A reasonable assumption in model specification might be that the Central Bank 
sets official interest rates based on expectations of future economic activity. This 
is reflected in the forward looking or forecast based nature of some models which 
are preferred over backward looking or contemporaneous specifications. Batini 
and Haldane (1999) for example, seek to capture the lag between instrument 
adjustment and initial effects on inflation and output using a forecast based 
specification. A rationale for this is that the absence of lags in the model may 
result in cyclical instability. In addition, Central Bank expectations are formed on 
the basis of a wide information set and in this sense, forecast based or forward 
looking rules can be thought of as information encompassing rules. This is a 
characteristic not available in backward looking rules. Although forward looking 
models might seem more robust for the reasons given above, the choice of an 
optimal policy rule will still depend on the structure of the model being 
considered. Of particular importance here, is the wage-price contracting process. 
In Batini and Haldane (1999) for instance, when wage bargaining is backward 
looking, it is shown that forward looking rules help to stabilise the backward 
looking nature of private sector agents. Conversely, if wages are completely 
flexible, a forward looking parameter is not required in the instrument rule. In the 
extreme case of excessive forward looking expectations held both by the Central 
Bank and the private sector however, forward looking rule may have a 
destabilising effect. 
It might be noted that forward looking specifications do not enjoy a firm 
consensus in terms of robustness in the empirical literature. Forward looking 
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rules are shown to marginally perform better than contemporaneous Taylor-type 
specifications in the backward looking model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). 
In Smets (1998) models the same specification as Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999) but without endogenous potential output. This modification allows a 
contemporaneous rule specification to perform in a similar, and sometimes 
slightly better, manner to forecast based rules. Taylor (1999a) finds little 
difference in the performance of inflation forecasts and actual inflation, thus 
concluding that forecast based rules have little advantage over contemporaneous 
specifications. In a further paper, Taylor (2000) notes that forward looking rules 
are similar to backward looking specifications, when the forecasts being used in 
the former are not too far out in the future. 
Instrument rule parameters often include an interest rate smoothing term, though 
in practice the success of such coefficients seems to depend on rule specification 
and model structure. In general, these two issues determine the degree to which 
smoothing speeds up the process of stabilisation or not. Interest rate smoothing 
has been incorporated in a number of ways in the empirical literature, with 
different rule specifications generating substantial variations in the magnitudes of 
interest rate movements. To illustrate this, a smoothing parameter can be 
incorporated into the simple rule in equation (16) to give: 
rt=a; z+fly t+Prt (20) 
Similarly in the Clarida et al. (2000), interest rate smoothing can be represented 
as: 
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I +P(L)l, 
-1 +16, (21) 
Smoothing parameters close to unity in rules such as equation (20) induce larger 
interest rate responses because the response to the current level of economic 
activity is incorporated into the previous interest rate change. Alternatively-. a 
large interest rate smoothing parameter in rules such as equation (21) induce 
relatively small interest rate responses because the policy instrument remains 
closer to the level of the previous period. 
As noted earlier, the structure of a policy instrument is an important determinant 
of the degree of interest rate smoothing. In particular, smoothing depends largely 
on the form of expectations assumed in the term structure of interest rates. Under 
rational expectations, long term interest rate changes respond to changes in 
expected future short term interest rates. In studies such as Woodford (2001), 
Taylor (2000,1999a), and Levin et al. (1999), it is shown that if aggregate 
demand is specified as a function of long term interest rates, then the Central Bank 
will stabilise fluctuations in output, without any extensive adjustments in short 
term interest rates. In the last of these three studies, the magnitude of the optimal 
smoothing parameter is shown to decline when the maturity of the long term 
interest rate in the model is shortened. When rational expectations are not 
incorporated into model specifications, expectations are assumed either implicitly 
or explicitly to be backward looking. Thus if long term interest rates do not 
respond to changes in expected future short term interest rates, the magnitude of 
changes in long term interest rates will be smaller and with less influence on the 
level of aggregate demand. Furthermore, short term interest rate changes will 
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only marginally by reflected in the term structure of long term interest rates. In 
these specifications, the effect of interest rate smoothing is simply to slow down 
the response of aggregate demand. If however, aggregate demand responds to 
short term interest rates rather than long term interest rates. then the inefficiencies 
of interest rate smoothing are reduced. 
The relationship between interest rate smoothing and types of expectations in the 
term structure of interest rates is considered by Williams (1999). The model used 
in this study is that of the Federal Reserve Board which incorporates rational 
expectations in price setting behaviour and in the term structure of interest rates. 
Empirically, the best performance in terms of reducing the variance of inflation 
and output, is found in rules specified in first differences and assuming rational 
expectations, rather than VAR based expectations.. In other words, where the 
interest rate smoothing parameter is equal to one. In Ball (1999), further 
empirical evidence is presented in support of interest rate smoothing inducing 
large variations in inflation and output variance, in a backward looking model. A 
general observation in the empirical literature is a longer feedback process in the 
absence of rational expectations in the term structure of interest rates. Again, 
though rational expectations are theoretically robust, the exact result depends 
heavily on the way in which the assumption is modelled. Taylor (1999a, 1999b) 
for example, notes that the use of lagged data to generate expectations of the 
future in rational expectations models, implies a backward looking specification. 
Hence there is no clear evidence to suggest rational expectations model properties 
based on lagged information, produce significantly better results than models 
estimated using backward looking expectations. 
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4.4.4 The Exchange Rate 
For economies with international trade making up a significant proportion of 
overall economic activity, the exchange rate will be an important channel for the 
transmission of the monetary policy rule. In Ball (1997), this effect is modelled 
by including an exchange rate channel in a modified system of the IS/Phillips- 
curve equations of (12) and (13) presented above. This gives: 
-ae, +Oy, -, +s1; 
(22) 
7, =YfI; iýj -1 (PYt-l -ý(et-l - et-2)+771, 
(23) 
eý =w1 +v1 (24) 
The parameters in this system are all positive. Equation (22) is an open economy 
IS curve, equation (23) is a Phillips curve and equation (24) is an interest rate 
parity condition. The real exchange rate takes the form of deviation from mean 
e, =e, -e, with a higher rate implying appreciation. In the closed economy 
system of equations in section 4.1, instrument adjustments impact inflation with a 
lag of two periods, while in the modified open economy system of Ball (1997) 
above, interest rates impact inflation with a one period lag, thereby increasing the 
speed of monetary policy. Solving equations (22) to (24) generates a policy 
instrument rule of the form: 
YIFI +(1 Yl )er -Y?. Yi +Y3 
ý7rt +ýet-1) (25) 
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where the y parameters represent functions of the remaining model variables. 
Thus the policy rule in an open economy model becomes a function of both the 
interest rate and the exchange rate, compared to it being a function of only the 
interest rate in a closed economy set up. The left hand side of equation (25) is 
interpreted by Ball (1997) as a monetary condition index. In other words. in an 
open economy, the Central Bank takes into account the interaction between 
nominal interest rates and the exchange rate before adjusting the policy 
instrument. Another innovation of this approach is the last term in the policy rule 
of equation (25). This represents long term inflation, which is included to produce 
net effects of direct but temporary exchange rate effects on the rate of inflation. 
This model is calibrated and the policy rule of equation (25) evaluated in terms of 
an inflation-output variance trade-off frontier where different combinations of 
parameter weights are used. The estimated results are then adjusted for 
comparison purposes with a closed economy system to capture the response of the 
interest rate to changes in inflation and output. When inflation and output are 
assigned equal weights in the loss function, the optimal coefficient on the inflation 
coefficient in the open economy model does not change. The coefficient on the 
output gap is slightly larger in the open economy system compared to the closed 
economy set up. Between the open and closed economy interest rate rules then, 
there is little change in the magnitude of policy instrument adjustments. Ball 
(1997) thus infers that for a given output variance, an optimal open economy rule 
does not reduce inflation variance much more than a close economy specification. 
Svensson (2000) also models the exchange rate in a Taylor-type rule but without 
conclusive results. The approach is a small open economy specification similar to 
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that of Ball (1999), except with forward looking aggregate demand and supply 
equations. These are derived from an exchange rate channel incorporated into the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The inclusion of the exchange rate 
in the estimated Svensson (2000) policy rule, leads to a lower variance for the 
inflation parameter, but a higher variance on output and the real interest rate 
compared to Taylor (1993). A point to note however, is that the loss function 
used by Svensson (2000) can bias the results towards the preferences of the 
Central Bank. Similar findings are reported by Taylor (1999a), in which empirical 
support for an exchange rate parameter in the policy rule is weak. The approach 
taken in this study is based on an earlier multi-country model adopted by Taylor 
(1993b), in which Germany, Italy and France represent European Monetary Union 
(EMU) economies, and in which Britain, Japan, Canada and the United States 
represent economies pursuing independent monetary policies. The model is 
simulated with a closed economy interest rate rule as in equation (16), and an 
open economy interest rate rule of the form: 
? =a ? Ct +ry, + %o er + xl er-1 (26) 
The study finds that the open economy policy rule performs just marginally better 
than the close economy specification, in terms of reducing the variance of output 
and inflation. In general, the findings in Svensson (2000), Taylor (1999a) and 
Ball (1999) do not provide convincing evidence that the inclusion of an exchange 
rate parameter in modified Taylor-type rules, improves model performance. 
These studies relate to large open economies, and in contrast, Clarida et al. (2000, 
1998) aim to model Taylor-type instrument rules for small open economies with 
exchange rate parameters. Here monetary policy reaction functions for Germany 
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and Japan are adapted to include the U. S. Federal funds rate and also their 
respective exchange rates with the U. S. The estimated results show statistically 
significant parameters which are small in magnitude and positive in sign. For the 
German reaction function however, the inclusion of a real exchange rate 
parameter produces a negative coefficient on inflation. 
Returning to Svensson (2000), Taylor (1999a) and Ball (1999), Taylor (2001) 
argues that even if the parameters xo and xl in equation (25) above are set to equal 
zero so that the policy instrument does not respond directly to changes in the 
exchange rate, it will nevertheless react indirectly to movements in the exchange 
rate. This is because changes in the exchange rate are transmitted through 
aggregate demand and inflation, filtering through into the interest rate rule of 
equation (25). For this reason, it is not necessary to include an explicit exchange 
rate parameter in instrument rules. In Cote et al. (2002a), the weak performance 
of open economy instrument rules is due to the exchange rate absorbing economic 
shocks, which means any attempt to smooth fluctuations in the exchange rate, acts 
as an obstacle to adjustment processes in the economy. 
4.4.5 Stability and the Output Gap 
Instrument rules in which the inflation parameter is less than zero will generate 
upward sloping demand curves and unstable reaction functions. This is illustrated 
by Taylor (1999a) in terms of an IS curve, in which stable equilibrium in Taylor- 
type rules depends on the structure of the macroeconomic model, the specification 
of the instrument rule and how it behaves within the overall model. The stability 
condition for Taylor-type instrument rules is illustrated by Svensson and 
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Woodford (2003) in terms of a forward looking IS/Phillips curve model. To 
illustrate, the Phillips curve can be presented as follows: 
7zt =q1+ VIE, ir, (27) 
where y is the output gap, E1; cr+, is the expectation of inflation at time t+1 given 
the information set available at time period t. The IS equation can be presented 
as: 
Yl =ElJl+1 -w(i, - 
Etir, 
1) (28) 
where it is the policy instrument. A Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function 
can thus be presented as: 
i=i +a(ir, -ýc)+ß(Y1) (29) 
where i is an intercept term, and 7c is the inflation target. To illustrate the role of 
a and ß in achieving stability, the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) approach to solving 
linear difference models is adopted by the following condition: 
a+1 
ýß>1 
cP 
(30) 
in which instrument rule stability is determined by both the inflation parameter 
(a), and the output parameter (ß). In this model, stability is achieved through a 
large coefficient on either estimated parameter. The Blanchard and Kahn (1980) 
approach is also used to test for stability in the calibrated forward looking 
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IS/Phillips curve model of Clarida et al. (1998). The estimates indicate a 
decreasing lower bound on the inflation coefficient in response to increases in the 
output gap coefficient. Inflation is only found to equal one when the output 
coefficient is equal to zero. Thus the policy instrument does not respond by a 
magnitude greater than one to inflation. Instrument rule stability can also be 
achieved if there is a sufficient response of the policy instrument to changes in the 
output gap. 
The relationship between the slope of the Phillips curve and the values of the 
estimated inflation (a) and output (ß) parameters is also reflected in equation (30). 
An increase in the gradient of the Phillips curve implies an increase in cp. In 
response, ß increases for a given value of a. In Isard et al. (1999), the Blanchard 
and Kahn (1980) method is applied to capture the stability conditions of a Taylor 
(1993) rule using a non-linear Phillips curve model, with forward looking and 
model consistent expectations. The original Taylor (1993) is shown to achieve 
equilibrium when output is at potential, but breaks down for high levels of excess 
demand where the gradient of the Phillips curve reaches a critical point. These 
findings are indicative of the implications of equation (30) above in that as the 
gradient of the Phillips curve (cp) increases, the estimated coefficient on the 
inflation parameter must increase for a given value of the output gap. Thus the 
original Taylor (1993) rule is shown to succeed in achieving unique solutions for 
low levels of excess demand, but breaking down for high levels. 
This analysis is extended by Svensson and Woodford (2003) for stability 
conditions in forward looking Taylor type rules. This specification is given in 
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equation (31) below with the corresponding stability conditions given in equations 
(30) and (32). For a forward looking interest rate rule then, the lower bound on 
the value of a for given value of ß is equation (30), and the upper bound is 
equation (32). The two combine to meet the following stability conditions: 
+a(E, ýý+ý -ý)-ß(vß) (31) 
a<1+1+V/ (ß+2w-1) (; 2) 
An implication of equation (32) is that instrument adjustments in response to 
deviations of expected future inflation from the target rate of inflation, under large 
values of the inflation parameter ((x), can induce fluctuations in equilibrium that 
are simply the outcome of self-fulfilling expectations. Clarida et al. (2000) also 
present estimates of an upper bound on the inflation parameter ((x), which is high. 
As with single equation estimates of Taylor-type rules, optimal policy rules are 
also subject to bias from errors in the measurement of the output gap. It was 
discussed earlier, that these can lead to substantial variations in the weights on the 
inflation and output gap parameters. The theme of measurement error and the 
resulting loss in performance of the policy rule is taken up by Orphanides et al. 
(1999) using the model of the Federal Reserve Board. A Taylor (1993) rule is 
used in the specification to show that increases in the size of measurement error 
lead to increases in the variance of nominal interest rate, inflation and output. A 
modification of the initial specification to include interest rate smoothing, and a 
reduction in measurement error, reduces the variance of the parameters relative to 
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Taylor (1993). However, as the measurement error is allowed to increase, the 
modified Taylor-type rule performs worse than the original. Though it is not 
argued that the value of the output gap in the rule should be set to equal zero. a 
small weight (less than the 0.5 in Taylor (1993)) on the output gap parameter in 
the presence of measurement error, still produces a lower variance on inflation 
and output than when the weight is zero. Similar findings are reported by Smets 
(1998) for an IS/Phillips curve specification which compares the weights on 
inflation and output gap parameters for six different monetary policy reaction 
functions, including four Taylor-type rules. When no measurement error is 
assumed for the output gap, the estimated coefficients on the output gap appear 
consistently larger than those on the inflation gap. When an assumption of 
measurement error is retained for the output gap, the results change, with the 
estimated coefficients on the output gap for Taylor-type rules falling substantially. 
In two of these rules, the weights on output gap parameters are actually smaller 
than those for the inflation gap, with inflation gap coefficients falling only very 
slightly. 8 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In specifications of Taylor-type monetary policy rules, the policy instrument in the 
form of short term nominal interest rates responds to deviations of 
contemporaneous inflation from a predetermined target, and to deviations of 
contemporaneous real output from the potential level of output. The magnitude of 
interest rate responses to shocks is determined by the relative weights assigned to 
8 An extensive literature review of instrument rule uncertainty is available in Armour and Cote (1999). 
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the inflation and output gap coefficients of the rule concerned. Though such 
monetary policy reaction functions are simple and tractable, they do nevertheless 
describe the essential workings of Central Bank monetary policy. In general. the 
relative weights on inflation and output gap coefficients are determined either 
through direct estimation of a Taylor-type rule for a specific time period, or 
through simulating a model in which a loss function represents the policy 
preferences of the Central Bank. These preferences are defined as the trade off 
between fluctuations in inflation and output. In this latter approach, optimal 
weights for inflation and output parameters are those which minimise the loss 
function. This chapter has considered both approaches to the design of Taylor- 
type monetary policy functions. 
The literature presented here indicates that estimated Taylor-type rules are not 
robust for a variety of reasons. For example, estimated relative weights for 
inflation and output experience shifts over sample horizons, with some also 
changing sign. This is often due to a change in the objective of monetary policy. 
Because of this, data observations over long periods of time prove inappropriate 
for estimating Taylor-type instrument rules, especially if the period concerned 
consists of several switches in policy regime. At the same time, small sample 
estimates reflecting individual monetary policy frameworks may be at risk of 
small sample bias, leading to inaccurately estimated parameters weights. 
Additionally, Taylor-type rule specifications are simple, incorporating 
modifications such as interest rate smoothing parameters or an exchange rate term. 
The empirical evidence in this chapter has shown however, that the weights of 
such policy rules are sensitive to different measures of inflation and potential 
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output. In models representing economies without official inflation targets. the 
problems are exacerbated since further estimation techniques are required to 
ensure robustness of model results. 
Other relative weight specification concerns relate to the use of current versus 
lagged and real time data, forward looking versus backward expectations and 
interest rate smoothing parameters. Models covered in this chapter, indicate that 
the outcomes of current or lagged data estimates are broadly similar. Although 
the Central Bank adjusts the policy instrument using real time data, the use of 
current time data in estimating Taylor-type monetary policy rules reflects the 
breadth of the information set available to the Central Bank other than inflation 
and output. In terms of backward looking or forward looking specifications, as 
well as interest rate smoothing, there exists no firm consensus in the empirical 
literature in favour of any particular method. It can be noted that all of these 
approaches are able to produce robust results, depending on the structural 
characteristics of the model concerned. 
An alternative to the direct estimation of relative Taylor-type weights is the 
random simulation of models in order to identify the relative weights for 
minimising the value of a given loss function. Model-consistent or optimal 
Taylor-type rules however, are dependent to a large extent on the interaction 
between the individual policy rule and the wider model within which it operates. 
Differences in the dynamic structures of models, such as the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, produce very different functional forms of policy 
rules. Furthermore, the selection of relative weights for policy rules is determined 
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by Central Bank preferences, which are in turn determined by a loss function 
defined over the variance of the inflation gap and the output gap. As a result, the 
degree of importance attached by the Central Bank to fluctuations in inflation and 
output in the loss function, will determined the relative weights assigned to 
Taylor-type rule parameters. 
Another theme common to both estimated Taylor-type rules and the design of 
optimal monetary policy reaction functions is the definition and measurement of 
variables such inflation and potential output, forecast based and backward looking 
expectations, current data and lagged data, and also interest rate smoothing and 
the exchange rate. Here again there exists no firm consensus over the best 
approach to take, and indeed estimates outcomes in the empirical literature depend 
more on the dynamic structural characteristics of the models being used. For 
example, if aggregate demand in a given model is sensitive to interest rate 
changes, then for a given loss function, the relative weights in the policy rule will 
be lower than under low interest elasticity. Finally, the specific inclusion of an 
exchange rate channel in the transmission of monetary policy is an important 
consideration. However, the empirical literature suggests that the inclusion of an 
exchange rate term in Taylor-type rules does not substantially improve the 
performance of macroeconomic models. In addition, it might also be argued that 
since the effects of overseas prices are captured in conventional Taylor-type rules 
in the form of changes in the level of aggregate demand and the costs of 
production, the exchange rate effect is already accounted for. 
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INFLATION TARGETING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, a number of Central Banks have resorted to Inflation 
Targeting as a means of achieving low levels of inflation. and many empirical 
studies have advocated Inflation Targeting for monetary policy. For example, 
Mishkin (1999: 595) argues that "the performance of inflation-targeting regimes 
has been quite good. Inflation-targeting countries seem to have significantly 
reduced both the rate of inflation and inflation expectations beyond that which 
would likely have occurred in the absence of inflation targets. " In addition to 
reductions in the rate of inflation and inflation expectations, Inflation Targeting is 
seen to overcome dynamic time-inconsistency problems together with an 
independent Central Bank, reduce inflation variability, stabilise output if applied 
in a "flexible" way (Svensson, 1997) and absorb inflationary shocks by "locking 
in" low inflation expectations. Also, since its inception by New Zealand in 1990, 
Inflation Targeting has not been abandoned by any of the Central Banks that have 
adopted it. ' 
In addition to the targeting of a rate of inflation as an objective of monetary 
policy, Inflation Targeting also includes the following. A government determined 
target range for the rate of price inflation, monetary policy as the primary 
instrument of achieving the target, by way of adjustments in official interest rates, 
' This might suggest that it is premature to argue Inflation Targeting has been "quite good" as quoted 
by Mishkin (1999) above. 
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an operationally independent Central Bank, and the rate of inflation as the sole 
objective of monetary policy. With the exception of short-term effects, the 
influence of monetary policy on other policy objectives is not considered. This 
chapter associates Inflation Targeting with the New Consensus Macroeconomics 
as an important theoretical and policy parameter. Secondly, the importance of 
Inflation Targeting as a theoretical construct and policy measure is underscored by 
the fact that it has been adopted in "more than 20 countries" according to Fracasso 
et al. (2003). The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section two 
identifies Inflation Targeting with the New Consensus Macroeconomics. Section 
three presents the theoretical basis of Inflation Targeting with a breakdown of the 
issues involved. Section four discusses the mechanism through which Inflation 
Targeting is used to control inflation. Section five reviews the empirical evidence 
on Inflation Targeting in terms of structural macroeconomic and single equation 
models. Section six concludes. 
5.2 INFLATION TARGETING AND THE NEW CONSENSUS 
As indicated in chapter three, the New Consensus can be illustrated as in Meyer 
(2001) or McCallum (2001). The example below follows Arestis and Sawyer 
(2003a): 
Yt = ao + alYr-i + a2Er (Yr+i) - a3 [Rr - Er (pr+i)] + si (1) 
Pt =1iY/ + ß2Pt-i +ß3E1 (pr+1) + s2 (2) 
rr = (1- C3) [R* + Er (Pf+i) + ci)'r-i + C2 (Pt-t -P)] + c3 rt-i (3l 
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where b2 + b3 = 1, yt is the output gap, rl is the nominal rate of interest. p is the 
rate of inflation, pT is the target rate of inflation, R* is the "equilibrium" real rate 
of interest consistent with zero output gap, implying a constant rate of inflation 
from equation (2), s; (with i=1,2) are random shocks, and E, are expectations 
held in time period t. Equation (1) represents an aggregate demand relation where 
the current output gap is a function of lagged and future expected output gap 
values, and also the real rate of interest. Equation (2) represents a Phillips (1958) 
curve where inflation is a function of the current output gap, and also lagged and 
future inflation. Equation (3) replaces the LM-curve with a Taylor (1993) type 
monetary policy reaction function, described by Svensson (2003: 448) amongst 
others, as a "prescribed guide for monetary-policy conduct. " The nominal interest 
rate in this equation is a function of expected inflation, the output gap, the 
deviation of inflation from target and the "equilibrium" real rate of interest. The 
lagged interest rate term represents Central Bank "smoothing" to improve 
performance through "history dependence" as illustrated by Woodford (1999), 
amongst others. The three unknowns in the system of equations above are then 
interest rate, inflation and output. 2 
Equation (1) is also akin to a conventional IS curve, but with expenditure 
determined by the intertemporal optimisation of a utility function. Lagged 
adjustment and forward looking aspects are captured by sticky prices in the form 
of lagged inflation in the Phillips curve, and complete long-run price flexibility. 
2 The model is not rigidly fixed and variations are possible. For example, interest rate smoothing or 
lagged output in equation (3). A fourth, stock of money equation can also be included to represent 
demand for money variables such as income, price and interest rates. This has the effect of 
endogenising money where the stock of money is demand determined. However, this would be almost 
irrelevant since the money stock is a residual with no causal relationship with other model parameters. 
See Arestis and Sawyer (2003a) for a detailed discussion. 
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In equation (2), the Et (p, +l) parameter reflects Central Bank credibility in that it 
signals an intention to target and maintain low inflation. This in turn lowers 
inflation expectations, with current inflation reduced at relatively lower cost in 
terms of output. In the monetary policy rule of equation (3), monetary policy 
adjusts systematically to changes in economic activity and not exogenous factors. 
The nominal interest rate is thus the sum of the real interest rate and expected 
inflation, and is therefore symmetric in targeting inflation. When inflation 
exceeds target, interest rates are raised and when inflation is below target they are 
lowered. The absence of a random shock in equation (3) implies monetary policy 
is not subject to shocks. The system as a whole assumes money neutrality. 
monetary policy-led inflation (through official interest rates), and real variable 
equilibrium values independent of the money supply. Also, the money stock has 
no causal role in the model and is a residual. Inclusion of a demand for money 
equation in the model would imply that the money stock is determined by the 
demand for money. This approach is new consensus in that it emphasises several 
factors, including the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, 
the absence of aggregate demand and fiscal policy, and the priority of monetary 
policy over fiscal policy. 3 
Inflation Targeting is encapsulated in the system of equations above, particularly 
expected inflation in equation (3). The inflation target and Central Bank forecasts 
have a strong influence on expected inflation, by adding a degree of monetary 
policy transparency inherent in Inflation Targeting. Inflation forecasts are thus a 
key aspect of Inflation Targeting, and according to Svensson (1997), are a form of 
3 See Arestis and Sawyer (2003a) for a detailed treatment. 
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intermediate monetary policy target. There is however, a problem with inflation 
forecasts particularly with regard to the large error margins involved which can 
affect the credibility and transparency of the Central Bank. On the other hand. 
inflation forecasts are the basis of inflation expectations which subsequently 
influence actual inflation. The central role of inflation forecasts in monetary 
policy is thus critical to Central Banks pursuing Inflation Targeting. particularly 
with regard to controlling inflation. This is because inflation is subject to large 
influences from external factors such as oil prices, exchange rates, wages and 
taxes, and the Central Banks have little control over these. If inflation is sourced 
to such variables, Inflation Targeting becomes redundant. For example, when 
negative supply shocks induce rising inflation and falling output, an Inflation 
Targeting Central Bank would respond by attempting to control inflation, and 
deepening the recession. Even if a Central Bank succeeds in achieving low and 
stable levels of inflation and output with output close to potential, the outcome 
remains the same since the objective of the Central Bank is an inflation target 
rather than a target rate of output growth. 
5.2.1 Inflation Targeting 
This section presents the main characteristics of Inflation Targeting in equations 
(1) to (3) above. There exists no firm consensus on these and this chapter covers 
those that would probably be accepted by the majority of commentators, as most if 
not all aspects of Inflation Targeting. In doing so, the approach here follows 
Arestis and Sawyer (2003a: 6). When monetary policy operates in an Inflation 
Targeting framework, official inflation targets or ranges are publicly announced, 
and low and stable levels of inflation are explicitly acknowledged as the primary 
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long-term objectives of monetary policy. 4 The advantage of this framework is 
clear communication between the Central Bank and public, private and market 
agents, whilst also ensuring a disciplined, accountable, transparent and flexible 
approach to monetary policy. The primary objective of price stability is supported 
by three additional objectives. These are a credible framework which develops 
trust, a flexible monetary policy which responds optimally to unanticipated 
shocks, and legitimacy derived from public and parliamentary support. 5 
According to Bernanke and Mishkin (1997: 104), Inflation Targeting is achieved 
through "constrained discretion" in that monetary policy is restricted to the pursuit 
of clear, long-term and sustainable objectives. 6 However, reasonable discretion 
can be used to respond to unexpected shocks if necessary. As a result, Inflation 
Targeting acts as a nominal anchor for monetary policy, giving a precise 
commitment to price stability. This in turn, imposes monetary policy discipline 
on the Central Bank and the government within a flexible policy framework. For 
example, monetary policy might be used to achieve short-run stability, but without 
4 The analysis here focuses on Inflation Targeting rather than money supply targeting. This is because 
an unstable money demand results in an unstable LM curve. This is further illustrated by HM Treasury 
(2003). Also, Inflation Targeting pursues a final rather than intermediate objective of monetary 
policy. King (1997) argues Inflation Targeting is preferable to money supply targeting because it 
responds to short-run shocks in an optimal manner, which money growth targeting does not. The 
circumstances under which Inflation Targeting might operate in an optimal way are illustrated in 
Svensson and Woodford (2003). 
5 Credibility is central to monetary policy as a means of over-coming time inconsistency. This problem 
is basically one of a discretionary Central Bank monetary policy aimed specifically at real economic 
variables such as output or unemployment, which causes inflation in the short-run, without producing 
any benefit for economic activity in the long run. A further discussion is in Barro and Gordon (1983). 
Authors such as Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983) argue that if 
monetary policy is not credible because of time inconsistency, then it is neither optimal nor feasible. A 
credible policy is one under which the Central Bank does not respond to developments. In addition, 
even if aggregate demand has a short-run influence on output, non-intervention is preferred in response 
to time inconsistency. 
6 In Bernanke (2003: 2), "constrained discretion" represents somewhat of a compromise between rules 
and discretion in the sense that it is "an approach that allows monetary policy makers considerable 
leeway in responding to economic shocks, financial disturbances, and other unforeseen developments. 
Importantly, however, this discretion of policy makers is constrained by a strong commitment to 
keeping inflation low and stable. " 
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compromising the long-run objective of inflation. This process causes policy to 
be consistent and rational, resulting in clear public expectations and points of 
reference from which to judge short-run policy decisions. Mishkin (2000: 5) 
argues that this approach reduces the possibility of deflation by noting that 
"Targeting inflation rates of above zero, as all inflation targeters have done. makes 
periods of deflation less likely. " Monetary policy also represents the primary 
instrument of macroeconomic policy since it can be used flexibly to achieve 
stability in the short to medium term, and adjusted quickly in response to 
economic shocks. It is the most direct determinant of the rate of inflation, and in 
the long run, is only effective against inflation. ' Also, according to HM Treasury 
(2003), a long run target of price stability should be achieved at minimum cost in 
terms of deviations of actual output from potential and of inflation from target. 
Fiscal policy is not considered as an instrument of macroeconomic policy, 
especially since it is subject to slow and uncertain legislative issues. It is also 
passive in the sense that the budget deficit on the balance of payments fluctuates 
over the business cycle. This according to Mishkin (2000: 2) implies that 
"Restraining the fiscal authorities from engaging in excessive deficits financing 
thus aligns fiscal policy with monetary policy and makes it easier for the monetary 
authorities to keep inflation under control. " As a result, "monetary policy moves 
first and dominates, forcing fiscal policy to align with monetary policy. " Because 
of the factors above, monetary policy takes priority over fiscal policy. In addition, 
the budget position is counter cyclical over the business cycle, in the sense that 
deficits rise during downswings and surpluses rise during upswings. In other 
Though not economic activity, such as output and employment. 
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words, an automatic stabilising effect absorbs variations in economic activity. 
However, changes in the budget occur on average, around a balanced budget. 
This means that fiscal policy strengthens Inflation Targeting credibility and 
reduces the real costs to the economy of keeping inflation on target. Low and 
stable inflation rates are considered preferable since they induce strong rates of 
economic growth, and monetary policy can be used as an instrument to achieve 
this. The caveat is that it must not be operated by politicians but rather an 
independent Central Bank. 8 Furthermore, Rogoff (1985) argues that monetary 
policy ought to be "conservative" in that low inflation is a greater concern than 
low unemployment levels. This contrasts with monetary politics, in which 
political considerations mean low unemployment in the short run is preferred 
against higher inflation in the long run. This is the time inconsistency problem 
alluded to earlier. In addition, an operationally independent Central Bank would 
signal greater credibility to the financial markets and commitment to low inflation, 
than politicians. 
The level of economic activity varies close to a supply-side equilibrium. In 
equations (1) to (3) above, this is represented by yt = 0, inflation rate at target and 
real interest rate at R*. In terms of the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU), unemployment levels above (below) the NAIRU will 
result in lower (higher) rates of inflation. The NAIRU is a supply-side construct 
8 Debelle and Fischer (1994) and also Fischer (1994) note the importance of distinguishing between 
goal independence and instrument independence. In terms of goal dependence, price stability as an 
objective of monetary policy is determined by the government. The role of the Central Bank is to 
pursue the goal by implementing official interest rates independently. Further discussion is presented 
by Bernanke et al. (1999). Instrument independence on the other hand is considered a solution to the 
time inconsistency problem, and the basis of a forward looking monetary policy with respect to the 
long and variable lags in official interest rates. Exceptions to this approach include Rogoff (1985) in 
which goal and instrument independence is advocated, together with a "conservative" approach to 
monetary policy. 
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and related to labour market developments. The domestic inflation rate relative to 
the expected inflation rate, is determined by below NAIRU levels of 
unemployment, with inflation increasing when unemployment is below the 
NAIRU. In the long run however, there is not a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, leaving the economy to move on average at the NAIRU in order 
to avoid rising inflation. In the long run, inflation is a monetary phenomenon in 
the sense that the rate of increase is the same as the rate of interest. As a result. 
monetary policy is determined by the Central Bank and controlling the money 
supply is not important. This is because the demand for money is unstable which 
means changes in the money supply have an uncertain impact on economic 
activity. 
In the long run, the level of economic activity is not determined independently by 
the level of effective demand. Rather, demand adjusts to support supply-side 
influences on economic activity, which corresponds to the NAIRU. This is akin 
to Say's Law. In addition, monetary policy responds to demand shocks by 
changes in interest rates as a means of controlling inflation, if unemployment falls 
below the NAIRU. As a result, monetary policy is restricted, in that it can only 
have temporary and serially correlated effects on the level of economic activity 
but no long run effects. Furthermore, interest rate changes result in short term and 
temporary effects which fade away with changes in prices. 
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5.3 THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF INFLATION TARGETING 
In Arestis and Sawyer (2003a), it is shown that a combination of monetary policy 
and fiscal policy measures produce better economic outcomes than the single 
policy instrument of Inflation Targeting, namely the official interest rate. 
Monetary policy is shown to be a flexible instrument in the stabilisation sense, 
though not necessarily the most significant determinant of inflation. In a similar 
proposition, Palley (2003) argues that problems with the balance sheet mean 
Inflation Targeting is not an appropriate guide for monetary policy. In the present 
environment of deregulated, highly innovative financial markets, such imbalances 
are more likely to be present. The effects may not necessarily have immediate 
influences on inflation, though they may on employment and output costs. Such 
imbalances, in the form of asset price and debt bubbles, cannot be managed by 
Inflation Targeting which means further policy objectives are required in support. 
Palley (2003) also notes the potential for Inflation Targeting induced moral hazard 
in asset markets. Since monetary authorities tend to be more concerned with asset 
values during economic downswings, the argument of asset price bubbles is given 
greater credence. 
Another short-coming of Inflation Targeting is the role of the committee in a 
monetary policy decision making process. Blinder (1998: 20), argues that 
committees "laboriously aggregate individual preferences ... need to 
be led 
... 
tend to adopt compromise positions on difficult questions ... tend to 
be inertial. " 
This latter factor is considered to contribute to "inducing the central bank to 
maintain its policy stance too long" which results in them "to overstay their 
stance. " A disciplined management of the committee may well go some way- to 
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countering these issues, though "a chairman who needs to build a consensus may 
have to move more slowly than if he were acting alone. " 
In equation (2) above, inflation expectations influence actual inflation and in 
equation (3), deviations of inflation above target result in official interest rate 
increases. In this respect, Inflation Targeting or a similar approach to controlling 
inflation, can thus reduce and maintain low levels of inflation if expectations of 
inflation can be influenced accordingly. It might be argued that money supply 
control in the 1980s was a similar policy. Therefore a target rate of money supply 
growth that is below the current rate of inflation would reduce inflation 
expectations, with actual inflation then reduced with minimal short run 
consequences for unemployment and no effects in the long run. Targets for 
money supply growth were not met where this approach was been followed in the 
past, such as in the U. S., U. K., or Germany. More important however, is the fact 
that inflation was not quickly reduced. Thus it might be said that target growth 
rates for the money supply were not successful, though as Mishkin (2002) 
suggests, Inflation Targeting may have been more successful. 
In addition, Arestis and Sawyer (2002b), suggest that the credibility of Inflation 
Targeting, strengthened by transparency and accountability, may also have 
contributed. A problem here however, is that Central Banks which have not 
adopted Inflation Targeting have also been successful in controlling inflation. 
whilst at the same time making no discernible effort to be more transparent and 
accountable. 
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5.3.1 The Nominal Anchor 
Another criticism concerns the role of a nominal anchor such as the inflation 
target. This leaves little room for stabilising output. The majority consensus on 
this issue is that it is feasible in the short run and not necessary in the long run 
because output returns to equilibrium. However, there do exist proponents of 
Inflation Targeting who argue that both output and price variations should be the 
concern of monetary policy. Meyer (2001) and also Bernanke (2003) distinguish 
between two approaches. In the first, price stability is the priority and all other 
policy objectives are secondary. In the second, price stability and economic 
activity objectives are of equal concern. Both these authors support the latter 
view, with Bernanke (2003: 10) arguing that, "Formally, the dual mandate can be 
represented by a central bank loss function that includes both inflation and 
unemployment (or the output gap) symmetrically. " Furthermore, Bernanke 
(2003a: 2) has also argued that, 
"In practice ... this approach 
has allowed central banks to achieve better 
outcomes in terms of both inflation and unemployment, confounding the 
traditional view that policymakers must necessarily tradeoff between the 
important social goals of price stability and high employment. " 
Others such as King (2002), argue that central banks should not be "inflation 
nutters. " In Mishkin (2002: 3), it is argued that, "the objectives for a central bank 
in the context of a long run strategy should not only include minimising inflation 
fluctuations, but should also include minimising output fluctuations. " In Svensson 
(1999) this is defined as "flexible inflation targeting. " Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999) and Svensson (1997) argue that even when Inflation Targeting is the sole 
policy objective, policy responses to the factors which determine inflation, as %\ ell 
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as current inflation and the output gap are optimal. This is because both inflation 
and the output gap are determinants of future inflation. Svensson (2003: 451) also 
argues for "forecast targeting" as a means of, commitment to minimise a loss 
function over forecasts of the target variables. In the loss function, both inflation 
and output gap forecasts are target variables. With regard to a general forecast 
target, Svensson (2003: 455) notes a problem with the degree to which monetary 
policy objectives are accurately specified, in that output gap weights are not 
explicitly stated. Secondly, the optimal approach may not hold under forward 
looking models though a solution to this might be, "a commitment to a specific 
targeting rule. " For the proponents of Inflation Targeting however, the priority is 
price stability. Mishkin (2000: 8), in reference to the U. S. experience, argues that, 
"the lack of a clear mandate for price stability can lead to the time-inconsistency 
problem in which political pressure is put on the Fed to engage in expansionary 
policy to pursue short-run goals. " For proponents of the dual approach, and where 
output stabilisation is possible in the short run, Bernanke (2003a: 10) argues, 
"The essence of constrained discretion is the general role of a 
commitment to price stability. Not only does such a commitment enhance 
efficiency, employment, and economic growth in the long run, but by 
providing an anchor for inflation expectations, it also improves the ability 
of the central banks to stabilise the economy in the short run as well. " 
Meyer (2001: 8) however, takes a contrasting view of long run price stability by 
stating that, 
"this view is misleading in a couple of respects. First, monetary 
policymakers should be concerned about two long run properties of the 
economy. One is price stability and the other is the variability of output 
1 37 
Chapter Five: Inflation Targeting. 
around full employment. Policy has to be judged by its success in both 
dimensions. Second, policy is made in the short run, not the long run. 
The speed of return of output to its potential level is influenced by policy 
decisions and cannot be treated with indifference. It may just take too 
long and waste too many resources in the interim to rely on the self- 
equilibrating forces of the economy. Policymakers will therefore have to 
take into account, in practice, both objectives in their policy decisions. " 
With regard to a preference for low inflation under Inflation Targeting. a working 
assumption is that low inflation is always preferable to high inflation, with lower 
inflation possible with no loss of output. This is a characteristic of the system of 
equations above. This position can be contrasted with panel data evidence on IMF 
economies between 1960 and 1996, from Ghosh and Phillips (1998: 674), in 
which, 
"there are two important nonlinearities in the inflation-growth relationship. 
At very low inflation rates (around 2-3 percent a year, or lower), inflation and 
growth are positively correlated. Otherwise, inflation and growth are 
negatively correlated, but the relationship is convex, so that the decline in 
growth associated with an increase from 10 percent to 20 percent inflation is 
much larger than that associated with moving from 40 percent to 50 percent 
inflation. " 
It might be said that the point at which nonlinearity switches from positive and 
negative does not have a large empirical basis and that more research would be 
beneficial. Other contributors to the debate include Stiglitz (2003) on inflation 
targeting who suggests, 
"there is an optimal rate of inflation, greater than zero. So ruthless pursuit 
of price stability harms economic growth and well-being. Research even 
questions whether targeting price stability reduces the trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. "9 
9 See also Akerlof et al. (1996). 
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5.3.2 Real and Monetary Factors 
A preference for low inflation is also related to a distinction between real and 
monetary factors in the economy. This relates to monetary policy being on the 
nominal side of the economy targeting inflation, and supply-side policies on the 
real side of the economy targeting unemployment. However, it need not be that 
supply side policies are an inherent characteristic of Inflation Targeting. 
According to King (1997: 6), 
"if one believes that, in the long run, there is no trade off between 
inflation and output then there is no point in using monetary policy to 
target output. You only have to adhere to the view that printing money 
cannot raise long run productivity growth, in order to believe that inflation 
rather than output is the only sensible objective of monetary policy in the 
long run. " 
An example of the constant supply side equilibrium can be illustrated by the 
"natural rate of unemployment" or the NAIRU being expressed in single digit 
form. In the system of equations above, constant supply side equilibrium is 
represented by a zero output gap. It may be that supply side equilibrium changes 
over time but this would not be because of demand side factors, but supply side 
variables such as the labour market. In terms of Inflation Targeting the more 
important issue is whether monetary policy has a long run influence on the supply 
side of the economy through official interest rate and aggregate demand changes. 
Variations of NAIRU estimates over time include Gordon (1997) in which 
inflation and the rate of unemployment are used to present evidence for the natural 
rate of unemployment. OECD estimates of the NAWRU - non-accelerating wage 
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rate of unemployment - are also available. 10 These are over ten year time periods 
for various economies, and show substantial variations of the NA`VRL over time 
l for the economies under consideration. " 
In the estimates, investment spending is the most interest rate sensitive aggregate 
demand variable; changes in investment expenditure in response to interest rate 
changes are larger than other aggregate demand variables. Under Inflation 
Targeting, the emphasis is on official interest rate transmission to the rate of 
inflation through the level of aggregate demand. Investment however, also 
influences the capital stock values and thus the supply side of the economy. For 
monetary policy to not influence the supply side in the long run, would require 
that the real rate of interest is on average, at equilibrium and the effects of interest 
rates relative to the equilibrium rate were symmetrical. However, even this would 
impact investment spending with the effects lasting as long as the life of the 
capital stock involved. This in turn implies that inflation control through 
deflationary monetary policy and increased interest rates would have a long run 
impact on the capital stock. 
5.3.3 The Causes of Inflation 
As equation (2) implies, monetary policy in the new consensus is based on the use 
of official interest rates to control demand- rather than cost-inflation. In a separate 
context, Gordon (1997: 17) notes that, 
" The estimates do not cover the determinants of such changes. In addition, they are based on 
econometric simulations of the model. 
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"in the long run inflation is always and everywhere an excess nominal 
GDP phenomenon. Supply shocks will come and go. What remains to 
sustain long run inflation is steady growth of nominal GDP in excess of 
the growth of natural or potential real output. " 
As illustrated in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for example, cost-inflation is 
either accommodated, or that the rate of inflation is unaffected by transitory 
supply shocks which are on average zero, under Inflation Targeting. An 
implication of Inflation Targeting therefore, is that inflation can be controlled 
through official interest rates acting to induce demand deflation. There is also a 
potential equilibrium or "natural rate" of interest which balances aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply so that there is a zero gap between actual and 
potential output. This concept of demand inflation under monetary policy, raises 
three questions. First, the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing 
inflation through changes in aggregate demand. In Arestis and Sawyer (2002b), it 
is shown to be ineffective. Second, the appropriateness of monetary policy in 
influencing aggregate demand and demand-inflation, as implied by the Phillips 
curve in equation (2). Again, Arestis and Sawyer (2002b), show that it is not and 
that fiscal policy is the most appropriate instrument of policy. Third, the lack of 
importance given to sustained cost-push and other non-demand related inflation in 
the new consensus. In equation (2), the simple Phillips curve does not include 
labour and production costs such as wages and materials, or imported inflation. 
Any sustained rise in money wages or profit demands are not included in equation 
(2). 12 While this may be feasible for stochastically varying and on average zero, 
wage and profit margin demands, positive periods in which the error term in 
equation (2) would also be positive, would have more long term effects. This is 
12 Though they could be represented in the equation error term. 
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because the lagged inflation term in equation (3) implies a feed through effect of 
inflation from one period to the next. Similarly, equation (2) implies that an 
increase in inflation expectations induces inflation increases resulting in higher 
than normal rates of inflation. If inflation was to rise in a sustained fashion, sa` 
on the back of cost pressure as evidenced in the 1970s, the only solution in this 
framework would be to increase official interest rates and reduce inflation through 
reduced demand and increased unemployment. 
5.4 INFLATION AND THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
In the Inflation Targeting framework, inflation is targeted through equation (1) 
where official interest rates are determined by the monetary policy rule as in 
equation (3). Changes in these interest rates influence the level of aggregate 
demand and in equation (2), changes in the level of aggregate demand influence 
the rate of inflation. The magnitude, frequency and predictability of interest rate 
adjustments on the level of aggregate demand are important considerations. High 
(low) interest rates tend to reduce (increase) aggregate demand which in turn 
reduces (increases) the rate of inflation. However, the fact that interest rates can 
also be a firm cost, leading to increased inflation, is not considered. In the system 
of equations outlined above, a single interest rate is included and this does not 
account for feed through effects of the policy instrument on long term interest 
rates. As former Federal Reserve chairman Volcker (2002: 9) notes, monetary 
policy in this framework, "relies upon direct influence on the short-term interest 
rate and a much more fluid market situation that allows policy to be transmitted 
through the markets by some mysterious or maybe not so mysterious process. " 
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The channels of monetary policy transmission are discussed in chapter three. 
These are the interest rate channel, the wealth effect channel, the exchange rate 
channel, the monetarist channel, the narrow credit channel and the broad credit 
channel. Central to the narrow credit and broad credit channels is the role of 
financial market imperfections. In particular, an assumption of credit market 
frictions leads to changes in financial position of borrowers and lenders. which in 
turn influences aggregate demand. In the narrow credit channel, known also as 
the bank lending channel in Hall (2001), the role of banks is key. 13 Banks finance 
investment and other projects through deposit demand and reserve requirements. 
Monetary policy decisions influence bank reserves, which in turn determine the 
supply of loans to borrowers. Since a substantial number of firms and households 
are dependent on bank finance, this has repercussions for aggregate demand and 
inflation. 
In the broad credit or balance sheet channel, aggregate demand is affected via 
changes in borrower financial positions which affect loan supply. '' Here, the 
supply of external funds to firms is dependent on an assumption of imperfect 
information. Lenders incur monitoring costs in supplying loans, which they 
recover through premiums charged to borrowers. In addition, the external finance 
premium for a firm is determined by its financial position. Thus low (high) firm 
gearing means high (low) internal finance and small (large) external premiums. In 
terms of firm cash flow, increases (decreases) in official interest rates raise 
(lower) gearing ratios. In other words, the amount of an investment project 
financed by external funds, which increases the monitoring cost premium. In 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and also Roosa (1951) consider the role of banks in further detail. 
'ý See Bernanke et al. (1999) and also Bernanke and Gertler (1989,1999) for further discussion. 
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terms of asset prices, the value of borrower collateral secured against loans is 
affected. The value of collateral is especially important in the presence of 
asymmetric information, agency costs and similar friction in the credit market. 
This is because if higher official interest rates induce collateral value falls (rises). 
say on the back of declining (rising) asset prices, then the premium for the 
borrower rises (falls). As a result, investment and consumption can be 
substantially affected by this "financial accelerator" effect. Asset price changes 
are also influential for the wealth effect channel, where the consumption function 
is determined by consumer expenditure, or wealth. Here, official interest rate 
decisions are transmitted to asset prices and the real value of household wealth. 
This results in changes in consumer expenditure. 
In the interest rate and monetarist channels, the underlying assumption concerns 
the nature of money as a substitute for other assets. A high degree of 
substitutability between money and financial assets such as short term liquid 
instruments, means official interest rates are subject to significant influence from 
changes in the money supply. Also affected are real interest rates and the user 
cost of capital, when prices are sticky. The components of aggregate demand are 
considered interest rate sensitive, implying official interest rate changes have a 
significant influence on the level and magnitude of economic activity. 
6'Availability" effects might also be present in the form of market interest rates not 
being adjusted following official interest rate changes. This may be so if financial 
institutions decide to engage in credit rationing as discussed in Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). Thus monetary policy indicates greater information than changes in the 
money supply. In the former, policy is conducted with greater certainty through 
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an emphasis on direct manipulation of interest rates, rather than control of the 
money supply. A prerequisite of this however, is the provision of an appropriate 
monetary base. A high degree of substitutability between money, and sa`-. real 
assets, means the effect of a change in the money supply is dependent on the 
relative changes in price. Changes in relative asset prices therefore, are key to the 
monetarist channel with changes in interest rate relegated to those of relative 
prices. Official interest rate changes affect relative "real" rates and thus the rate 
of interest is not considered as the instrument of monetary policy. Instead, 
monetary policy sets the money supply leaving interest rates an endogenous 
variable, with the subsequent influence on aggregate demand coming from 
changes in relative asset prices. 
In the exchange rate channel, monetary policy decisions are transmitted to 
inflation through total demand and expected exchange rates. In the former, the 
uncovered interest rate parity assumption links interest rates to inflation. 
Monetary policy induced changes in domestic market interest rates relative to 
overseas interest rates lead to changes in the balance of payments via the 
exchange rate. This in turn leads to changes in the overall level of aggregate 
demand and thereby, the rate of inflation. In the latter, it is interest rate 
differentials and the price of imports. Here, a direct effect of exchange rate 
changes on import prices has an effect on the rate of inflation. The channels of 
monetary policy transmission are gauged in the section below, where the 
quantitative impact of interest rate changes on the level of economic activity and 
the rate of inflation is considered. 
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5.5 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INFLATION TARGETING 
The empirical evidence on Inflation Targeting can broadly be categorised in terms 
of macroeconometric modelling and single equation techniques. Both of these 
approaches are considered below. 
5.5.1 Inflation Targeting and Macroeconometric Modelling 
Ideally, the effects of monetary policy transmission through the channels 
discussed above would be assessed in some quantitative manner. However, this is 
not possible for a variety of reasons. For example, no one channel is mutually 
exclusive and the effects of official interest rate changes on economic activity are 
determined by an interaction between the channels. Since these channels operate 
interdependently and simultaneously, it is difficult if not impossible to gauge the 
role of any single channel in the transmission of monetary policy to the rate of 
inflation. An additional problem concerns identifying change, magnitude and 
relevance of a transmission channel over time, often in the presence of other 
structural change taking place at the same time. Perhaps the most important issue 
is the fact that the effects of changes in monetary policy often take relatively long 
time periods to become evident, and this, together with the other problems 
highlighted are indicative of Kuttner and Mosser (2002: 17-18) who imply a 
continuously changing relationship between monetary policy and the real 
economy. In Boivin and Giannoni (2002a, 2002b) both VAR and structural 
equation approaches are adopted respectively for the U. S, between 1960 and 2001. 
and these point to a changing transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Simultaneity is another important issue. Monetary policy tends to adopt both 
loose and tight stances depending on economic developments. This is illustrated 
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by Kuttner and Mosser (2002: 23), who ask, how is it possible to isolate the 
effect of interest rates on economic conditions when interest rates are themselves a 
function of economic conditions. " Thus an endogenous response of policy to 
economic developments is an obstacle in the identification and quantitative 
assessment of individual channels of monetary policy transmission. Any such 
exercise must therefore bear these issues in mind. 15 
Arestis and Sawyer (2002b) estimate the effects of interest rate changes using 
dynamic macroeconometric simulations. Models used in official policy making 
are used, namely those of the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and 
the U. S. Federal Reserve. These are surveyed in Bank of England (1999,2000), 
Van Els et al. (2001), and Angeloni et al. (2002) respectively. The authors find 
limitations on permanent interest rate changes. Under interest rate parity. the 
influence of official interest rates on the exchange rate is significant in the sense 
that an interest rate differential between domestic and overseas interest rates 
results in a continuous change in the exchange rate. However, the authors cast 
doubt on the empirical robustness of this relationship because of near impossible 
difficulty in estimating exchange rate movements. Theoretically, interest rate 
variations ought to be limited by the close link between the interest rate 
differential and expected movements in the exchange rate. Empirically however, 
this does not seem to be the case, with variations in the exchange rate proving 
difficult to model in any theoretical specification. Secondly, model simulations 
for European Central Bank interest rates indicate monetary policy effects on 
aggregate demand are driven by significant changes in the rate of investment. The 
15 Volcker (2002) discusses the problems identified here at length. 
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implication is that interest rate changes affect investment activity over the long 
run through changes in the value of the capital stock. Thirdly, monetary policy 
affects the rate of inflation only moderately in that a one percentage point change 
in the rate of interest leads to a change in the price level of 0.41 percent in one 
model and 0.76 percent in another, over a five year time horizon. The greatest fall 
in the rate of inflation is 0.21 percent. Thus the potential influence of interest 
rates seems to be minimal and not theoretically robust as implied under Inflation 
Targeting. 
5.5.2 Inflation Targeting and Single Equation Techniques 
In single equation estimates of the Inflation Targeting model, the emphasis is on 
the performance of inflation, the credibility of monetary policy, and the sacrifice 
ratio. The latter point relates to reducing inflation without a substantial increase in 
cost. An early study is that of Leiderman and Svensson (1995) though with a 
small number of observations. Longer data runs are used in later studies including 
Bernanke et al. (1999), Corbo et al. (2001,2002), Clifton et al. (2001), Arestis et 
al. (2002), Johnson (2002), and also Neumann and von Hagen (2002). The latter 
of these studies is a comprehensive review of empirical findings on Inflation 
Targeting, which support the importance of this framework. Low levels of 
inflation and interest rate and inflation volatility has been achieved in economies 
adopting the Inflation Targeting framework. As Neumann and van Hagen (2002: 
144) note, "Of all Inflation Targeting countries, it is the United Kingdom that has 
performed best even though its target rate of inflation is higher than the inflation 
targets of most other countries. " In addition, Bernanke (2003b: 1) states that. 
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"central banks that have switched to inflation targeting have generally 
been pleased with the results they have obtained. The strongest evidence 
on that score is that, thus far at least, none of the several dozen adopters of 
inflation targeting has abandoned this approach. " 
Several shortcomings of the empirical literature surveyed in Neumann and von 
Hagen (2002) can be identified. First, the notion that Inflation Targeting improves 
the performance of inflation, the credibility of policy and lowers the sacrifice ratio 
is not robust. The 1990s saw a period of economic stability, or "a period friendly 
to price stability" as Neumann and von Hagen (2002: 129) state. Therefore at 
most, Inflation Targeting may have achieved little more than if another policy had 
been adopted. In fact Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002), note that the experiences of 
non-Inflation Targeting economies have been similar to those of Inflation 
Targeting over the same period. Second, despite the lack of any firm consensus 
on the robustness of Inflation Targeting, proponents of the policy argue very 
strongly that Central Bank price stability is at great risk if Inflation Targeting is 
not adopted. For example, Bernanke et al. (1999) "submit a plea" for Inflation 
Targeting by the Federal Reserve, and Alesina et al. (2001) suggest European 
Central Bank monetary policy would be improved through a policy of Inflation 
Targeting. However neither of these studies provide any supporting evidence for 
their positions, in contrast to doubts over their appropriateness expressed by 
Gramlich (2000) and Duisenberg (2003) for the Federal Reserve and the European 
Central Bank respectively. Third, authors such as Mishkin and Posen (1997), 
suggest inflation has been brought under control before the introduction of 
Inflation Targeting in economies such as Canada, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. This implies that Inflation Targeting acts to "lock in" the gains from 
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inflation control rather than generating it in the first instance. Bernanke et al. 
(1999: 288) for example, note that, 
"one of the main benefits of inflation targets is that they may help to "lock 
in" earlier disinflationary gains particularly in the face of one-time 
inflationary shocks. We saw this effect, for example, following the exit of 
the United Kingdom and Sweden from the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism and after Canada's 1991 imposition of the Goods and 
Services Tax. In each case, the reigniting of inflation seems to have been 
avoided by the announcement of inflation targets that helped to anchor the 
public's inflation expectations and to give an explicit plan for and 
direction to monetary policy. " 
Returning the Mishkin and Posen (1997), Inflation Targeting is considered an 
effective "strategy" to control inflation, with evidence presented to suggest 
economies which adopted Inflation Targeting also experienced low rates of 
inflation, and low interest rate and inflation volatility. The authors do not 
however, show how, if at all, Inflation Targeting is more effective a monetary 
policy than targeting of the money supply. Between 1974 and 1998 German 
monetary policy targeted the money supply, and between 1980 and 1990, the U. S. 
Federal Reserve did not engage in monetary or Inflation Targeting. The authors 
also produce VAR estimates of Taylor-type monetary policy reaction functions to 
support a Central Bank policy of inflation control under Inflation Targeting, with 
an implication of price stability. The results indicate that inflation shocks become 
relatively more important as determinants of interest rate variations under 
Inflation Targeting. 
With regard to the material in Neumann and von Hagen (2002), Mishkin (2002) 
notes that the estimated coefficients on the inflation parameter in Taylor-type 
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reaction functions are less than one in both the short run and the long run. This 
implies that inflation is a very unstable process. This is because inflation 
increases are met by relatively smaller official interest rate increases. which in 
turn reduce the real rate of interest. The obvious outcome here is inflationary 
rather than deflationary monetary policy. The result also holds for economies 
where Inflation Targeting is not adopted, such as the U. S. and contrasts with 
Taylor (1993) in which it is greater than one for the post 1979 period in which 
monetary policy is considered to have performed better than the pre 1979 period. 
Mishkin (2002) also notes a problem concerning VAR analysis, namely that it 
does not incorporate a dynamic structural model. By implication, this means that 
interest rate variability induced by inflation shocks, is not necessarily an 
interpretation of greater preference for inflation control by policymakers. The 
reason for this is because if interest rate variability is caused by inflation shocks 
under Inflation Targeting, then inflation expectations prevent deviations of 
inflation from target. Thus inflation control is less of a concern for monetary 
policy and not more. As Mishkin (2002: 150) therefore notes, "the VAR evidence 
in the paper, tells us little about the impact of inflation targeting on the conduct of 
monetary policy. " 
In Ball and Sheridan (2003), the Inflation Targeting experience of twenty OECD 
economies is considered, including seven economies in which the framework was 
adopted during the 1990s. The authors report little evidence supporting the view 
that macroeconomic performance was improved under Inflation Targeting. in 
terms of interest rate, inflation and output measures. This is not to say that 
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Inflation Targeting economies experienced better performance. Indeed, inflation 
fell and became stable in such economies, and output growth also stabilised. 
However, economies which had not adopted Inflation Targeting also experienced 
similar outcomes and therefore factors other than Inflation Targeting need to be 
considered. Improvements in economic performance were greater for Inflation 
Targeting economies than others, an outcome similar to that of Neumann and von 
Hagen (2002) in which this is considered indicative of the benefits of Inflation 
Targeting. The authors refer to this as "convergence" in reference to convergence 
on average, of Inflation Targeting economies' inflation rates to those of non- 
Inflation Targeting economies over the same period. However Ball and Sheridan 
(2003), argue that even these benefits of Inflation Targeting are doubtful. The 
authors cite evidence to suggest economies with high and unstable rates of 
inflation, experienced improvements in economic performance regardless of 
whether or not they adopted Inflation Targeting. The perceived benefits are 
thought to disappear altogether once these effects are controlled for, with the 
apparent success of Inflation Targeting economies considered by Ball and 
Sheridan (2003: 16), due to "high initial inflation and large decreases, but the 
decrease for a given initial level looks similar for targeters and non-targeters. " 
The authors report a similar outcome for inflation variability and inflation 
persistence. With regard to the influence of Inflation Targeting on interest rates 
and output, Ball and Sheridan (2003) also conclude that the framework does not 
affect output growth or output variability, nor interest rates or interest rate 
variability. In a similar study of Inflation Targeting in Canada between 1980-89 
and 1990-99, Bodkin and Neder (2003: 355) produce graphical evidence 
indicating that inflation did fall during these periods but at a substantial cost to 
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output and inflation. The authors thus conclude with doubt over a central tenet of 
Inflation Targeting namely, 
"the theoretical notion of the supposed long-run neutrality of money. " 
They also suggest that the "real effects (higher unemployment and ... lower growth) during the decade under study suggests that some small 
amount of inflation (say in the ranger of 3 to 5 percent) may well be 
beneficial for a modem economy. " 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented the close relationship between Inflation Targeting and 
the New Classical Macroeconomics. The theoretical foundations of the former 
have been outlined, together with several shortcomings. An assessment of the 
empirical evidence on Inflation Targeting has also been presented. Mishkin 
(1999: 595) when commenting on inflation reductions in Inflation Targeting 
economies argues that this has been "beyond that which would likely have 
occurred in the absence of inflation targets. " However, it appears that there is 
very little empirical evidence or theoretical robustness behind such a stance. 
Rather Ball and Sheridan (2003) seem closer to the mark in noting that the recent 
experience of "low inflation" is the same for economies, regardless of whether or 
not Inflation Targeting has been adopted. 
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DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the variables used for the purposes of estimation and 
explains the methods of research adopted for them. The sections that follow. 
explain each of these in more detail. 
6.2 THE DATASET 
The Bank of England policy instrument is represented by the end of month Bank 
Rate (January 1970 to September 1972), the Minimum Lending Rate (October 
1972 to December 1974), and the Official Bank Rate (January 1975 to June 
2007). 1 Monthly data observations reflect the frequency of monetary policy 
committee decisions since May 1997, noting of course that the decision is often no 
change. Prior to operational independence, the interest rate was reviewed 
frequently but the only decision which was announced would be when there was a 
change. The series moves close to the Treasury bill rate, which is an alternative 
measure for the same period. The official bank rate however, is preferred over the 
Treasury bill rate, as it is the actual rate set by the committee and although the 
Treasury bill rate is consistent over the period, the rate set by the Bank of England 
has changed. 
' From January 1975, observations of the policy instrument are taken from the Statistical Interactive 
Database of the Bank of England. Prior to this period, observations are taken from 
http"//www bankofeng7land co. uk/statistics/rates-baserate. pdf, Pages 14-19. 
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Between January 1970 and September 1972, we adopt the Bank of England end of 
the month Bank Rate as the policy instrument. Before September 1971, the main 
objective of monetary policy making was to try and control the supply of credit 
which was made available to the private sector. In this period, another main 
objective of policy-making was to try and exert some influence over the level and 
structure of interest rates. Control over the supply of credit was achieved by, 
imposing both quantitative and qualitative restrictions on bank lending and also by 
imposing strict conditions on hire purchase credit. This chapter is more concerned 
with the role of monetary policy in controlling the level and structure of interest 
rates. To this end, we are more focused on the interest rate set by the Bank of 
England. This was the Bank Rate. When the bank rate was in use, a surplus of 
funds in the money market was created by a net flow of funds from the Bank and 
the government to the banking sector. In addition, a shortage was created by a net 
flow of funds from the banking sector to the government and the Bank of 
England. This implied that government revenue did not equal government 
expenditure. As a result, the Bank of England operated in the financial markets, 
particularly discount houses. It did so by engaging in the sale and purchase of 
Treasury bills as intended to ensure that there was a balance in the banking 
system. Therefore, for the early part of the sample period adopted in this study, we 
adopt the Bank Rate as a measure of the policy instrument. This is because the 
Bank Rate had a direct influence on money market interest rates in the UK 
economy and it was also the rate at which the Bank of England in its capacity as 
lender of last resort used when lending to the discount markets against T-bills. In 
the early 1970s, the Bank Rate was also used as a reference point by clearing 
banks in London when determining an interest rate to be paid on deposits and 
155 
Chapter Six: Data and Research _tlethod. 
deposits. It might also be noted that the Bank Rate was less influential in terms of 
non-resident and other banks in the UK which were more influenced from interest 
rates in money markets especially the interbank market. From October 1972 to 
December 1974, we adopt the Minimum Lending Rate. The Minimum Lending 
Rate (MLR) was introduced on the back of reforms to the monetary and banking 
system which were implemented around September 1971. The main purpose of 
these was to encourage greater competition amongst clearing banks. This was 
also a period when the rate of growth of the money stock was considered a 
primary objective of monetary policy making in the UK. As a result, the 
Minimum Lending Rate replaced the Bank Rate on 13 October 1972 as the 
official policy instrument. 
Again, the Bank of England used the Minimum Lending Rate in its capacity as 
lender of last resort when lending to the discount markets against specific 
securities. Between October 1972 and May 1978, the Minimum Lending Rate 
was usually set at 1/2% above the average discount rate for T-bills. The average 
rate of discount on T-bills was determined by weekly tenders and rounded to the 
nearest quarter percent above an effective rate for lending purposes from the 
following working day. For lending purposes, the announcements were made the 
following day. The system however, did not include changes in the Minimum 
Lending Rate. This new rate became effective immediately and the usual formula 
was suspended until markets into line. In March 1977 there was one modification 
to this arrangement. This concerned a possible reduction in the Minimum 
Lending Rate. In case of a prospective reduction in the Minimum Lending Rate, 
then the Bank of England was allowed the right in exceptional circumstances to 
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either leave the rate unchanged or to change it by an amount less than that would 
have resulted from the previous formula. From October 1972 to December 1974 
therefore, we are adopting the Minimum Lending Rate as the instrument of 
monetary policy. The primary reason for adopting the Minimum Lending Rate is 
that it represents the implementation of monetary policy on a monthly basis. It is 
noted and accepted however that although the Minimum Lending Rate represents 
the instrument of monetary policy, the actual methods with which monetarN- 
control was achieved over a longer period include the special deposit scheme 
which had existed from 1961 onwards, the reserve assets ratio which existed 
between 1971 and 1981, and also the supplementary deposit scheme which 
operated between 1973 and 1980. Each of these methods had a direct influence 
on the money markets. For example, calls on special or supplementary deposits 
meant that cash was withdrawn from the banking system while reserve ratios 
meant that some of the short-term assets were not available to meet cash 
shortages. From May 1978, the Minimum Lending Rate became administered in a 
manner which meant that any change in the Minimum Lending Rate was 
announced at midday on Thursday and the new rate became effective for bank 
lending immediately. 
Although the Minimum Lending Rate is used as a proxy for the policy instrument 
for the early 1970s some criticisms are also acknowledged and noted. The first is 
that worldwide inflation in the early 1970s was higher and more variable. Second, 
the growing emphasis on monetary growth in this period. Both of these were 
associated with higher and more volatile interest rates. Secondly, it might also be 
noted that during this period there were not sufficient reserves of Treasury bills 
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for the purposes of selling to the Bank so that any shortages in the market could be 
funded or any surpluses could be bought in. 
October 1980 saw a gradual change in the way in which the Bank of England 
operated in the money markets. This was largely the result of discussion papers 
and consultation meetings with relevant authorities. Nevertheless the exact 
arrangements were explained in a paper entitled "Monetary Control Provisions" 
which became effective in August 1981. This is when the Minimum Lending 
Rate was suspended. Nevertheless, the bank of England was still able to use its 
discretion to announce to the market beforehand the Minimum Lending Rate at 
which it would lend to the market. Historic records show that the Minimum 
Lending Rate has actually been used on several occasions for periods of one day 
only. This was followed by a discontinuation of the reserve ratio requirements 
which were replaced by the cash ratio scheme. The special deposit scheme 
however, continued to operate. Initially, the Bank of England aimed to keep 
short-term interest rates within a pre-announced region which was determined by 
the authorities and to establish a very specific level of official interest rates. 
Lending was usually above comparable market interest rates but within this band 
established by the monetary authorities. There existed four dealing bands ranging 
from band one to band four and these had maturity of between 1 to 14 days, 15 to 
33 days, 34 to 63 days and also 64 to 91 days. In most cases the Bank of England 
operated in band one. Such ranges were used because if the Bank had a specific 
maturity date then the market may have had difficulty in producing sufficient 
paper maturing on that specific date at short notice. The Bank of England's 
intervention in the money markets was primarily along the lines of open market 
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operations rather than direct lending in the bill markets. Here the Bank acted 
primarily through the London Discount Markets Association. The general 
intention of the Bank being to offset daily cash flows in either direction between 
the Bank itself and the money markets. The number of banks which were 
required to hold a minimum proportion of their eligible liabilities in the form of 
security deposits with members of the London Discount Markets Association was 
extended. This meant that during periods of extreme shortages in the money 
markets the discount houses would be able to perform their roles as intermediaries 
in an effective manner. The Bank of England in acting to supply liquidity to the 
market, fulfilled this role primarily through discount houses and it did this by the 
sale of Treasury bills and local government bank bills either outright or on a sale 
and repurchase treatment which allowed it to anticipate potential surpluses and all 
shortages. The aim of the Bank was to supply daily the necessary amount of the 
liquidity. The Bank has been known to operate up to three times a day depending 
on the size of the shortage on any given day. If this did not address the shortage 
then the Bank of England was able to lend on a secure basis to discount houses at 
the end of the day up to an amount linked to their capital. 
After predetermined dealing rates had been phased out discount houses competed 
with one another to sell to the Bank of England including repo arrangements. In 
reacting to these offers the Bank of England was able to influence interest rates. 
For example, when the Bank was to accept these offers then it was able to ensure 
that sufficient amounts existed in the market and that therefore there was a 
balance. If however, any of these offers did not meet with the Bank of England's 
primary interest rate objective then these offers were not accepted. In this case the 
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Bank would not deal with the bill markets and could limit its dealings with 
discount houses who were short of cash and would inevitably need to borrow. 
The Bank of England was then able to set an interest rate which was consistent 
with the actual level that it was seeking to establish. The amount of liquidity that 
the Bank of England has had to supply on a daily basis has often been sizeable. 
especially after 1991 when changes in government financing had taken place and 
discount houses had generally decreased in size. To deal with this, the Bank of 
England introduced a twice monthly repo operation in 1994 which built on some 
of the temporary arrangements that had been introduced in 1992 after the UK left 
the exchange rate mechanism. This twice monthly repo facility was offered to 
banks, discount houses, building societies and guilt edged market-makers. It 
consisted of various different assets. In the main however, these were primarily 
gilt repo assets which the Bank of England would purchase from its counterparties 
and sell back to them at an agreed future date and price which had been set in 
advance. By providing such liquidity to the repo facility the Bank of England was 
able to reduce the amount of liquidity that was required to support its daily open 
market operations to an amount that was more easily manageable. 
Between January 1975 and June 2008, we use the Bank of England repo rate. 
This came about largely because of a change in the Bank of England's open 
market operations which were announced during 1996. Further details are 
contained in the "Reform of the Bank of England's operations in the sterling 
money markets. " The market for gilt repos was established in January 1996 and 
was included in the Bank of England's open market operations by February 1997. 
During this period, the Bank of England continued to use Treasury bills and also 
160 
Chapter Six: Data and Research Method. 
eligible bank and local government bills both for repo agreements alongside gilts 
and also for outright sale to the Bank. Also included in these were foreign 
currency marketable debt which took the form of Euro notes and bills issued by 
the government and the Bank of England, sterling denominated securities issued 
by EEA governments and major international institutions and also eligible Euro 
denominated securities including strips issued by EEA governments and also other 
institutions. 
Inflation data begin with observations of the retail prices index spliced into the 
retail prices index excluding mortgage interest payments as in Nelson (2000: 13), 
when they first become available from the Office for National Statistics in January 
1976. The latter maps the initial inflation target measure under instrument 
independence and the series might be interpreted as backward looking as in 
equation (2.1.1) of Appendix Two, since the data relate to percentage change over 
the preceding twelve months. However, it is not clear from the academic 
literature whether this is an appropriate measure and so alternatively, current and 
forward looking measures might also be considered as in equations (2.1.2) and 
(2.1.3) of Appendix Two respectively. The latter being in effect, a rational 
expectations view of anticipated inflation. These two measures are derived from 
the Office for National Statistics level of retail price inflation tables, RP022 and 
RP053 respectively. The former runs from the beginning of the sample period, 
and is replaced by the latter from January 1978, which is when the level of retail 
price inflation is measured to exclude mortgage interest payments. In the original 
tables cited above, two base years are used to calculate both the price level 
2 htt p: //www. statistics. gov. uk/downloads/theme economv/RPO2. p df 
http : //www. statistics. ,,,, ov. uk/downIoads/theme economy, 
RPIX. pdf 
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(January 1962 and January 1974), and the price level excluding mortgage interest 
payments (January 1974 and January 1987). In this study. the data have been 
rebased to a common point at the beginning of the sample period, to ensure 
consistency. In other words January 1970 and January 1974 for the price level. 
and January 1978 and January 1987 for the price level excluding mortgage interest 
payments. The series are not seasonally adjusted and there are a number of 
reasons for this, including the non-seasonal nature of mortgage interest payments. 
Unemployment enters the data set in the form of the claimant count rate as a 
possible factor in decision making, and also because of the role of NAIRU, though 
minor issues concern the reliability of this variable; unemployment figures are not 
subject to final revision whereas output figures are. Seasonally adjusted 
observations are however, available from the beginning of the sample period, 
though it is acknowledged that this is a narrow measure and does not correspond 
to the current National Statistics definition of unemployment. 4 Equation (2.2.1) in 
Appendix Two illustrates a second alternative, which is a relative claimant count 
rate measure. This is calculated by the difference between current period 
observations and a thirty-six month average. The rate of unemployment has 
fluctuated substantially over the entire sample period and a horizon of thirty six 
months compared to say, twelve months, is preferred to allow for a more 
meaningful understanding of the data. 
A variety of output gap measures are presented in the academic literature, though 
without firm consensus on any particular one. Here the index of industrial 
' The first twelve data observations for 1970 are not available from the ONS website and are archived 
in the Employment and Productivity Gazette, LXVIII, Jan-Dec, 1970: Page 810. 
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production is used since it closely approximates GDP and also reflects the 
frequency of monetary policy committee decisions. The series is smoothed using 
a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter from the literature on real business cycle theory. 
thereby making the trend more sensitive to long term rather than short term 
fluctuations. This adjustment is achieved by subtracting the solution to equation 
(2.3.2) in Appendix Three from the original industrial production series. 
6.3 PERIODISATION 
Periodic accounts of monetary policy development in the UK are presented by 
Cobham (2002: 15-20 and 23-25) and also by Nelson (2000: 15) amongst others. 
These cover the floating of Sterling in 1972, monetary targeting (with varying 
degrees of discretion) and the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) which 
were introduced between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. These are followed 
by Deutsche Mark shadowing in the late-1980s, and the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) in the early-1990s. Inflation targeting by the Government 
follows from 1992, with an independent Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
taking over from 1997. Coverage of monetary policy instruments over these same 
periods include Competition and Credit Control in 1971 followed by the 
Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme (or the `Corset') in late 1973. Monetary 
targeting with the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) and net sales of 
public sector debt to the private sector are also considered. Since the mid-1980s. 
the rate of interest has acted as the instrument of monetary policy. A firm 
consensus on the exact dating of policy regimes does not exist in the academic 
literature and studies such as Cobham et al. (2001: 3) for example, identify sub- 
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periods "on the basis of an examination of how policy evolved... " The two 
studies cited at the beginning of this paragraph also examine the development of 
monetary policy, reaching broadly similar conclusions in their determination of 
sub-periods. It might be noted that such examinations are comprehensive in their 
coverage and can be referred to rather than repeated here. The general approach 
to identifying sub-periods might further be considered indicative of the Taylor 
rule as a description of monetary policy, and with this in mind, the following sub- 
periods might be identified for the UK. 
A renewed interest in monetary policy in the UK and other countries during the 
1970s offers a backdrop to January 1970 as the sample start date. As Cobham 
(2002: 15) notes, "... monetary policy became more important during the course of 
the 1970s, after the Bretton Woods system had broken down and inflation had 
become a more pressing issue for economic policymakers. " In June 1972, the 
Bank of England (1972: 310) announced a floating of the exchange rate, effective 
the following month. On 22 July 1976, Chancellor Healey announced a growth 
rate target for £M3 (Bank of England, 1976: 296). The Medium Term Financial 
Strategy (MTFS) set £M3 targets in the March 1980 Budget, before being 
abandoned in October 1985 (Nelson, 2000: 15). Chancellor Lawson "... began to 
shadow the DM in March 1987" (Cobham, 2002: 18), or there was an "informal 
linking of the pound to the Deutsche Mark" (Nelson, 2000: 15). The UK "finally 
entered the ERM under another Chancellor, John Major, in October 1990. " 
(Cobham, 2002: 18). This "membership of the ERM" (Nelson, 2000: 15), was 
followed by the introduction of an inflation target and a new relationship between 
the Bank of England and the Treasury, under which the former would publish a 
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regular report on and forecast of inflation and would make formal 
recommendations on interest rates which the latter (that is, the Chancellor. then 
Norman Lamont) could accept or reject (Cobham, 2002: 19). This "period of 
inflation targeting in the United Kingdom prior to the Bank of England receiving 
operational independence" (Nelson, 2000: 15), was followed by a "decision by the 
incoming Labour government to hand decision-making on interest rates to a new 
Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England" (Cobham, 2002: 19). For 
estimations purposes then, sub-periods for estimation might be summarised as 
follows. 
" January 1970 to June 2007: the full sample period. 
" January 1970 to June 1976: from the start of the sample period to the last 
month of the floating of Sterling. 
" July 1976 to April 1979: monetary targeting with varying degrees of 
discretion. 
9 May 1979 to February 1987: the Medium Term Financial Strategy. 
" March 1987 to September 1990: Deutsche Mark shadowing. 
" October 1990 to September 1992: Membership of the ERM. 
" October 1992 to April 1997: Inflation targeting with Bank advising 
Chancellor. 
" May 1997 to June 2007: Inflation targeting with instrument independence. 
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6.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
Sheets 1 to 7 contain the results of estimates obtained using monthly observations 
and sheets 8 to 11 contain the results of estimates obtained using quarterly 
observations. In sheet 8 there is a jump in model numbers from those used in the 
monthly observations in sheet seven. For example, sheet seven finishes with 
model number 63 but sheet number eight begins with model number 73. Indeed 
there are similar jumps in sheet nine which begins with model 91 and sheet 10 
which begins with model 109 and also sheet 11 which begins with model number 
118. Where this is the case, the number of missing models is due to the fact that 
the number of quarterly observations were too small for the purposes of 
conducting an econometric analysis and therefore some observations were 
combined so that a great number of observations could be used to perform the 
analysis. We explain the following procedure using sheet number 1 as an 
example. The reader will notice that this sheet begins with model 1 which has 
with it, 4 tables. These are tables A, B, C and D for model 1. Table A for model 
1 represents a VAR lag order selection criteria which was used to determine the 
optimal number of lags. In this case, table A for model 1 in sheet 1 suggests that 
the optimal lag length was a lag length of 1 and this can be seen in row 13 of sheet 
1. This is followed by table B for model 1 which is in row 25 of sheet 1. This 
represents a Pantula (1989) principle test, in other words a cointegration test for 
the number of long-run parameters. The results from this are presented in table 3 
for model 1 which is in a row 38 on sheet 1. In rows 52 and 53 the normalised 
cointegration coefficients can be seen. Once a cointegrating relationship has been 
identified, then a fourth table is constructed. This is table D in row 59 of sheet 1 
which contains the results of a vector error correction mechanism. In other words. 
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4 tables are usually used for each model. The first table indicates the number of 
optimal lags, the second table gives the Pantula (1989) principle, the third table 
the results of a cointegration test and the fourth table the results of a vector error 
correction mechanism test. All these 4 tables for model 1, reflect the simple case 
where cointegration has been identified and an error correction mechanism has 
been adopted. The only other difference for each of the tables Appendix Three 
concerns cases where cointegrating or long-run relationships cannot be identified 
and model 2 also on sheet 1 can be used to illustrate this. In row 73 of sheet 1, the 
reader can see a VAR lag order selection criteria again conducted to identify an 
optimal lag length for model 2. Again this was shown to be 2 lags as indicated by 
row 85 of sheet 1. However, model 2 does not contain tables B, C and D, as one 
would expect for model 1. The reason for this is quite simply because a long-run 
relationship or cointegrating vectors were not identified for this model. Therefore 
model 2 was estimated in terms of a VAR in first differences and table E, which is 
in row 96 of sheet 1, represents this for model 2. This pattern is adopted 
throughout Appendix Three. To reiterate, an optimal lag length test is performed 
and this is followed by a Pantula (1989) principle for cointegration regression 
where cointegrating or long-run vectors have been identified. If they have, this is 
followed by a third table for normalised cointegrating coefficients and a fourth 
and final table contains the results of a vector error correction mechanism test. In 
cases where the long-run relationship has not been identified, then only tables A 
and E contain these results. These represent first an optimal lag length test and 
second a VAR in first differences. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
Having described and outline the dataset and also the periods for estimation, we 
are now able to proceed with initial estimates. These begin with chapter seven 
over the page. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INITIAL ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is important to test for the order of integration and the purpose of this is to avoid 
the problem of spurious regression. To do this, we will be using the ADF and TP 
tests. In part three, we aim to determine the appropriate lag length of the models 
and the purpose of this is to ensure that the error terms are Gaussian. This will be 
achieved by using the AIC and SBC criteria. In part four we determine the 
appropriate deterministic trends for model selection, in other words we decide 
whether to include an intercept and/or trend in the short-run model, the long-run 
model or both. The purpose of this is to select the most appropriate model for 
cointegration testing and this will be achieved using their Pantula (1989) principle. 
In section five we move on to determine the number of cointegrating vectors, the 
purpose being to determine the appropriate long-run relationship and the method 
used to achieve this will be the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests. In section 
six we test for weak exogeneity and the purpose of this is to check which of the 
variables are significant. This shall be performed using conventional significance 
tests. This is followed by testing for parameter stability in section seven, the 
reason being to determine the presence if any, of structural breaks and this shall be 
achieved using the Quandt-Andrews (Andrews, 1993 and Andrews and Ploberger. 
1994) test. Finally, section eight concludes with a summary of results obtained. 
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7.2 TESTING FOR THE ORDER OF INTEGRATION 
It was noted in the introduction that we intend to test for the order of integration 
and that the purpose of this was to avoid the problem of spurious regression. 
According to Asterious and Hall (2007: 291), "Most macroeconomic time series 
are trended and therefore in most cases are non-stationary. " To illustrate, they cite 
examples of GDP, money supply and CPI inflation in the UK. The authors suggest 
that the problem with stationary or trended data is that standard OLS regression 
procedures can very easily lead to invalid estimates. Typical examples of 
spurious regression include very high values of R2, often greater than 0.95 and 
also very high values of t-ratio statistics which sometimes exceed values of four. 
This, when there is no meaningful relationship between any of the variables. 
Similarly, Osterholm (2005: 218-219) notes that, 
"theoretical objections regarding the Taylor rule translate into suspicions 
of mis-specification. It is therefore remarkable that previous studies in the 
area have to a large extent ignored the time series properties of estimated 
reaction functions and their included variables. This is particularly 
serious given indications that variables in such regressions have unit roots 
or are at least highly persistent. Phillips (1986,1988) showed that if 
variables are integrated of order one, I(1), or near integrated - that is, have 
roots close to unity - mis-specified static regressions in levels are likely to 
be spurious. Before an estimated Taylor rule is used to evaluate central 
bank behaviour or make statements about its preferences over time, the 
econometric properties of the model should be scrutinised; such 
statements should not be based on a model in which there are serious 
reasons to doubt the consistency of the estimated parameters. " 
The existing evidence surrounding stationarity testing seems to be mixed. The 
literature consists of studies which assume stationarity for reasons such as the 
properties of tests used or the results presented in other studies. Those that do 
formally test for stationarity report mixed findings, many of which differ because 
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of the variations of the Taylor (1993) rule under consideration. Enders et al. 
(2007: 13) for example, use real time data to estimate a nonlinear Taylor (1993) 
rule for several sample periods, finding strong evidence of cointegration. The 
authors note that "... diagnostic checking indicates that the interest rate and 
inflation variables act as unit root processes. Specifically, Dickey-Fuller tests 
indicate that for all sample periods it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of 
a unit root... " Costas (2006) uses monthly and quarterly data from Greece over a 
ten year period and is unable to determine a consistent Taylor (1993) rule because 
the variables do not cointegrate. Testing for stationarity following Dickey and 
Fuller (1979) and using the Schwarz (1978) Information Criterion (SIC) to 
determine the optimal lag, the interest rate is shown to be stationary whilst 
inflation and the output gap are non-stationary. In an alternative specification, 
Bueno (2005: 24) uses Markov-Switching regimes to evaluate the Taylor (1993) 
rule for Brazil and the USA. Monthly and quarterly data are also used in this 
study, including an interest rate smoothing parameter to, 
"simply assume that interest rate is stationary as in Clarida et al. (2000), 
because of the empirical plausibility of this assumption, as well as the low 
power of the unit root tests. Moreover, stationarity is also a property 
found in many theoretical models. " 
A more formal analysis is presented by Bunzel and Enders (2005: 1), who 
"conduct a thorough statistical analysis of the empirical foundations for the 
existence of a Taylor rule. Inflation, the output gap and the federal funds rate 
appear to be non-stationary variables that are not cointegrated. " This paper also 
considers a nonlinear Taylor (1993) rule specification on the basis that 
macroeconomic variables may follow asymmetric paths over the business cycle. 
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The essential insight being nonlinearities in macroeconomic variables manifesting 
themselves in nonlinear Taylor (1993) type rules. 
Gerlach-Kristen (2003) considers Taylor (1993) rules for the Euro area, 
encountering problems of instability and mis-specification. Non-stationarity in 
interest rates, inflation and the output gap is treated with a cointegration approach 
to capture short-term nominal interest rate movements. In a first specification, the 
cointegrating vector links the official interest rate to inflation, output and the long 
interest rate. In a second specification, a unit coefficient on inflation allows the 
real short-term rate to respond to the output gap in the long run and the long 
interest rate. Gerlach-Kristen (2003: 7) notes that, 
"given that the time series properties of the data will play an important 
role ... 
it is worth noting that all series display unit root characteristics ... 
The unit root hypothesis is rejected for the first differences of these 
variables, but not for their levels, whether or not we include a time trend. 
While interest rates, inflation and the output gap are likely to be stationary 
in large samples, the results suggest that in order to draw correct statistical 
inference, it is desirable to treat them as non-stationary in the relatively 
short sample studied here. " 
In a guide to monetary policy, Nelson (2000), estimates a series of Taylor-type 
rules for the period 1972 to 1997 in the UK. The study begins with a full sample 
estimate of the Taylor (1993) rule using UK data, though an initial consideration 
of the underlying time series properties of model parameters is not presented. The 
full sample estimate is shown to suffer from mis-specification and is subsequently 
split into five sub-periods, under which inflation and nominal interest rates are 
treated as 1(0) variables within each regime. This is on the basis of supporting 
evidence from VAR estimates in Batini and Nelson (2000: 35-36). Hence. 
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cointegration testing following Johansen (1991) is not adopted. Similarly. in their 
estimated reaction function for the United States, Clarida et al. (2000: 154) 
maintain an, 
"assumption that both inflation and the nominal interest rate are 
stationary. We view this assumption as reasonable for the post-«-ar 
United States, even though the null of a unit root in either variable is often 
hard to reject at conventional significance levels, given the persistence of 
both series and the well-known low power of unit root tests. " 
In further testing, Clarida et al. (2000: 159) use alternative measures of inflation 
and the output gap as robustness analysis against the initial specification. 
However, the underlying time series properties of these variables are not 
accounted for. 
To illustrate, the inflation rate variable can be treated as stationary, if its mean and 
variance are constant over time and the value of covariance between two time 
periods depends only on the distance or lag between the two time periods and not 
on the actual time at which the covariance is computed. ' In other words, if the 
inflation rate is a stationary variable then its mean, variance and covariance at 
various lags remain the same, regardless of the time at which they are measured. 
Stationary variables can generally be identified from a diminishing correlogram as 
the number of lags increases. For a non-stationary variable, the theoretical 
correlogram will not tend towards zero. A visual inspection however, has the 
drawback of near unit root variables exhibiting autocorrelation functions (ACF) 
which are the same as those of an actual unit root variable. Since an apparently 
1 To be precise, this is known as weak stationarity. 
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unit root variable might be confused with a stationary one. a more formal 
approach is required. To illustrate, consider the following AR(1) model: 
. 
Yt = oyt-1 + ut 
where u, is a white noise process and the stationarity condition is given by I0I<1. 
This implies three general cases. That the series is stationary as in 101 <1, that the 
series is an exploding process as in 101>1, and that the series exhibits a unit root as 
in 0=1 and is therefore non-stationary. Thus if 0=1 then the variable exhibits a 
unit root. Subtracting yt_1 from both sides of equation (1) above, gives: 
yt - yr-1 = yr-i - yr-i + er 
Ay, =eý 
(2) 
where e, is a white noise process and Ay, is a stationary variable. Thus stationarity 
is achieved by differencing y'. More formally, a variable yt is integrated of order 
one or exhibits a unit root when y, is non-stationary and Ay, is stationary. In the 
general case, a non-stationary variable yt might be differenced more than once 
before it is stationary. d orders of differencing implies that the variable is 
integrated of order d. 
It was noted earlier that a formal approach to testing for the presence of a unit root 
is necessary in order to overcome some of the drawbacks associated with a visual 
inspection of the ACF. To this end, we introduced the well known Dickey and 
Fuller (1981,1979) test for non-stationarity. This method essentially tests for the 
presence of a unit root and can be illustrated in terms of a simple AR(1) model: 
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yr = Oyr-1 + ur (3 ) 
Here, a unit root exists when 0 is equal to one. Hence the null hypothesis is 
Ho: 0=1 and the alternative hypothesis is Hl: 0<1. Subtracting y, _j 
from both 
sides of equation (3) above gives: 
Yt - Yt-1= oyt-1- y-I + ut 
zyc-j=(0-1)Yr-, +ur 
Avi-i = YYt-I + ur (4) 
where v= (0 - 1). The null hypothesis is therefore Ho: y=0 and the alternative 
hypothesis is Ha: y<0, where if y=0 and then y, is a random walk process. The 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) method can be adapted for the purposes of identifying a 
unit root in the presence of a constant in random walk models: 
dyt-1= ao + Yyt-I + ut (5) 
An implication here is that a trend exists when y=0, as in the notion of trended 
macroeconomic variables. A non-stochastic time trend in the model can also be 
represented in terms of: 
4Yt-1 = a0 + a2 t+ YYt-1 + Ut (6) 
Evidently, the Dickey Fuller method is a conventional t-test applied to the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The distribution of this test however, 
is not conventional and the appropriate critical values are tabulated by MacKinnon 
(1991). Once again, the test examines whether y=0 and the test statistic is the t- 
statistic for the lagged dependent variable. When this is smaller than the critical 
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value in absolute terms it can be concluded that the null hypothesis of a unit root 
is rejected and that the variable y, is stationary. Since the error term is unlikely to 
be a white noise process, the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) contains extra 
lagged terms of the dependent variable so as to eliminate serial correlation. The 
lag length of the extra lagged terms is normally determined by the Akaike (1974) 
Information Criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz (1978) Bayesian Criterion (SBC). 
Alternatively, the residuals of the ADF regression can be inspected for serial 
correlation using a conventional LM test. Three representations of the ADF 
method are: 
P 
dvr = Yvý-ý + L, 8, Ay, -, 
+ ut 
-ý (7) 
P 
dv, = ao + YYt-1 + ß, AY, + ut 
-i (8) 
P 
Ay, = ao + YYr-, + a2 t 18, Ay, + ut 
i=1 (9) 
The distinction between equations (7), (8) and (9) above can be explained in terms 
of the deterministic terms ao and a2 t, where the critical values are the same as 
those of the DF test. An obvious question is how to estimate the most appropriate 
version if the actual data generating process is unknown. Doldado et al. (1990) 
suggest a method that begins with equation (9), which is an estimate of the most 
general specification. It might be noted that this is a helpful suggestion but not 
one which is expected to be applied in a formal manner. To supplement the 
Dickey and Fuller method, we also introduce the Phillips and Perron test for the 
purposes of complementarity. The Phillips and Perron method can be contrasted 
with the Dickey and Fuller approach in the sense that the DF method assumes 
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statistically independent error terms with constant variance. This implies that the 
error terms must be uncorrelated and with a constant variance when applying the 
ADF test. The Phillips and Perron (1988) method can be thought of as a 
generalisation of the ADF test in that it incorporates less restrictive assumptions 
about the distribution of errors. To illustrate, the Phillips and Perron test can also 
be presented in terms of an AR(1) model: 
zyi-1 
- a0 + Y. Yt-1 + e, (lo) 
The difference is, that the ADF test eliminates higher order serial correlation by 
including lagged differenced terms on the right hand side of the equation, while 
the Phillips and Perron tests accounts for serial correlation by making a correction 
to the t-statistic of the y coefficient in the AR(1) model. Hence the PP test adapts 
the t-statistic in the ADF method in a manner which is less restrictive about the 
error process. Both the ADF and the PP t-statistics share the same asymptotic 
distribution, which means that MacKinnon (1991) critical values can again be 
used. Both the ADF and PP test can be applied for models which include a 
constant, a constant and linear trend, or neither a constant or linear trend. 
For each variable, stationarity testing proceeds as follows. These tests are for the 
full sample period, which implies that monetary policy is being treated as a single 
regime. In the UK of course, monetary policy has passed through several regimes 
during this period. This is an issue that we will return to later. First we test for 
the presence of a unit root in levels with an intercept included in the test equation. 
The lag length is selected automatically using the Akaike (1974) Information 
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Criterion or AIC, following Akaike (1974). This is then repeated for a trend and 
intercept in the test equation and also for neither a trend or intercept. The 
procedure is repeated using the Schwarz Information Criterion or SIC, following 
Schwarz (1978). The Phillips-Perron test procedure is the same as that of the 
ADF method, except that lag length is replaced by a spectral estimation method. 
for which we accept the default Bartlett (1937) kernel, and bandwidth, which we 
select automatically using the Newey-West (1986) method. 
The results of ADF tests (AIC criterion) for the interest rate, the rate of inflation 
and the output gap are presented in table 7.2.1 at the end of this chapter. These 
are for all three test equations discussed earlier. Also included are the results of 
the tests for an interest rate smoothing parameter and also for the Deutschmark 
variable. In the top half of the table, the results are presented first in the levels of 
each variable and then in their first differences. The results suggest that each 
variable is non-stationary when defined in levels. However, first differencing 
removes non-stationarity for all variables and the null hypothesis of non- 
stationarity is clearly rejected at the 5% level of significance. This suggests that 
each variable is integrated of order one. An exception here concerns the output 
gap as measured by relative unemployment and also by industrial production. 
These are shown to be stationary when measured in levels and this is not 
surprising given their prior construction. Table 7.2.2 then presents the results of 
ADF tests from these same variables using the SBC criterion. These also confirm 
the results of the previous table where the AIC criterion was used. Table 7.2.3 
contains the results of the Phillips-Perron tests and these are not fundamentally 
different from the ADF results. At this stage, the results from both ADF and PP 
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tests in the levels of the variables clearly point to the presence of a unit root in all 
cases except for relative unemployment and industrial production measures of the 
output gap. After first differencing each variable, the results strongly reject the 
null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root and suggest therefore that each 
variable is integrated of order one. 
In Table 7.2.1, forward looking inflation does not reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity, when a constant and trend are included in the test equation. This 
anomaly is not apparent in Tables 7.2.2 or 7.2.3 and may be due to the well- 
known property of diminishing power of the ADF test. This is also noted by Zivot 
(undated: page 132), who points out that, 
"... the power of unit root tests diminish [es] as deterministic terms are 
added to the test regressions. That is, tests that include a constant and 
trend in the test regression have less power than tests that only include a 
constant in the test regression. " 
Similarly the Phillips-Perron test in Table 7.1.3 does not reject the null hypothesis 
of stationarity for relative unemployment when a constant and also a constant and 
trends are included in the test equation. The findings here contrast with 
Osterholm (2005: 226-227), who finds little firm evidence of stationary Taylor- 
type variables. Only the output gap for the full sample period is found to be 
stationary. Osterholm (2005: 226-227) argues that all three parameters (official 
interest rate, inflation rate and output gap) should be stationary. The output gap is 
expected to be stationary around zero and the inflation rate stationary around 
target. A stationary inflation rate variable is said to imply stationarity of interest 
rates in terms of the Fisher hypothesis. Empirical persistence in the variables 
179 
Chapter Seven: Initial Econometric Anah"sis. 
however is said to be considered sufficient enough to represent unit root behaviour 
in the variables. This study uses ADF and KPSS unit tests for several countries 
and sub-samples. For the United States, both tests suggest that the Federal Funds 
rate is an integrated of order one variable for one sub-sample. though they reach 
conflicting conclusions for three further sub-samples. The unit root hypothesis is 
supported for the rate of inflation which is found to be integrated of order one for 
two out of four sub-samples. The output gap is shown to be stationary for the full 
sample period, though conflicting results are reported for different sub-sample 
periods. For example, the ADF test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root and the KPSS test does not reject the null hypothesis of stationarity. Using 
further data for Australia, the output gap is reported as an integrated of order one 
variable according to both tests. The results differ for the rate of inflation, for 
which the ADF test does not reject the null hypothesis that it is an integrated of 
order one variable, whilst the KPSS test does not reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity. For Swedish data the repo rate and the output gap are found to be 
integrated order one variables according to both tests, though conflicting results 
are reported for the rate of inflation. Given that each series is now integrated of 
order one over sub-sample periods, it is possible to proceed with cointegration 
analysis. 
7.3 SETTING THE APPROPRIATE LAG LENGTH 
We now move on to a discussion of cointegration, which builds on the idea 
discussed earlier that the presence of trends in macroeconomic variables may lead 
to invalid estimates. The procedure of differencing to achieve stationarity was 
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also illustrated and applied. To illustrate, a set of two variables { Y. X} integrated 
of order one can be considered. We assume a vector {91,82} which gives a linear 
combination of{ Y, X} which is stationary. This can be written as: 
O1Yt + 92X = ut--I(O) (11) 
In equation (11) above, the variable set { Y, X} can be termed the cointegration set 
and the vector of coefficients { 81,02) can be termed the cointegration vector. 
Here, we are interested in determining the long-run relationship for Yt, which is: 
Yt =ßXt (12) 
To show how this is derived from the cointegration method, equation (12) above 
can be normalised for Yt which gives: 
Yt= - 
02 
e Xt+et 
1 
(13) 
where Y* = -(ei)Xt is the long-run or equilibrium value of Yt given the value of 
Xt. In the academic literature, cointegration theory is closely attributed to the 
work of Granger (1981) and Engle and Granger (1987), though Engle and Yoo 
(1987), Philips and Ouliaris (1990), Stock and Watson (1988), Phillips (1987 and 
1986) and Johansen (1995,1991,1988) are also well known works. For the case 
of one cointegrating vector, Engle and Granger (1987) describe the presence of 
cointegration between two variables in terms of both series being integrated of 
order d, and there existing a linear combination of these variables which is 
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integrated of order d-b. The vector {ß1, ß2) therefore, is the cointegrating vector. 
From an empirical perspective, we are interested in transforming the variables to 
achieve stationarity using the cointegrating vector. In other words, when d=h 
and the cointegrating coefficients are identified as parameters in the long-run 
relationship between the variables. An extension of cointegration analysis 
concerns the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM), which we now describe. It was 
noted earlier that non-stationary variables are prone to spurious estimates. If for 
example, Yt and Xt, are both integrated of order one, then the regression: 
Yt =ß1+ß2Xt+ut (14) 
does not produce satisfactory estimates of /31 and iß2. One solution to this, is to 
difference the variables to achieve stationarity. As a result, DYt-I (0) and 
OXt-I (0), which means that the estimated model is: 
AYt = a1 + a20Xt + IUt (15) 
In this instance, the estimates of ä1 and a2 are correct and the problem of spurious 
regression has been avoided. Note however, that equation (15) above is simply a 
short-run relationship and in the long-run, AYr does not offer any information 
about the long-run behaviour of the model. Since we are interested in determining 
long-run relationships, the issue of cointegration and ECM is relevant. To 
illustrate, it was noted earlier that Yt and Xt are both integrated order one. If there 
exists a linear combination of Yt and Xt which is stationary, then Yt and Xt are 
cointegrated variables. This being so, the estimated model in equation (14) is not 
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subject to spurious estimates, which also gives the following linear combination 
connecting Yt and Xt in the long-run: 
üt=Yt-ßi-ß2x (16) 
If therefore, Yt and Xt are cointegrated then Üt-I (0) and the relationship between 
Yt and Xt can be expressed in terms of the following ECM specification: 
DYt = ao + b14Xt - TrÜt_1 + Yt 
(17) 
This model now contains both long-run and short-run terms. b1 for example, is 
the short-run effect which represents the immediate impact of a change in Xt on a 
change in Yt. rc on the other hand is a feedback or adjustment effect which 
represents the extent to which the disequilibrium is being corrected. In other 
words, the extent to which any disequilibrium in the previous period affects any 
adjustment in Yt. Note that ü _1 = 
Yt_1 - ß1 - ß2 Xt_1, which means that ß2 is 
also the long-run parameter. Equation (17) therefore represents the basic 
approach for cointegration and error correction. The issue of spurious estimation 
exists because of non-stationary data, though in equation (17) above the variables 
are stationary. Also, the change in X and Y is stationary because of the 
assumption of integrated of order one variables and the residual from the levels 
specification in equation (16) is stationary given the assumption of cointegration. 
Therefore equation (17) meets the assumptions of the CLRM and is conducive to 
OLS estimation. We select an ECM specification citing four advantages. First, 
that it is a convenient means of measuring the correction from disequilibrium in 
the previous time period, thus allowing for a meaningful economic interpretation. 
Second, in the presence of cointegration, the first difference specification of the 
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ECM helps to eliminate the trends from variables thereby removing the problem 
of spurious regression. Third, the ECM can very easily be adapted in a general-to- 
specific econometric modelling process. This is actually the most parsimonious 
ECM which gives the best fit to the data. Fourth, the disequilibrium error term is 
a stationary variable given cointegration. An important implication of this is that 
there exists some adjustment process which minimises errors in a long-run 
relationship. We now illustrate cointegration and the error correction mechanism 
using a two-variable ARDL model as follows: 
nm 
Yt=µ+ ai Yt-i + Yi X t-i + ut (18) 
i=1 i=o 
Yt =µ+a1Yt-Z+... +anYt-n+YoXt+Y1Xt-1+... (19) 
+ Ym't-m + Ut 
The objective is to determine a long-run solution, or in other words, the point at 
which Yt and Xt reach constant steady state levels. That is to say: 
Y* = ßo + ßiX * (20) 
assuming X* constant. Inserting this identity into equation (18) gives the 
following long-run solution: 
Y* 
µ+ Yi X* 
1-Ea1 1-Ea1 
Y* G 1) 
1_a1_a2_... -an 
+ 
(Y1+Y2+... +Ym) 
X 
1-a1-a2-... -an 
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or 
Y* =ßo+ß1X 
which means that Y* can be defined given a constant value of X at time t. This is 
the relationship with cointegration discussed earlier. If et is the equilibrium error 
term, then this gives: 
et -Yt-Y*=Yr-ßo+ßlXt (22) 
Here we need to be able to estimate the parameters ßo and ß 1. Naturally ßo and 
ß1 can be derived by estimating equation (18) using OLS and calculating A= 
µ/(1 -Z al) and B=Z yi/(1 -Z a1). However this method is not ideal 
because any calculation of the standard errors is difficult. These difficulties are 
overcome by the ECM specification as follows. Model twenty-three below is a re- 
parameterisation of equation (18) above in which n=1 disappears as the second 
term on the left hand side: 
n-1 
AYt =µ+ ai AYt_j + 
ti=i 
M-1 
Yi Axt-i + 91Yr-1 
-o 
+ B2Xt_1 + Ut 
It can be seen that: 
02 = Yi 
is the numerator of the long-run parameter, ßl. Furthermore; 
(23) 
(-)4) 
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n 
81 = -(1 - ai) (25) 
i=1 
so the long-run parameters are ßo = 1/0, and ß1 = -02/01. Therefore the level 
terms of Yt and Xt in the ECM specification provide exclusive information about 
the long-run parameters. Therefore the ECM can be written as follows: 
n-1 m-1 
Yt =p+ ajAYt-i + YilAXt-i + 01 
(-1 
- 81 
i=1 i=0 (26) 
02 
- eXt-1 + Ut 
1 
n-1 m-1 
Yt =i t+ ai/Yt-i + YifXt-i - ir(Yt-1 - ßo 
i=1 i=0 
ý27 
- a1xr-1) + ut 
where it = 0. In addition, Yt_1 - /3o - /31xt_1 = et is the equilibrium error which 
means that equation (26) above can be re-written as: 
n-1 m-1 
LYt =µ+ aiEYt-i + YiOXt-i - net-i + Et (28) 
i=1 i=o 
It is important here to be able to interpret it. This is the error correction 
coefficient for the adjustment mechanism which indicates the extent of adjustment 
towards equilibrium in each time period. In other words how much of the 
equilibrium error is being corrected. To illustrate, if it equals one then this 
implies that all of the adjustment occurs within a period or that it is instant or 
complete. Similarly, if it equals 0.5, half of the adjustment occurs in each time 
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period. If it equals zero, then no adjustment takes place and Yt is not a long-run 
component of Yt. Of importance here is to demonstrate the relationship between 
the ECM and cointegration. Given cointegration, et-I(O) and et_1-'1(0). 
Therefore in equation (28) above, the model represents an ECM specification 
were each variable is stationary or integrated of order zero. This allows for the 
most important feature of the ECM to be used, namely long-run information and 
short-run disequilibrium dynamics. 
We now select an appropriate method for undertaking cointegration analysis. The 
work of Granger (1981) is well known in the academic literature for identifying 
the relationship between non-stationary variables and long-run equilibrium. This 
is cointegration as discussed earlier and further developed by Engle and Granger 
(1987) in terms of a test for identifying cointegration for long-run equilibrium 
between variables. This can be illustrated briefly using two variables as follows. 
If Yt'I (0) and Xt--'I (0), then every linear combination of these two variables; 
O1Yt + e2Xt (29) 
will produce a series which will be integrated of order one or non-stationary. This 
is because the non-stationary variable will influence the stationary variable. If 
both Xt and Yt are integrated order one then a linear combination of both variables 
such as equation (29) will also be integrated of order one. Although this is quite 
realistic it is also possible that a combination of equation (29) above exists which 
is integrated of order zero. This being so, Xt and Yt are cointegrated of order 
(1,1). The objective then becomes an estimation of the long-run parameters and to 
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identify whether or not cointegration exists. The Engle and Granger method 
proposes the following solution. First, to determine the order of integration of 
each variable using conventional DF and ADF tests to determine the number of 
unit roots. If both variables are integrated of order zero, conventional estimation 
methods can be applied. If the variables are integrated of different orders then it 
can be inferred that cointegration does not exist. If both variables are integrated 
of the same order then a long-run or possible cointegrating relationship can be 
estimated as follows and the residuals obtained: 
Yt=ßs+ß2Xt+et (30) 
If cointegration does not exist, then the estimated equation is spurious. If 
however, the variables are cointegrated, any subsequent estimates of the 
cointegrating parameter /32 will be super-consistent. The next step is to determine 
the order of integration of the residuals. If a cointegrating relationship actually 
exists, the estimated sequence of residuals can be denoted as et. This is the series 
of estimated residuals from the long-run relationship. If these deviations from 
long-run equilibrium are stationary, then Xt and Yt are said to be cointegrated. 
The order of integration of the residuals is simply a conventional DF test of the 
form; 
let = al et_ 1+ (5iAet-i 
+ yr 
i=1 
(31) 
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Since et is a residual, a constant or time trend are not included. The critical values 
also differ somewhat from their ADF counterparts and are typically more 
negative, taking values of approximately -3.5. If et-I (0), the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration between and can be rejected. This is also the case for a single 
equation specification consisting of two or more explanatory variables. When 
cointegration does exist the residuals from the estimated equilibrium regression 
can be used to derive an Error Correction Model which makes it possible to 
interpret the long-run and short-run effects of the variables. The adjustment 
coefficient can also be determined and this is the coefficient of the lagged residual 
terms in the long-run relationship identified above. 
An appealing feature of the Engle-Granger method is that it is relatively easy to 
implement. There are however some important drawbacks which also need to be 
considered. The first concerns the order of variables. In the long-run relationship, 
one variable appears on the left hand side with the remaining variables acting as 
regressors. This estimation method does not determine which of the variables 
might be used as regressors and why. Second, when more than two variables are 
used, there may exist more than one cointegrating relationship. Since the Engle- 
Granger method uses single equation residuals, it cannot account for this 
possibility. In other words the Engle-Granger method does not identify the 
number of cointegrating vectors. Third, the Engle-Granger method is based upon 
a two step estimation procedure. In the first step, a residual series is estimated and 
in the second step, a regression is estimated to determine stationarity. As a result. 
if an error is introduced in the first step, this will be carried forward into the 
second step. Given such drawbacks, we elect to apply the Johansen method in 
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preference to the Engle-Granger approach. This can be illustrated as follows. It 
was noted earlier, that more than one cointegrating vector may exist when there 
are more than two variables in a model. In other words, multiple equilibrium 
relationships may exist. In general, n-1 cointegrating vectors will exist for n 
number of variables. For example, if n>2 and it is assumed that only one 
cointegrating relationship exists, when in fact there are actually two or more 
relationships, then this is a serious problem which the Engle-Granger method does 
not address. To illustrate, we assume three endogenous variables, or Yt, Xt and 
Wt. This is similar to the dynamic two variable model in equation (18) above. 
This can be re-formulated into a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) using 
matrix notation as follows: 
L\Zt = r1liýZt-1 + r20Zt-2 + ... + "k-1liýZt-k-1 + IIZt-1 
(32) 
+ ut 
where r=(I-Al-A2-"""-Ak)(i=1,2,..., k-1) and 17=-(I-Al- 
A2 -"""- Ak). Here we have a three by three H matrix which gives information 
about long-run relationships. This can be decomposed into 17 = aß' where a 
represents the speed of adjustment to equilibrium while ß' represents the long-run 
matrix of coefficients. The term ß'Zt_1 therefore is equivalent to the error 
correction mechanism Yt_1 - ßo - ß1Xt_1) for a single equation model where 
ß'Zt_1 now represents up to (n - 1) vectors in the multivariate system. For 
simple illustration, k=2 for two lagged terms. The model is therefore: 
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AYt iýYt-1 Yt-i 
L Xt = T1 AXt-1 + ri Xt-1 + et (J3 ) 
(Awt) (Awt-i) (Wt-i) 
or 
Ayt 
=r+ 
all a12 ß11 ß21 ß31 Yt-1 
+e ý-ý Axt 1 (a21 a22 ß12 Xt-1 t (-- ) 
OWt a31 a23 
ý22 ß32) 
To determine the error correction term for the first equation, or for AYt on the left- 
hand side, we now have: 
fl1Zt-1 = (a11ß11 + Q12ß12 a11ß21 
+ a12 ß221 [a11ß31 
Yt 
-1 
(35) 
+ a12ß320 Xt-1 
wt-1 
where H represents the first row of the 17 matrix. Re-writing equation (35) above 
gives: 
fl1Zt-1 = a11(ß11Yt-1 + ß21Xt-1 + ß31Wt-1) + 
(36) 
a12(ß12Yt-1 + ß22Xt-1 + ß32wt-1) 
which clearly shows both cointegrating vectors and their respective speed of 
adjustment parameters all and a12. This multiple equation approach thus derives 
estimates for both cointegrating vectors in equation (36) above, compared to the 
simple equation which gives only a linear combination of both long-run 
relationships. In addition, if there exists just one cointegrating vector instead of 
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two, the multiple equation approach means that all three speed of adjustment 
coefficients (a11 a21 a31)' can be determined. When a21 = a31 =0 and one 
cointegrating vector is identified then the multiple equation approach reduces to 
the single equation method. As a result, there is no loss when the determinants of 
OXt and OWt are not modelled. It might also be noted here that when a21 = 
a31 = 0, then this is the same as Xt and Wt being weakly exogenous variables. 
To summarise then, the single equation approach only provides the same estimates 
as the multivariate method when all right hand side variables are weakly 
exogenous. 
Returning to the Johansen method outlined above, we can now illustrate the II 
matrix in further detail. If Zt is a vector of non-stationary or integrated of order 
one variables, then IZt_1 are integrated of order zero and IIZt_1 must also be 
integrated of order zero in order to have ut- J(0). In a general sense, 
IIZt_1 maybe integrated of order zero in three instances. First, when each variable 
in Zt is stationary. This implies no spurious estimates and a simple VAR in levels 
can be used. Second, if cointegration does not exist and the II matrix is an nxn 
matrix of zeros given an absence of linear relationships between the Zt. Here, a 
VAR model in first differences can be adopted without long-run terms since a 
long-run relationship does not exist. Third, if there exist up to (n - 1) 
cointegrating vectors of the form ß'Zt_1-1(0). Here, r< (n - 1) cointegrating 
vectors exist in ß. This implies that r columns of ß form r linearly independent 
combinations of the variables in Zt, each of which is stationary. Since fl =aß' 
this implies that in the last point above the matrix is nxn and the a and ß 
matrices will be nxr. Therefore a rank of r can be imposed on the Fl matrix. In 
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other words, this imposes r linearly independent rows in the matrix. Therefore the 
complete fl matrix includes a restricted set of r cointegrating vectors given by 
ß'Zt_1. This method is known as reduced rank regression and is associated with 
Johansen (1988) in the analysis of non-stationary data. Returning to the three 
points above, the following observations might be made about the rank of the II 
matrix. First, when II consists of a full rank. In other words there exist r=n 
linearly independent columns. In this case the variables in Zt are integrated of 
order zero. In the second case, the rank of II is zero. In other words there do not 
exist any linearly independent columns, which means that a cointegrating vector is 
not present. Third, II consists of a reduced rank. In other words r< (n - 1) 
linearly independent columns. Therefore we have r< (n - 1) cointegrating 
relationships. The Johansen (1988) method tests for the rank of rl and gives 
estimates of a and ß through reduced rank regression. 
It was noted in the introduction that determination of the appropriate lag length 
was an important requirement for ensuring that the error terms are Gaussian. In 
other words, that they are standard normal error terms which do not suffer from 
non-normality, autocorrelation, or heteroscedasticity and so on. In this section, 
we determine the optimal lag length by estimating a VAR model based on a levels 
specification of the variables. The model is estimated for a large number of lags 
then reduced down successively through re-estimation until zero lags are reached. 
For each model, the values of the AIC and SBC criteria are inspected, along with 
the results of conventional diagnostic testing. Overall, we aim to select that model 
which minimises the AIC and SBC as the one with an optimal lag length. In 
addition, the model must also conform to conventional diagnostic tests. As an 
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example, Table 7.3.1 at the end of this chapter suggests an optimal lag length of 
four when modelling the nominal interest rate as a function of (backward-looking) 
inflation and the output gap. 
In both the monthly and quarterly datasets, the optimal lag length ranges between 
one and three lags, although there are some models were the optimal lag lengths is 
four or five. It might also be noted here, that the Schwarz criterion often reports a 
lower lag length than the AIC criterion as is well known in the academic 
literature. In such instances, Akaike's final prediction error and the Hannan-Quinn 
(1979) criterion can also be used. 
7.4 DETERMINISTIC TRENDS FOR MODEL SELECTION 
At this stage, the nominal interest rate, the rate of inflation and the output gap are 
integrated of order one variables, and the appropriate lag length of four has also 
been established. In order to determine the appropriate deterministic trends for 
model selection, in other words whether or not to include an intercept and/or trend 
in the short-run model, the long-run model or both, we are now able to introduce 
and apply the Pantula (1989) principle, which helps to select the most appropriate 
model for the purposes of cointegration testing. 2 To illustrate, a general vector 
error correction model which includes all options can be specified as follows: 
See also, Berger and Sinclair (1984) for a similar treatment of the issue. 
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R OZt = F1liýZt-1 + ... + rk-lOZt-k-1 +a (Zt-1 1 t) 
S1 (37) 
+µ2+61t+ut 
We might elect for a constant and/or trend in the long-run model. This is the 
cointegrating equation. Alternatively, we might elect for a constant and/or trend 
in the short-run model. This is the VAR specification. At this stage, five distinct 
models can be considered. We do not consider the first and last of these to be 
realistic for the purposes of estimating a Taylor (1993) type monetary policy 
reaction function. Nevertheless, we include both for the purposes of illustrating 
the Pantula (1989) principle. In a first model then, we might exclude an intercept 
or trend in the cointegrating equation or VAR. This implies that there are no 
deterministic components in the data or in the cointegrating relationships. In a 
second model, we assume an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation 
and no intercept or trend in the VAR. This implies that there are no linear trends 
in the data and that therefore, the first differenced series have a zero mean. In this 
instance, the intercept is restricted to the long-run model or the cointegrating 
equation. Model three assumes an intercept in the cointegrating equation and 
VAR but no trends. This implies that there are no linear trends when the data are 
specified in levels form. Nevertheless, both specifications are allowed to drift 
around an intercept. In this specification, the intercept in the cointegrating 
equation is assumed to be cancelled out by the intercept in the VAR which leaves 
just one intercept in the short-run model. Model four assumes an intercept in the 
cointegrating equation and VAR, a linear trend in the cointegrating equation but 
no trend in the VAR. This implies a trend in the cointegrating equation as a trend 
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stationary variable, which accounts for exogenous growth. In this instance. both 
specifications allow for an intercept but no trend in the short-run relationship. 
Model five includes an intercept and quadratic trend in the cointegratina equation 
and an intercept and linear trend in the VAR. This implies linear trends in the 
short-run model and therefore quadratic trends in cointegrating equation. In this 
final model therefore, all parameters are unrestricted but remain difficult to 
interpret from an economic point of view. Hence the question is which of these 
five models is the most appropriate for the purposes of testing for cointegration. 
It was noted earlier that models one and five are very unlikely representations of 
monetary policy rules and that they are also somewhat implausible in terms of 
economic theory. Therefore, the choice reduces to models two, three or four. At 
this point we follow Pantula (1989) who suggests a test of the joint hypothesis of 
both the rank order and the deterministic components. This involves an 
estimation of models two and three and presentation of their results from the most 
restrictive hypothesis first. In other words, where r is equal to the number of 
cointegrating relations which in turn is equal to zero or model one, through to the 
least restrictive hypothesis where r is equal to the number of variables entering the 
VAR, less one. This is equal to n -1 and model four. The model selection 
procedure then involves moving from the most restrictive model, at each stage 
comparing the trace test statistic to its critical value and stopping only when we 
are unable to conclude for the first time that the null hypothesis of cointegration is 
not rejected. The results in Table 7.4.1 at the end of this chapter point to an 
assumption of no deterministic trend in the data or model 2. 
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7.5 DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF COINTEGRATING VECTORS 
In determining the number of cointegrating vectors, we follow Johansen (1988) 
and also Johansen and Juselius (1990). Both methods involve the estimation of a 
kxk matrix with a rank r, for which the test procedure is as follows. In the first 
method, the null hypothesis that the rank of the kxk matrix is equal to r or the 
number of cointegrating vectors, is tested against the alternative that the rank is r 
+I vectors. In other words, the null hypothesis is that there exist cointegrating 
vectors and that there are up to r cointegrating relationships. The alternative 
hypothesis suggests the existence of r+1 vectors. The test statistics in this 
method are based on maximum eigenvalues determined from the estimation 
procedure. The maximum eigenvalue test statistic is: 
Amax(r, r+ 1) = -T In (1-, +1) (38) 
The second method is based on the likelihood ratio test concerning the trace of the 
kxk matrix, in other words a trace statistic. This method considers whether or 
not the trace is increased through the addition of eigenvalues beyond the rth 
eigenvalue. Here, the null hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors 
is less than or equal to r. The test statistic for the trace test is as follows 
n 
Atrace (r) = -T 
Y, 
In (1 -'r+1) (39) 
i=r+1 
critical values for both the maximum eigenvalue and trace test statistics are 
obtained following Johansen and Juselius (1990). Preliminary results from a 
cointegration test are presented in Table 7.5.2 at the end of this chapter and are 
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somewhat disappointing. The estimated rule does not include an intercept and 
although the long-run response coefficients for both (backward-looking) inflation 
and the output gap are positively signed, they are statistically insignificant. 
We now proceed to a discussion of the estimated results for each of the sub- 
sample periods under investigation. For the first sub-period, we estimate nine 
different specifications of a Taylor-type monetary policy rule, the parameters of 
which have been explained in Chapter 6. Optimal lag length testing for this sub- 
period suggests an optimal lag ranging from one to two. When the Taylor rule is 
modelled using contemporaneous inflation and relative unemployment, a lag 
length of three is suggested. Similarly, when backward looking inflation and 
contemporaneous inflation are included with an industrial production measure of 
the output gap. Beginning with the first model in this subset, we perform a 
cointegration test using a lag length of one and with an assumption of no 
deterministic trend and restricted constant. The results in Table C indicate the 
presence of two cointegrating equations at the 5% level of significance. Model six 
is estimated using an optimal lag length of two and also with the assumption of no 
deterministic trend. This returns one cointegrating equation at the 5% level of 
significance. Both models one and six are thus estimated in terms of an Error 
Correction Mechanism, whilst the reaming seven models in this first subset do not 
indicate the presence of any cointegrating vectors. Hence each of these are 
estimated in first differences in the form of a VAR. For the second sub-period, we 
identify an optimal lag length of one for all nine models. With the exception of 
model seventeen and eighteen, which combine contemporaneous and forward 
looking measures of inflation with industrial production respectively. Each of 
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these are estimated under an assumption of no deterministic trend. Models 
seventeen and eighteen are estimated by allowing for a linear deterministic trend 
in the data. We identify the presence of one cointegrating vector for specification 
one of the Taylor rule and also for three further specifications which combine all 
three measures of inflation with the industrial production measure of the output 
gap. 
When the relative unemployment measure of the output gap is combined with 
backward and forward looking measures of inflation, we find two cointegrating 
vectors. Again these are modelled in terms of an error correction mechanism with 
the remainder estimated in terms of a VAR in first differences. Interestingly, the 
third sub-period suggests an optimal lag length of one when industrial production 
is included with various measures of inflation. For the remaining models, an 
optimal lag length is four and five when forward looking inflation is combined 
with the unemployment rate in which case the optimal lag length is five. For each 
of these nine models in this third sub-period, we include an assumption of no 
deterministic trend in the data. An exception being contemporaneous and forward 
looking inflation combined with the rate of unemployment, in which case a linear 
deterministic trend in the data is allowed for. Additionally, a linear deterministic 
trend is also included for backward and contemporaneous measures of inflation 
and industrial production. All nine models in this third sub-period indicate the 
presence of cointegrating vectors. These can be seen in the Appendix Three 
where the number of cointegrating vectors ranges from one to three. As a result, 
we estimate each model in this third sub-sample in terms of an error correction 
mechanism. For the fourth sub-period, we again estimate nine specifications of 
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the Taylor rule, again identifying an optimal lag length of one to t wwo. Models 
twenty eight, thirty one and thirty two are estimated assuming no deterministic 
trend in the data. Each of these suggest the presence of one cointegratin`J vector 
and are again modelled in terms of an error correction mechanism. Once more. 
the reaming nine models are estimated in terms of a VAR in first differences. For 
the fifth sub-period an optimal lag length of one is identified for each of models 
thirty seven through to forty five. We estimate models thirty seven, thirty eight 
and thirty nine and also models forty two, forty three and forty five under an 
assumption of no deterministic trend in the data. The results in Appendix Three 
suggest the presence of between one and two cointegrating vectors. Each of these 
are also estimated in terms of an error correction mechanism with the remainder 
taking the form of a VAR in first differences. 
For the sixth sub-period, the optimal lag length again ranges from one to two and 
the assumption of no deterministic trend in the data is held. An exception being 
models fifty two and fifty four, where we allow for a linear deterministic trend. 
Again one cointegrating vector is suggested for each of these models, with two 
cointegrating vectors suggested for model fifty three. Again, these follow an 
Error Correction Mechanism with the remainder modelled in terms of a VAR in 
first differences. Finally, for the seventh sub-period we find that the optimal lag 
length ranges from three to five. An assumption of no deterministic trend is used 
for models fifty six, fifty eight, fifty nine and sixty, each of which suggest the 
presence of one cointegrating vector for error correction mechanism analysis. The 
setup for quarterly data is essentially the same as the discussion of the monthly 
sub-periods outlined above. For the first quarterly sub-sample, the optimal lag 
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length ranges from one to three. Cointegration testing assumes no deterministic 
trend except for model seventy three, where a linear deterministic trend is 
assumed. In both instances the data suggest the presence of one cointegrating 
vector. For the second quarterly sub-sample, we find an optimal lag length 
ranging from one to four, which is not surprising given our quarterly observations. 
Again an assumption of no deterministic trend in the data is incorporated with an 
exception being model ninety eight, which assumes both no deterministic trend in 
a first specification and a linear deterministic trend in the second specification. 
We identify between one and three cointegrating vectors for this second quarterly 
sub-sample. An exception being models ninety two and ninety three for which the 
presence of cointegration is not determined. For subsamples four and five, the 
optimal lag length is predominantly one and two, an exception being three lags for 
model one hundred and twenty four. For both these sub-samples, we assume no 
deterministic trend in the data. As Appendix Three illustrates, we are able to 
identify between one and two cointegrating vectors for which the corresponding 
models are estimated in terms of an error correction mechanism. The remainder 
follow a VAR in first differences specification. 
7.6 TESTING FOR WEAK EXOGENEITY 
Having determined the number of cointegrating vectors, the next step is to test for 
weak exogeneity. The kxk matrix above contains information about the long-run 
relationships where alpha represents the speed of adjustment coefficients and beta 
represents the matrix of long-run coefficients. Therefore when there exist r<n- 
1 cointegrating vectors in beta, then this implies that there are at least n-R 
columns of alpha which are equal to 0. In other words, having determined the 
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number of cointegrating vectors, we are now able to determine which of the 
variables are weakly exogenous. A feature of the Johansen approach to 
cointegration testing is that it allows for a test of restricted forms of cointegrating 
vectors. For example, 
(L\Yt' DYt-1 
Axt = rl Axt-, 
/wt I wt-1 
(40) 
Q11 a12 
ß1i 
ß21 ß31 Yt-1 
+ a21 a22 
(ß12 
RR)+ 
a31 a23 F'22 ! '32 
(Wt-, ) 
equation (40) above amounts to testing for weak exogeneity in terms of the long- 
run parameters and this amounts to testing which of the rows of alpha are equal to 
0. We define a weakly exogenous variable as one which is a function of lagged 
variables and the parameters of the equation generating that variable are 
independent of the parameters which generate the other variables in the system. If 
we find a variable to be weakly exogenous, we can consider dropping it as an 
endogenous component of the system. As a result, this means we can drop the 
whole equation for that variable although it will continue to feature on the right- 
hand side of other equations. 
7.7 TESTING FOR LINEAR RESTRICTIONS 
Another important issue here concerns testing for linear restrictions in the 
cointegrating vectors and this is a feature also included in the Johansen approach. 
This allows for estimation of the coefficients of the matrices alpha and beta, 
before proceeding with a test for possible linear restrictions. Further applications 
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of linear restrictions in the Johansen cointegration approach are contained in 
Enders 1995 and also Harris (1997). In this instance, we apply the following 
restrictions. The first that the coefficient on the inflation parameter is equal to 1.5 
and second that the coefficient on the output gap is equivalent to not 0.5 as in the 
original Taylor (1993) rule. Table 7.7.1 at the end of this chapter reports 
summary results from the VECM and some basic diagnostics about the residuals 
of the error-correction equation. It contains the coefficients and the corresponding 
t-statistics for the error-correction component, for which the interest rate is 
correctly signed and statistically insignificant. Both (backward-looking) inflation 
and the output gap are statistically significant but incorrectly signed. The 
insignificance of these parameters can also be interpreted as a sign of their being 
weakly exogenous to the model. 
7.8 TESTING FOR PARAMETER STABILITY 
We now apply the Quandt-Andrews (Andrews, 1993 and Andrews and Plobeger. 
1994) breakpoint test for one or more unknown structural break points in the full 
sample period. The Quandt-Andrews (Andrews, 1993 and Andrews and Plobeger, 
1994) test applies a single Chow breakpoint test at every observation between two 
dates or observations. The test statistics from these Chow tests are then 
summarised into one test statistic and tested against a null hypothesis of no break 
points between two dates or observations. This procedure tests for the presence of 
a structural break in all of the initial regression parameters. For each individual 
Chow break point test, two statistics are retained and these are the Likelihood 
Ratio F-statistic and the Wald F-statistic. The Likelihood Ratio F-statistic 
compares the restricted and unrestricted sum of squared residuals. The Wald F- 
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statistic on the other hand is estimated from a standard Wald test on the restriction 
that the coefficients on the equation parameters are the same in all subsamples. 
Since we are estimating a linear equation, it is to be expected that both of these 
two statistics will be the same. 
The individual test statistics which make up the Quandt-Andrews (Andrews. 1993 
and Andrews and Plobeger, 1994) test can be illustrated in terms of three separate 
statistics. The first is a Sup or Maximum statistic; the second is an Exp statistic, 
and the third is an Ave statistic. The Maximum statistic is quite simply the 
maximum of the individual Chow F-statistics. The Ave statistic can be illustrated 
in terms of a simple average of the individual F-statistics. The test statistics do 
not follow a standard distribution and their approximate asymptotic values can be 
derived from Hansen (1997) and also from Andrews (1993). 
In practice, the ends of the equation sample are not included in the testing 
procedure because the distribution of these statistics is reduced as one approaches 
the beginning of the equation sample for the first subset or the end of the equation 
sample for the second subset. In general, a standard level for this "trimming" is 
15% which excludes the first and last 7.5% of the observations. Table 7.8.1 at the 
end of this chapter indicates that all three of the summary statistic measures have 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no structural breaks within the 322 possible 
dates tested. The maximum statistic was in July 1988 and this is the most likely 
breakpoint location. As noted earlier, since the original equation was linear both 
the LR F-statistic and the Wald F-statistic are identical. 
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7.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter completes the process of initial econometric analysis of the data. 
Chapter eight overleaf now discusses the implications of these and further results 
for monetary policy. 
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Table Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results AIC 
7.2.1 (January 1970 to June 2008) Criterion 
Unit-root tests in levels 
Variables Constant Constant and trend %'one 
Interest rate (Rt) -2.030 -2.826 -0.915 
Inflation rate (Pt') -1.840 -2.981 -1.251 (Pty) -2.007 -3.142 -1.348 
(Pt3) -1.971 -3.479* -1.229 
Unemployment rate (Ut) -2.414 -2.440 -0.817 
(Utz) -4.274* -4.989* -4.2-4* 
Industrial production (IPt) -6.379* -6.374* -6.385* 
Smoothing parameter (SPt) -2.033 -2.824 -0.911 
Unit-root tests in first differences 
Variables Constant Constant and trend None 
Interest rate (ARt) -18.850* -18.843* 18.8-0* 
Inflation rate (APt') -5.810 * -5.795* -5.814* 
(APt2) -4.745* -4.736* -4. -48* 
(APt3) -4.707* -4.703* -4.717* 
Unemployment rate (AUt) -3.708 * -3.813 * -3.713* 
(AU? ) -3.863* -3.860* -3.867* 
Industrial production (AIPt) -7.357* -7.346* -7.365* 
Smoothing parameter (OSPt) -18.867* -18.861 * -18.88'"* 
Notes: * Denotes significance at the 5% level and rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarinv. 
Critical values obtained from Fu ller (1976) are -2.868, -3.420 and -1.942 for the first, second and 
third test equations respectively. Optimal lag lengths chosen automatically using the AIC. 
Table Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results SBC 
7.2.2 (January 1970 to June 2008) Criterion 
Unit-root tests in levels 
Variables Constant Constant and trend None 
Interest rate (Rt) -2.037 -2.826 -0.915 
Inflation rate (Pt') -1.671 -2.664 -1.129 
(Pt2) -2.132 -3.166 -1.340 
(Pt3) -2.129 -3.059 -1.468 
Unemployment rate (Ut) -1.915 -1.934 -0.850 
(Ut2) -3.403 * -3.802 * -3.407* 
Industrial production (IPt) -7.784* -7.775* -7.792* 
Smoothing parameter (SPt) -2.033 -2.824 -0.911 
Unit-root tests in first differences 
6Variables Constant Constant and trend None 
Interest rate (ARt) -18.850* -18.843* -18.870* 
Inflation rate (APt') -6.665* -6.652 * -6.671 * 
(AP? ) -9.542 * -9.530* -9. j52* 
(APt3) -9.507* -9.495* -9.516* 
Unemployment rate (AUt) -4.057* -4.145* -4.061 
(AUtz) -4.131 * -4.126* -4.135 * 
Industrial production (AIPt) -26.503 * -26.474 * -26.532 
Smoothing parameter (ASPt) -18.867* -18.861 * -18.887* 
Notes: * Denotes significance at the 5% level and rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
Critical values obtained from Fuller (1976) are -2.868, -3.420 and -1.942 for the first, second and 
third model respectively. Optimal lag lengths chosen au tomatically using the SBC. 
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Table Phillips-Perron test results 
7.2.3 (January 1970 to June 2008) 
Unit-root tests in levels 
Variables Constant Constant and trend ; done 
Interest rate (Rt) -2.030 -2.858 -0.912 Inflation rate (Pt') -2.027 -3.098 -1.281 (Ptz -1.939 -2.953 -1.289 (Pt) -1.938 -2.839 -1.360 Unemployment rate (Ut) -1.252 -1.241 -0.590 
(U) -2.271 -2.394 -2.272 * 
Industrial production (IPt) -8.025* -8.017* --tip. 033 
Smoothing parameter (SPt) -2.064 -2.805 -0.940 
Unit-root tests in first differences 
variables Constant Constant and trend None 
Interest rate (ARt) -18.833* -18.809* -18.85_'* Inflation rate (APt') -14.605* -14.596* -14.618* 
(OP? ) -14.006* -13.993* -14.019* 
(APt3) -13.822* -13.808* -13.835* 
Unemployment rate (AUt) -14.273* -14.595* -14.281 * 
(AU? ) -25.244* -25.233* -25.255 * 
Industrial production (AIPt) -29.692 * -29.653 * -29.30* 
Smoothing parameter (ASPt) -18.850* -18.827* -18.8-0* 
Notes: * Denotes significance at the 5% level and reje ction of the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
Critical values obtained from Fuller (1976) are -2.868, -3.420 and -1.942 for the first, second and 
third model respectively. Optimal lag lengths chosen using the Bartlett kernel, bandwidth selected 
automatically using Newey- West. 
Table VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
7.3.1 (January 1970 to June 2008) 
Endogenous variables: INTR INFL UNEM 
Exogenous variables: C 
Sample: 1 464 
Included observations: 454 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -3562.446 NA 1330.325 15.70681 15.73402 15.71753 
1 -389.4435 6290.093 0.001177 1.768473 1.877322 1.811359 
2 -277.7639 219.9153 0.000748 1.316140 1.506625 1.391190 
3 -231.1297 91.21405 0.000634 1.150351 1.422472 1.257565 
4 -192.4484 75.14725 0.000556* 1.019597* 1.373354* 1.158975* 
5 -188.6299 7.367908 0.000569 1.042422 1.477816 1.213965 
6 -176.1762 23.86505 0.000561 1.027208 1.544238 1.230914 
7 -165.8205 19.70781 * 0.000557 1.021236 1.619902 1.257106 
8 -162.7009 5.895625 0.000572 1.047140 1.727443 1.315175 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwarz information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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Table 7.4.1 The Pantula Principle for the Taylor Rule, k=4 
(January 1970 to June 2008) 
Ho r n-r Model 2 Model 3 
X max test 
0 3 35.06115 35.05097 
1 2 10.76640* 10.75948 
2 1 1.680593 1.642065 
X trace test 
03 47.508 14 47.45251 
1 2 12.44700* 12.40155 
2 1 1.680593 1.642065 
Note: * indicates the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 95% significance 
level. 
Table 7.5.2 Cointegration Test Based on Johansen's Maximum Likelihood Method, k=4 
(January 1970 to June 2008) 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis Critical 
Value (95%) 
X max rank tests k max rank value 
HOB: r=0 HQ: r> 0 35.05097 21.13162 
HO: r< 1 HQ: r> 1 10.75948 14.26460 
Ho: r<2 HQ: r>21.642065* 3.841466 
X trace rank tests a, trace rank value 
HO: r=0 HQ: r=1 47.45251 29.79707 
HO: r=1 Ha: r=2 12.40155* 15.49471 
HO: r=2H. r=31.642065 3.841466 
Normalised cointegrating coefficients (standard errors in parentheses): 
INTR = 0.326207(0.08983)*INFL + 0.909211(0.14937)*UNEM 
Notes: 464 observations from 1970M1 to 2008M6. *indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 
5%. 
Table 7.7.1 Summary Results from the VECM and Diagnostic Tests 
(January 1970 to June 2008) 
AINTR AINFL DUNEM 
ECM 0.004 -0.004 -0.0007 
(1.554) (-2.230) (-2.539) 
R`' 0.065 0.231 0.556 
S. E. of Regression 0.602 0.523 0.075 
Note: * Rejects null hypothesis at 5% significance level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 7.8.1 Quandt-Andrews Unknown Break-Point Test Results 
(January 1970 to June 2008) 
Statistic Value Prob. 
Maximum LR F-statistic (July 1988) 117.6630 0.0000 
Maximum Wald F-statistic (July 1988) 117.6630 0.0000 
Exp LR F-statistic 56.01058 1.0000 
Exp Wald F-statistic 56.01058 1.0000 
Ave LR F-statistic 55.76582 1.0000 
Ave Wald F-statistic 55.76582 1.0000 
Note: probabilities calculated using Hansen's (1997) method. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Nelson (2001: 2) it is noted that, 
"it may not be feasible to model all historical breaks in policy regime, so 
information about the quantitatively important breaks in policy behaviour 
is useful. The estimates in the present paper indicate which are the 
quantitatively most important shifts in policy and so can aid future work 
on structural modelling of the UK economy. " 
Goodhart (1989: 330-331) notes an, "unhelpful dichotomy, between the theory 
and the reality of Central Bank operations. " With regard to Keynes and Friedman. 
he notes "practical policy matters concerning the level of short term interest 
rates.. . 
had no doubts that these were normally determined by the authorities. and 
could be changed by them, and were not freely determined in the market... " In 
contrast however, Goodhart (1989) also acknowledges the analysis of monetary 
policy decisions in terms of a growth rate for money. This bears similarities with 
the work of Barro (1977) on monetary policy rules. According to the MPC (1999: 
69), of which Goodhart was a member, "for each path of the official rate given by 
the decisions of the MPC, there is an implied path for the monetary aggregates. " 
In contrast, Nelson (2001) argues that the description of central bank behaviour in 
terms of a money-growth policy rule hinders many of the challenges facing the 
MPC. In reality, central bank decisions are more to do with changes in the level 
of official interest rates given information on economic activity. Leaving official 
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interest rates unchanged for example, does not lead to constant money growth 
since the rate of money growth given the official interest rate. will not differ as a 
result of shocks to the economy. Therefore the rate of money growth does not 
overlap with official interest rates, which are the central bank's chosen variable. 
Nelson (2001: 3) further argues that much work in monetary economics before the 
1990s failed to accurately describe the actual behaviour of central banks. 
regardless of the type of instrument and policy rules in use. 
From an empirical perspective, estimates of structural economic parameters calls 
for an accurate characterisation of central bank decisions. This also applies to 
actual monetary policy over time. It might be noted, that much of the empirical 
evidence on monetary policy pre-dating the 1990s falls short of adopting such an 
approach. In many studies, the rate of money growth is included in policy rules as 
a dependent variable. When the emphasis of monetary policy on interest rates in 
policy rules became apparent, it took the form of narrowly defined official interest 
rates as in Poole (1970). Johnson (1972: 233), notes that "the tradition of British 
central banking and monetary theory... identified monetary policy with the fixing 
of the level of interest rates. " In contrast however, this measure was often 
incorporated into economic models in terms of fixed interest rate levels regardless 
of economic activity. In Kaldor (1982) for example, monetary policy decisions 
are specified in terms of a fixed official interest rate at which the nominal supply 
of money is perfectly elastic. Goodhart (1987: 253) argues such a description of 
monetary policy at monthly or quarterly observations is problematic. He argues 
that, "I will dispute the repeated claim that the UK authorities have operated 
implicit interest rate targets.. .1 cannot recall a period of open-loop fixed targets in 
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the UK in the last eighteen years, during in which I was personally involved. " As 
an alternative, Goodhart (1987) suggests that monetary policy was modelled in 
terms of closed-loop targets for official interest rates, which are adjusted in 
response to changes in economic activity. Such an approach is illustrated in 
Goodhart and Bhansali (1970). Therefore Goodhart (1987) argues that actual 
monetary policy decisions are not specified in terms of policy rules, which do not 
incorporate money-growth or narrow official interest rates. In fact, Goodhart 
(1987) suggests a monetary policy rule in which the official interest rate is 
adjusted with the aim of achieving economic stability. There is an enormous 
variety of policy rule specifications in the academic and empirical literature. In 
the Goodhart (1987) specification, an appropriate policy rule captures some of the 
characteristics identified by Poole (1970) such as shocks in money demand which 
do not lead to variability in output and inflation. Similarly, it is the stock of money 
rather than the official interest rate which rises as a result of a permanent fall in 
velocity. In addition, the appropriate policy rule does not allow for rapid money 
growth if for example, official interest rates are held below their natural value. 
According to Goodhart (1992: 324), 'I have sometimes wondered whether, starting 
from a presumed equilibrium with zero inflation and 3% nominal interest rates, 
there should not be a presumption that such interest rates should rise by one and a 
half percent for each one percent that inflation rises above zero, that the Governor 
should be asked, say twice a year, to account for any divergence from that "rule. " 
Goodhart (1992: 324) further notes that "in order to raise real interest rates, 
nominal interest rates must be raised significantly more than the prior increase in 
the annualised rate of growth of the RPI. " In a similar vein, Taylor (1993) 
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suggested that the official interest rate responds to annual inflation and the output 
gap as advocated by Goodhart (1992) in that the official interest rate responds to 
inflation by a magnitude of 1.5. The Taylor (1993) rule however. also 
incorporates a response of the output gap which is not present in Goodhart's 
(1992) approach. Nelson (2001), suggests that this may have been due to an 
appropriate measure of real aggregate demand which can be obtained on a timely 
basis and measured with a degree of reliability. As Orphanides (1999) argues. 
accurate real-time estimates of GDP are important considerations in setting 
official interest rates. Nelson (2001) suggests that the output gap may be missing 
in Goodhart's (1992) specification because of an expectation that attempts to 
stabilise inflation may cause output to remain close to potential. This seems 
consistent with the Governor of the Bank of England's (2001: 126) approach to 
inflation targeting as one which aims, "to keep overall demand in the economy 
growing broadly in line with supply side capacity. " It may also be consistent with 
the fact that variations in the output gap may have been the result of decisions 
which induced large increases in inflation as was the case for example during the 
Lawson boom. Alternatively, this may be due to attempts to use monetary policy 
to control inflation after periods of excess demand as in the downturns of the early 
1980s and early 1990s. Nelson (2001) argues that a response to the output gap 
therefore is not necessary since inflation targeting would contribute to output gap 
stability. Nevertheless, the Taylor (1993) rule has generated much renewed 
interest in estimated monetary policy reaction functions, seemingly moving the 
debate in the direction proposed by Goodhart (1992). This can be seen from 
Ireland (2001), who points out that, 
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"following the publication of Taylor's (1993) original essay... Monetary 
economists have come to appreciate that most central banks... conduct 
monetary policy by managing short-term nominal interest rates rather than 
some measure of the nominal money supply; in addition monetary 
economists have come to appreciate that most central 
banks... systematically adjust their nominal interest rate instruments in 
response to output and inflation. " 
For empirical purposes, we treat the Taylor (1993) rule as an approximate 
description of central bank behaviour, which seeks to characterise a complex 
process using a small number of variables. The rule can also be compared to other 
variants such as optimal and real time rules. Therefore it is not a strict 
requirement that policy rule coefficients take values of 1.5 and 0.5 for inflation 
and the output gap respectively as in the original specification. In fact, estimates 
of the Taylor rule in various different formats have regularly reported higher 
values for one or both of the feedback coefficients in the original rule. A general 
observation might be, that the long-run coefficient on inflation does not ideally 
exceed one, such that the rule can be used to ensure that inflation equals its target 
value on average. This is actually a key characteristic of the policy rule advocated 
by Goodhart (1992) and also Woodford (2001) who calls it "the Taylor principle. " 
The original Taylor (1993) rule emphasises a graphical match with official 
interest rate decisions. It has been further extended by Clarida et al. (2000,1998) 
and Judd and Rudebusch (1998). The main findings of these studies is a large, 
positive coefficient on lagged values of the dependent variable. This is often 
considered indicative of the costs involved in adjusting money balances. 
However, the central bank is able to adjust official interest rates with relative ease 
in the short-term, making the adjustment-cost of these money demand studies 
applicable to an estimation of monetary policy reaction functions. Instead, the 
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coefficient of the lagged dependent variable has been treated as an interest rate 
smoothing parameter where the long-run solution of such a model follows that of 
Taylor (1993). 
8.2 JANUARY 1970 to JUNE 1976 
We estimate nine separate specifications for the first sub-period of monetary 
policy. This consists of 78 observations. We identified two and one cointegrating 
vectors respectively for models one and six. The long-run estimated response to 
inflation in model one is 0.86 and in model six it is 0.40. However both are 
statistically insignificant. These contrast with long-run estimated response 
coefficients of 0.12 in Nelson (2001), 1.5 in Goodhart (1992) and 1.5 in Taylor 
(1993). Similarly the output response coefficient in model one is large and 
significant, taking a value of 4.77. Again this contrasts with a response coefficient 
of 0.57 in Nelson (2001) for the same period. In model six, the response 
coefficient is small and insignificant. These results do not corroborate 
descriptions of monetary policy during this period as outlined by Campbell (1993: 
471) or Goodhart (1997: 403). In this period, the government of Edward Heath 
argued that it could stimulate output through the use of expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies, whilst using wage and price controls to manage inflation. It 
might be argued that the Labour government of 1974 thought inflation in the 
1970s was largely the result of autonomous changes in wages and prices and that 
therefore policy ought to influence the prices of individual products without 
resorting to monetary policy measures. Examples of non-monetary policy 
responses to controlling inflation include the incomes policy of the Heath 
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Government in 1972, the voluntary incomes policy of 1974. food subsidies in the 
same year and also reductions in indirect taxes. As a further example. Sir Edward 
Heath (1998: 405) argued that "our policy of expanding demand was essential to 
growth and employment and therefore broadly non-inflationary on which basis 
inflation resulted largely from wage settlements. " The estimates for this sub- 
period of monetary policy are imprecise and difficult to interpret. It is difficult 
therefore to determine whether monetary policy was used in response to past 
period changes in real aggregate demand or inflation. Model seventy-three 
represents an estimate of a similar rule using quarterly data. Here, the long-run 
estimated response to inflation and the output gap is large and insignificant. 
Furthermore, a constant is not included. In models seventy-four and seventy-five, 
the long-run estimated response to inflation is 1.27 and 0.44 respectively, though 
both again are insignificant. Similarly for model seventy-eight, the long-run 
response to inflation is small and insignificant while the long-run response to 
output is large, but insignificant. 
Estimates from the Vector Error Correction Models VECM(s) show that the 
coefficients and their corresponding t-statistics for the error correction 
components. These again show that the parameters for estimated policy rules are 
incorrectly signed and statistically insignifinicant. Thus each parameter being 
insignificant may also indicate that the ratio between the official interest rate and 
inflation and the output gap, is weakly exogenous for this model. In addition, the 
estimated parameter response, does not include a constant term. A second VECM 
reports a positively signed and significant long-run response to (forward looking) 
inflation and the relative unemployment measure of the output gap. Again 
216 
Chapter Eight: Implications for Monetary Policy. 
however, both coefficients are small in size and the model does not include a 
constant term. For the first sub-period therefore, we are unable to identify an 
estimated monetary policy reaction function which conforms in any way to the 
Taylor principle. 
The discussion now turns to a consideration of the period including monetary 
targeting. Overleaf is presented further evidence on the estimated long-run 
response parameters. 
8.3 JULY 1976 to APRIL 1979 
This period begins with the announcement of £M3 targeting, finishing with the 
month before the election of the new conservative Government. The sample 
consists of 34 observations estimated in models ten to eighteen. For model ten we 
find that the estimated long-run response to inflation and the output gap is large 
and insignificant and large and significant respectively. Similarly for model 
thirteen we find that the estimated long-run response to inflation and the output 
gap is 1.66 and 6.60 respectively. Although the output gap is large and 
significant, the inflation parameter is negatively signed and insignificant. Model 
fifteen shows that the long-run response to inflation and the output gap is large 
and correctly signed. However inflation is insignificant. For model sixteen, both 
long-run response coefficients are incorrectly signed and statistically insignificant. 
Models seventeen and eighteen do not contain a constant and their signs and 
magnitude remain difficult to interpret. It is therefore difficult to interpret the 
stance of monetary policy during this period. This sub-sample is characterised by 
217 
Chapter Eight: Implications for Monetary Policy. 
aggressive cuts in the nominal interest rate by over 900 basis points between late 
1976 and early 1978 which preceded a fall in inflation between 1977 and 1978. 
The estimated results for models ten to eighteen above make it difficult to 
determine whether or not this had any effect on controlling inflation. Similarly. 
inflation bottomed out at 7.6% in October 1978 before rising to 21 % in May 1980. 
Again this is difficult to interpret on the basis of the estimates presented here. 
Another feature of this sub-period is the average level of interest rates. Since the 
Bank of England adjusts nominal interest rates, it is able to influence the short-run 
behaviour of real interest rates. The dataset indicates that the real rate of interest 
is not positive until June 1978 and that the ex-poste real interest rate only becomes 
positive in the same month, averaging -3.4% between 1976 and 1979. This is 
higher than the ex-poste real interest rate of -5.72% between 1972 and 1976. 
However it is again difficult to say whether or not this indicates a preference for 
holding nominal interest rates below actual and expected inflation for this period. 
For the same period using quarterly data, the results are broadly the same. Model 
ninety-five for instance, shows that the long-run response coefficients on the 
inflation and output gap are 0.25 and 0.35 respectively. Again, both parameters 
are statistically insignificant. The best characterisation of this period seems to be 
that monetary policy responds to expected (forward-looking) inflation, with a 
small response of the long-run coefficient on the output gap. The long-run 
inflation response in Nelson (2001) is 0.62 which is four times greater than the 
estimated response for the 1972 to 1976 period, though it is not being suggested 
that monetary policy was especially tight during this period. We also find that the 
long-run response coefficient in this sub-period does not does not rise compared to 
the previous sub-period. Ideally, we would like to use this finding to suggest that 
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this might have been due to aggressive cuts in nominal interest rates amounting to 
over nine-hundred basis points between late 1976 and early 1978. followed by a 
fall in inflation from mid-1977 to late 1978. However, the parameter coefficients 
remain statistically insignificant and incorrectly signed. The long-run response on 
(backward-looking) inflation remains negatively signed and statistically 
insignificant and the output gap as measured by relative unemployment is positive 
and significant. The long-run response coefficient for industrial production 
however, is negatively signed and insignificant. A VECM model for this period 
further reinforces the lack of a viable Taylor (1993) type monetary policy rule, for 
which the coefficients on (backward-looking) inflation and unemployment are 
both positively signed but small in magnitude. Although the inflation parameter 
appears significant, the VECM does not include a constant. 
8.4 MAY 1979 to FEBRUARY 1987 
In this sub-period, ninety-four monthly observations cover the period in which the 
conservative government was elected and the Louvre Accord on exchange rates 
was agreed. The estimates for this time period do not shed any light on inflation 
control as an objective of monetary policy, nor on the largely floating exchange 
rate. It might be argued that this period should commence with the announcement 
of the Medium Term Financial Strategy in March 1980 and end with the 
abandoning of £M3 targeting in October 1985. However, substantial overshoots 
of the £M3 target existed as early as mid 1980, and the MTFS was revised in 
1982. It also seems to be the case, that £M3 misses were tolerated before 1985 as 
long as other measures of monetary conditions did not suggest a loose policy 
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stance. According to Nelson (2001), it might therefore be suggested that the 1979 
to 1987 period be treated as single policy regime rather than being divided to 
allow for £M3. For model nineteen, the estimated long-run response to inflation 
is 5.52 and to the output gap it is 26.18. Both are significantly positive. Although 
this might be treated as the `best' model for this dataset, it is not corroborated by 
model one-hundred-and-ten, which is an estimation using quarterly data. Here, 
the estimated long-run response to inflation is 0.95, positively signed and 
statistically insignificant. Similarly the output gap is low, negatively signed and 
statistically insignificant. The results do not explain falls in inflation over much 
of the 1979 to 1987 period, by which it was down to 3.7%. The estimated models 
above cannot be interpreted in terms of a disinflation which was achieved by a 
response of the nominal interest rate to inflation of less than one. Interestingly, 
existing studies such as Clarida et al. (2000), suggest disinflation represents 
periods were the response of nominal interest rates to inflation is greater than one. 
According to the dataset, monetary policy during the early 1980s seems to point 
towards disinflation. Real interest rates in the same period appear high and the 
Taylor (1993) rule often assumes that the average real rate of interest over a 
period of time is equal to its steady state level. This is often assumed to range 
between 2% and 4%. For the 1979 to 1987 period however, ex-poste real interest 
rates were on average 4.66% or approximately 750 basis points above their 1976 
to 1979 level. This implies that changes in nominal interest rates in response to 
inflation between 1979 and 1987 were less pronounced and that the average level 
of interest rates was conducive to a restrictive monetary policy stance. This is 
supported by Clarida et al. (1998: 1054) who argue that, "Monetary policy boiled 
down to keeping real rates steadily high over this period even when inflation was 
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low during the mid 1980s. " For the 1979 to 1987 sub-period, we are again unable 
to capture the Taylor (1993) principle. Nelson (2001), reports an estimated long- 
run response to inflation of 0.34 which is significantly positive and below unity. 
The long-run output gap response is 0.26. The estimated results in this chapter are 
again problematic, because inflation fell over much of 1979 and 1987. falling 
down to 3.7% by February 1987. This disinflation may have been the result of 
nominal interest rates responding to inflation with a magnitude of less than one as 
reported by Nelson (2001). Although Clarida et al. (2000) characterise this 
disinflation as being greater than one, we are not able to corroborate either of 
these findings on the basis of estimated results. An obvious question is why 
monetary policy achieved disinflation in the early part of this sub-period, but the 
estimates reported in this chapter are unable to cast any light on this. For the 
1980s, monetary policy appears to be more successful in controlling inflation. 
This is indicated by Nelson (2001), who reports a long-run response of nominal 
interest rates to inflation of below unity, until the inflation targeting period of 
1992. 
8.5 MARCH 1987 to SEPTEMBER 1990 
The next sub period consists of fourty-three monthly observations between March 
1987 and September 1990. This is the period in which the pound was informally 
linked to the Deutschmark. More accurately, Deutschmark shadowing was 
adopted between 1987 and 1988 and monetary policy in the UK continued to 
follow German monetary policy between 1988 and 1990. According to Lawson 
(1992: 951), the UK "immediately followed" the German interest rate in October 
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1989. The estimates presented here for both monthly and quarterly data follow 
Clarida et al. (1998) and Nelson (2001), in that the UK nominal interest rate 
responds to the German nominal interest rate, inflation and the output gap. In 
model twenty-eight, the long-run response to inflation is 2.17, to the output `gap it 
is 0.56 and to the German mark it is 1.80. Although each of these coefficients are 
positively signed, their t-statistics show that they are statistically insignificant. 
We found similar results for models twenty-nine to thirty-three. For models 
thirty-four to thirty-six, we could not identify a cointegrating vector. Once again, 
the results do not give an indication as to whether German monetary policy acted 
as a nominal anchor for the UK. Similarly, it is not possible to infer whether 
economic conditions in the UK remain important. This contrasts with the 
estimates of Nelson (2001) and Clarida et al. (1998), who estimate long-run 
responses of UK to German interest rates of 1.11 and 0.60 respectively. There is 
obviously a large discrepancy here and the long-run response in Clarida et al. 
(1998) could be lower because their sample period of 1979 to 1990 includes a 
period in which German nominal interest rates did not exert a major influence on 
UK monetary policy. This was the period 1979 to 1987. The second part of this 
sample runs from 1987 to 1990, when German nominal interest rates were of 
greater importance for UK monetary policy. In the late 1980s of course, inflation 
increased rapidly in the UK rising by over five points between 1987 and 1990. It 
is not known from the estimates presented here, whether this is due to an increase 
in money growth or some other factor. 
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8.6 OCTOBER 1992 to APRIL 1997 
The next sub-period covers the years 1992 to 1997. in which the UK saw a shift to 
inflation targeting after an exit from the ERM. The long-run response coefficients 
reported by Nelson (2001) are also wrongly signed and insignificant. Nelson 
(2001) argues that a more plausible specification would be a forýtiward-looking 
version of the Taylor (1993) rule. This in fact satisfies the Taylor (1993) principle 
with an estimated long-run coefficient on inflation and the output gap of 1.27 and 
0.47 respectively. These are of course very close to the values 1.5 and 0.5 as 
reported by Taylor (1993) and similar to the rule proposed by Goodhart (1992). 
These results suggest that inflation was perhaps now better controlled. In contrast, 
the estimates reported in this chapter indicate the long-run response coefficient on 
(backward-looking) inflation is positive, but insignificant. Similarly, the long-run 
response coefficients on (current) inflation and unemployment are negatively 
signed and insignificant. Fifty-five monthly observations represent this period. 
Model forty-five suggests that the long-run response to inflation is 1.29 and 0.30 
to the output gap. Once again, both coefficients appear statistically insignificant 
and the estimates do not shed any light on inflation targeting with official interest 
rates. 
This is the period in which a new policy target was set, namely a target rate of 
inflation within the range of 1% to 4%. The estimates reported in this study do 
not indicate a long-run relationship between the nominal interest rate and the rate 
of inflation which mirrors this target range of between 1% and 4%. From a 
methodology perspective, it is interesting to note that inflation during this policy 
regime was measured by the 12-month increase in the RPI X which is the variable 
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used for this period. For the 1995 period, when the inflation target became 2.5% 
or less we are again unable to find a long-run relationship to this effect. Given the 
repeated failure of the Taylor (1993) rule in this period, it might be worth 
considering whether other factors were at play. For example. targeting of the 
monetary base or sterling M3. This period also coincides with the adoption of 
inflation targeting in several other small open economies. It is difficult to 
determine whether inflation proved harder to control in this sub-period than 
monetary aggregates. Given the failure of the policy rule to identify any 
meaningful long-run relationship between the nominal interest rate and the rate of 
inflation, it might be worth noting that Mervyn King (1994: 123), who has been 
the chief economist at the Bank of England, talked about institutional changes 
designed to bolster the credibility of the commitment to low inflation. This may 
also be interpreted as a classic example of the general nature of Taylor (1993) type 
monetary policy rules, in the sense that for this period an emphasis on 
transparency and credibility may also be taken into consideration. 
Since the estimates presented in this study yield little information on the nature of 
monetary policy, we might turn to the rate of inflation in the dataset. In 
September 1992, the 12 month RPIX which was the target rate of inflation, was 
4% and down from the previous peak of 9.2% in November 1998. It continued to 
fall to around 2% in September 1994 and for most of 1995 and 1996, hovered 
around 2.8% before rising to 3.3% in October 1996. A further point worth noting 
is the fact that the time period for this sub-sample is relatively short and therefore 
the role of inflation expectations may also be considered. According to the Bank 
of England, inflation expectations suggest that short-term expectations continued 
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to fall with regard to market interest rates after Black Wednesday. rising over 
most of 1994 and declining over 1985 and part of 1996. As a general remark. it 
might be said that this period of inflation targeting notes that monetary policy 
decisions were ultimately made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. though for 
the purposes of credibility allowed for publication of the views by the Bank of 
England. 
Several other developments in monetary policy making between October 1992 
and April 1997 may be worth noting, which the estimates in this study failed to 
capture. It might be argued that the government was willing to raise the official 
interest rate in late 1994 and early 1995 as a means of stimulating the economy 
towards controlling inflation. In the summer of 1995 however, it might also be 
argued that the government was unwilling to raise official interest rates. 
Additionally, we can consider that there were cuts in the nominal interest rate 
between December 1995 and June 1996. It may be argued that this was in part to 
do with the forthcoming election. Finally it may also be argued that between 
December 1996 and April 1997, the government repeated repeatedly ignored 
advice from the Bank of England to raise interest rates. Although it has not been 
suggested that these observations are empirically true, nevertheless it may be 
argued that the data shows that it cannot be shown to be untrue either. 
This period of monetary policy also saw the introduction of new arrangements for 
monetary policy making, which distinguish between four separate approaches. 
This is according to King (1997), who was an executive director at the Bank of 
England during this sub-period. According to King (1997), this sub-period 
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between October 1992 and April 1997 was a relatively open one in which 
monetary policy was considered to be credible and predictable. In addition, the 
presence of any inflation target might be interpreted as an incentive to monetary 
policy in terms of following the first best state contingent rule. According to King 
(1997), some have gone further and proposed changes to give an even greater role 
to the Bank of England. Similarly, "a decade of growth through stability" and 
"a result of our own technical incompetence or some failure of the 
political process. In the latter case you may find that the Bank of England 
had been made independently accountable to decisions about monetary 
policy but that is the subject for in the lecture. " 
The results presented in this study might be compared to the findings of Cobham 
et al. (2001). The authors find a cointegrating vector between what they call a 
credibility index and the differential between UK and German interest rates. The 
idea here is that as credibility falls as a result of differences between the 
government and the Bank of England, the spread period on UK bonds over 
German bonds rise. Another monetary policy reaction function for this sub-period 
is presented by Adam et al. (2001), which reports a short-run parameter on the 
lagged dependent variable of 0.45 and an equation standard error of 0.16%. An 
interpretation therefore is that monetary policy was responding to factors other 
than the rate of inflation and the output gap. 
Overall it might be noted that for this period the rate of inflation remained within 
a target of between 1% and 4%, achieving 2.5% during the spring of 1997 before 
rising again. The estimates presented in this study cannot be used to determine 
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whether this new monetary policy regime represents an improvement on previous 
policy frameworks. 
8.7 MAY 1997 to JUNE 2008 
The final sub-period characterises the current UK monetary framework. namely 
inflation targeting with Bank of England operational independence. This sub- 
period runs from May 1997 to June 2008 and offers one hundred and thirty four 
monthly observations. We find that the long-run estimated response to inflation is 
0.61 and to the output gap it is 1.69 in model fifty-six. Both coefficients however, 
are incorrectly signed. Similarly the remainder of this sample period does not 
produce plausible estimates for UK monetary policy and the results are largely 
corroborated by estimates using quarterly data. We find that the long-run response 
coefficients on (current and forward-looking) inflation are both correctly signed, 
but statistically insignificant. Similarly both unemployment and relative 
unemployment measures of the output gap are also insignificant and incorrectly 
signed. Relative unemployment however is large and significant when modelled 
with (backward-looking and current) inflation. Again however, this long-run 
response coefficient is incorrectly signed. 
In this study, the Taylor (1993) rule has been treated as more of a simple estimate 
of the monetary policy reaction function. In the original study, Taylor (1993) uses 
it as a guide for policy. In other studies, the reaction function has been tested for 
its feasibility as a guide for monetary policy. While it might be accepted that the 
Taylor (1993) rule is a simple estimate of monetary policy as operated by, many 
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central banks, the estimates in this study do not support the view- that these are 
robust descriptions of monetary policy. There are some obvious advantages for 
describing monetary policy in terms of a Taylor (1993) type of rule. For example. 
the use of simple parameters of variables based on data which is relatively easy to 
obtain. However the Taylor rule as estimated in this study fails to be able to 
explain the development of monetary policy in the UK since 1970. Studies in the 
academic literature do suggest that monetary policy has largely succeeded in 
controlling inflation. Again this cannot be confirmed on the basis of estimates 
presented in this study. It may be that small adaptations of the rule such as 
forward versus backward looking behaviour help to improve what is considered to 
be a simple monetary policy reaction function. The specifications in this study 
include backward looking, current and forward looking policy rules. However 
these are not able to cast any light on the robustness of the policy rule. Perhaps a 
similarity with Goodhart, is that monetary policy rules often break down when 
they are used for the purposes of controlling inflation. However, it is well-known 
that central banks do not set interest rates on the basis of Taylor (1993) type 
policy rules alone. Therefore it is difficult to determine the robustness or 
otherwise of the estimates presented in this paper. Some attempts in the academic 
literature do try and determine the robustness of monetary policy rules by 
including tests of statistical properties under different model assumptions such as 
backward looking versus forward looking models. In this regard Taylor (2001) 
suggests that policy rules work very well. Again the differing model assumptions 
of backward versus forward looking measures of inflation for example do not 
confirm this view. It is interesting to note that McCallum (2000: 23) argues that if 
the Taylor rule is valid then we can "arm a clerk with a calculator in place of a 
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monetary policy maker. " Similarly Svensson (2001) argues that simple policy 
rules are inappropriate descriptions of monetary policy making. Given the failure 
of monetary policy reaction functions presented in this paper. it might be argued 
that the inflation targeting methods adopted by many central banks are a broader 
commitment to the targeting of a rule. Interestingly, it might seem useful to 
present a critical review of the Taylor (1993) rule. Perhaps it could be argued that 
the fate of monetary policy reaction functions are somewhat on an uncritical 
acceptance of the notion that there has been an improvement in monetary policy. 
The estimates presented in this paper may be interpreted as support for this to 
some extent, in terms of the attention given to the fit of estimated policy rules. A 
further observation relates to backward looking specifications which do not reject 
parameter stability. This being despite the fact that monetary policy has not been 
stable during some of the sample periods . The 
backward looking model 
estimated in chapter seven does not reject parameter stability and therefore does 
not support this position. Similarly, the operating procedures of monetary policy 
have undergone substantial change between October 1979 and December 1982. 
Nevertheless this does not violate the Chow test for parameter stability for the full 
sample period. Sims (2006) argues that this is due to the fact that differences in 
interest rate behaviour are well within the range of sampling errors. Although 
Sims (2006) criticises the assumption that monetary policy may have improved, 
he also suggests that the Taylor rule might be interpreted as a stable summary of 
central bank behaviour even when monetary policy is unstable and changes to 
monetary policy making lead to interest rate volatility. The results presented in 
this chapter however, are unable to support this assertion. Another observation is 
that if reliable estimates of Taylor (1993) type monetary policy functions were 
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obtained, then the Taylor (1993) rule may break down as a description of central 
bank behaviour. This is because, economic activity would be at potential output 
and inflation would be on target. Therefore changes in the official interest rate 
would not be related to deviations of inflation from target of the output gap. In 
fairness, it may be argued that Taylor (1993) type rules are useful for central 
banks who are not able to identify and offset shocks. For example, Mervyn King 
(1999) has suggested that "central banks that have been successful appear ex post 
to have been following a Taylor rule even if they had never heard of that concept 
when they were actually making decisions. " Of course in a Taylor (1993) type 
policy rule, the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to expected deviations 
of inflation from target and the output gap. Nevertheless there is quite a 
difference between the use of estimated monetary policy reaction functions to 
describe the past behaviour of central banks compared to their use of it before as a 
forecasting device for future decisions. 
8.8 CONCLUSION 
This section aimed to characterise the behaviour of monetary policy making in the 
UK between 1970 and 2008, using Taylor-type monetary rules. We estimated six 
separate regimes using both monthly and quarterly data. A summary of these 
results are presented in Appendix Three. It can be seen that the results do not fit 
with the original Taylor (1993) rule and do not correspond to similar estimates in 
other studies. The first sample sub-period for example, is characterised by high 
inflation as illustrated by the original dataset. According to Nelson (2'001), there 
is also a near-zero response of official interest rates to the rate of inflation. This 
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represents a Taylor (1993) rule principle in which inflation is controlled when this 
response is greater than one. The estimates presented here show that monetary 
policy reaction functions do not capture such behaviour. In addition. the estimates 
presented here do not identify a Taylor (1993) rule which corresponds to the 
period of no inflation from 1992. In other words, the estimates here do not show a 
response greater than unity. Furthermore, these estimates do not conform to those 
suggested by Goodhart (1992). Similarly we did not find periods of restrictive 
monetary policy where the response of the nominal interest rate to inflation was 
greater than one. In addition, the effects of contractions in monetary policy- in 
1979 which resulted in increases in average real interest rates were not identified. 
This contraction is not captured by the increase in an estimated inflation response 
parameter. The results here are of relevance to Goodhart (1992) who has also 
been involved in monetary policy making at the Bank of England from the early, 
1970s to the mid 1980s. Goodhart (1992) is known for his criticisms of monetary 
analysis in the 1970s and 1980s. The results here are therefore relevant in the 
sense that they might also be interpreted as a response to some of these criticisms. 
Furthermore, much of the sample period used in this chapter covers the 
development of monetary policy in the UK between the early 1970s and the late 
1990s. In 1997 of course, the Monetary Policy Committee was established and 
Goodhart contributed to decision making. More specifically, Goodhart served as 
a member of the MPC between 1997 and 2000. Therefore the estimates presented 
in this chapter extend the previous analysis of Nelson (2001) by covering this 
period. Inflation between 1972 and 1990 was generally high and monetary policy 
non-optimal. A further disadvantage of the estimates presented in this chapter is 
that they do not identify some of the structural features of price and output in the 
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UK economy. An example of this is the Smets and Wouters (2001) study, which 
decomposes inflation in the Euro Zone for the period 1973 to 1998. This study 
specifies a policy rule as part of a structural model which allows the parameters to 
be disentangled from those representing price and spending. 
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INTEREST RATE PASS THROUGH IN THE UK 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Overall, the transmission of official interest rates to the wider economy varies 
from economy to economy but depends to some extent on the differences in 
institutional setups as highlighted by Britton and Whitley (1997). The main 
transmission of the nominal interest rates in the UK is through demand and to a 
lesser extent the price of imports. The transmission of official interest rates to 
demand in the economy takes place through wealth effects, exchange rates and the 
cost of credit. The primary link between nominal interest rates and the wider 
economy is the transmission of official interest rate decisions to market interest 
rates. This includes bank loans, asset prices and savings accounts. The exact 
nature of this relationship is far from clear and an objective of this chapter is to try 
and determine the extent of interest-rate pass through. A more formal explanation 
of the transmission of nominal interest rates to market interest rates is provided by 
Dale and Haldane (1993: 3). The authors show that changes in nominal interest 
rates actually represent changes in the rate at which banks are able to access 
liquidity. According to Mervyn King (1994: 264), the bank supplies base money 
on demand at its prevailing interest rate, and broad money is created by the 
banking system. " For the sample period under consideration in this chapter. the 
Bank of England has used the gilt repo rate for buying and selling government 
bonds. According to the Bank of England (1997), these are typically for fourteen- 
day securities. Changes in the gilt repo rate are transmitted to market interest rates 
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through short-term money markets and expectations. A key question in the 
interest-rate pass through literature is the exact impact of official interest rates on 
market interest rates, with the resulting impact on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Another obvious question is how to determine an appropriate relationship 
between nominal and market interest rates. This is all the more interesting for the 
current time period adopted in this study which reflects, a more open emphasis on 
the transmission of nominal interest rates to market interest rates relative to 
previous monetary policy regimes. As discussed in chapters two and eight, 
monetary policy in the UK over the last three to four decades has focused on 
money and credit growth. In the early 1980s for example, monetary targets were 
an explicit policy objective. The current monetary policy committee set-up still 
observes the growth rate of credit when deciding on adjustments in the official 
interest rate. 
One such explanation of this is offered by Mariscal and Howells (2002). In terms 
of a flow of funds identity, which decomposes changes in money stock into credit 
counterparts and changes in bank lending into non-bank private sector which is 
the primary source of monetary growth. If an increase in the nominal interest rate 
is passed through to retail banks, say for example in the form of an increase in 
interest rates on loans, then we move up the demand curve for bank loans and the 
flow rate of new loans and therefore deposits is hence reduced. It seems that 
banks have in most cases generally passed on such changes since the early 1970s. 
There are however, exceptions to this as well as some technicalities such as loan 
demand elasticity. Prior to competition and credit control, retail banks paid 
interest on a subset of deposits and even here at rates which were lower than non- 
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money liquid assets. As a result, an increase in retail bank interest rates was 
transmitted more easily into the interest rate on loans and to interest rates on non- 
money assets rather than to money itself. Although the 1970s brought increased 
competition between banks for wholesale deposits, this relationship held for the 
1970s albeit less strongly. A second observation is that an increase in retail bank 
interest rates also increases the opportunity cost of money, thereby leading to a 
change from money to non-money assets. In the 1980s of course, the banking 
system was characterised by deregulation which led to increased competition 
between banks and building societies for retail deposits. In relation to these 
changes over the decades, it is interesting to note Goodhart (1984). who comments 
that, 
"it is not that the demand for lending has become less sensitive to changes 
in relative interest rates. If anything, it has become more so. The problem 
lies in the increasing inability of the authorities to cause changes in 
relative rates by changing the level of absolute rates. " 
9.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we present a review of the empirical literature on interest-rate pass 
through and discuss the implications of these findings for monetary policy 
making. The empirical evidence suggests that interest-rate pass through is 
incomplete, especially in the US. It also seems that a limited degree of interest- 
rate pass through has an effect on the so-called Taylor (1993) principle. When 
interest-rate pass through is complete, an implication of the Taylor (1993) 
principle is that the official interest rate increases by more than unity in response 
to an increase in expected inflation. If interest-rate pass through is not complete. 
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then official interest rates should respond by an amount greater than unity. The 
importance and relevance of interest-rate pass through lies in the fact that 
monetary policy has an effect on the economy through multiple channels of 
transmission. One such channel is of course the interest-rate channel, where 
changes in the official interest rate have an effect on short-term market rates. 
which in turn have an effect on market rates such as mortgage interest rates in the 
medium to long term. The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between the 
official interest rate and mortgage interest rates (both bank and building society). 
loan rates and also deposit rates. In keeping with chapter eight, the objective is to 
survey the literature in order to develop an understanding of the degree to which 
interest-rate pass through takes place, and to then consider some of the 
implications of this for monetary policy. The empirical literature on interest-rate 
pass through is large. Studies suggest that the adjustment in bank rates is not 
complete when market rates change. The literature also seeks to explain the 
reason for this incompleteness. Allen and Gale (2000) for example, suggest that 
this may be interpreted as an implicit contract between retail banks and their 
customers, which is the result of a long-run relationship. In other words, banks 
which have close or long-standing relationships with their customers are able to 
offer relatively stable interest rates which help to protect them from volatile 
market interest rates. According to Hofmann (2004), incomplete interest-rate pass 
through may be the result of adjustment costs such as labour, computing or menu 
costs, which cause retail banks to adjust interest rates only relatively infrequently. 
Even then, only when the expected gain exceeds the associated cost. A further 
explanation for incomplete interest-rate pass through relates to asymmetric 
information and moral hazard. The idea here is that retail banks have little 
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incentive to raise retail interest rates because borrowers who accept such offerings 
are likely to be of poor quality, more likely to engage in risk' projects and 
decrease the expected value of the amount repaid. Another view, is that 
incomplete interest-rate pass through allows banks to absorb all volatility in the 
sector. Hence incomplete interest-rate pass through might pose problems for the 
stability objective of monetary policy. This suggests that changes in short-term 
market interest rates as a result of changes in the official rate are not completely 
transmitted to the economy and that incomplete interest-rate pass through also 
changes the so-called Taylor principle. Whether this is an important requirement 
for economic stability is unknown. At least two approaches to interest-rate pass 
through can be identified from the empirical literature. According to Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004), these are the "cost of funds approach" and be the "monetary 
policy approach" The former is concerned with the pricing decisions of banks and 
is largely concerned with the opportunity cost to banks for issuing loans under the 
costs of financing deposits. An important characteristic of this approach is the 
maturity of retail interest rates. de Bondt (2005) for example, argues that there 
must be some degree of maturity between retail banks and mortgage interest rates. 
For example, mortgage loans are more usefully explained in terms of long-term 
rather than short-term interest rates. In contrast, the monetary policy approach is 
more concerned with the effect of official interest rate decisions on retail interest 
rates and does not include any other explanatory variables. The main emphasis of 
this on determining the relationship between retail interest rates and official 
interest rates. According to Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), empirical estimates of 
interest-rate pass through in the literature can be explained in terms of the 
following equation: 
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drr= C+ Ej=0ajA't-j + Yk=1ßkýrt-k + YCrt-1 - 
lt-1) 
where rt represents retail bank interest rates, it represents official interest rates and 
A represents the difference term. A general observation from the empirical 
literature, is that retail interest rates and official interest rates are integrated of 
order one. It is therefore appropriate to estimate the equation above in first 
differences so that spurious regression can be avoided. This issue has also been 
covered in chapters seven and eight. Returning to the existing evidence, changes 
in retail bank interest rates are explained by changes in official interest rates, the 
persistence of changes in retail bank interest rates and also error correction 
mechanisms which account for long-run relationships between retail bank interest 
rates and official interest rates. The optimal number of lags are selected according 
to the AIC, which has also been explained in chapters seven and eight. Briefly 
therefore, the objective for estimating the above equation is to determine the 
degree of interest-rate pass through which is given by a,. This represents the 
response of retail bank interest rates to a change in the official interest rate for a 
given time period. A represents the long-run multiplier as explained in equation to 
and also in chapter seven. This represents the amount of change in retail bank 
interest rates in response to a change in the official interest rates by 100 basis 
points. The long-run multiplier can be denoted as: 
EJn=o al 
%-1-kk 
l 
ßk 
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where aj and the ßk represent the coefficients on the official interest rate and the 
retail bank interest rate respectively. In addition, n and m represent the number of 
lags selected when estimating equation 1. If the long run interest-rate pass 
through coefficient returns a high value, this might be the result of direct effects 
which are passed through from official interest rates to retail bank interest rates, or 
a high degree of persistence in retail bank interest rates. If, when 2 =1 equals one, 
interest-rate pass through is said to be complete and in the long-run, changes in 
official interest rates up to the full extent are transmitted to retail bank interest 
rates. Since there is a close movement between official interest rates and retail 
interest rates such as the three-month money market rate, money market rates are 
also used to represent official policy rates. Also, official interest rates might be 
said to be relatively constant for longer periods of time, changing only when 
monetary policy decisions are made. It might be argued that this makes them less 
suitable for the purposes of interest-rate pass through but there is no firm 
consensus. As a result, some studies use money market interest rates rather than 
official interest rates. According to the empirical literature, interest-rate pass 
through seems to give differing results depending on the type of retail interest rate 
that is selected. For example, the interest rates on deposit accounts with a 
maturity of less than three months appear relatively constant with a low degree of 
pass through. On the other hand, interest rates on time deposits with a maturity of 
less than two years, seem to track money market interest rates more closely. 
Evidence from retail lending rates seems to report a similar picture. Interest rates 
to households for the purposes of loans do not appear to fluctuate significantly. 
thus reflecting a low degree of interest-rate pass through. Interest rates on short- 
term loans to businesses however, move closely with money market interest rates. 
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Therefore these differences in the extent of interest-rate pass through depending 
on the type of retail interest-rate which is used, are a common finding in the 
literature. For example, Mojon (2000), Sander and Kleimeier (2004). de Bondt 
(2005) and Kwapil and Scharler (2006) suggest that deposit rates with short term 
maturities have lower interest-rate pass through compared to deposit rates with 
longer maturities, such as time deposits. In addition, Sander and Kleimeier 
(2004), de Bondt (2005) and Kwapil and Scharler (2006). also find that interest 
rates on short-term loans to businesses indicate a higher degree of interest-rate 
pass through compared to medium and long-term interest rates. In addition most 
of the studies in the empirical literature uses monthly data. This might be 
interpreted as implying that the immediate interest-rate pass through is a reflection 
of the response of retail bank interest rates to changes in money market interest 
rates within the same month. There are of course some exceptions, such as Mojon 
(2000) reports a response exceeding three months, and also Kaufmann and 
Scharler (2006) who use quarterly data. In this latter study, the response of 
interest-rate pass through takes place within the first quarter. It might also be 
worth noting, that there does not exist a firm consensus in the empirical literature 
as far as econometric methodology is concerned. For example, most of the 
authors and studies cited above, estimate interest-rate pass through using different 
time periods and data sources. In addition, some use aggregate variables while 
others use averages, with still some others using proxy variables. Therefore in 
terms of the studies cited above, the evidence might more accurately be 
interpreted as a range of interest-rate pass through coverage rather than in the 
long-run estimates of official interest rate or retail bank interest rate variables. 
Nevertheless, an observation of the above studies seems to be that responses of 
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retail bank interest rates to changes in money market interest rates takes place with 
time lags and does not happen instantaneously. This may be due to the fact that 
interest-rate pass through in the short-term is smaller than interest-rate pass 
through in the long-run. This seems to be particularly the case for deposit interest 
rates and lending interest rates. Another observation of the above studies. is that 
short-run interest-rate pass through seems to be less than 0.6 for each study. This 
implies that just more than half of the change in market interest rates is 
immediately passed through to retail bank interest rates. For interest-rate pass 
through in the long-run, the range of estimates is larger. Nevertheless, the results 
seem to suggest on the whole, that interest-rate pass through in the long-run is less 
than one and therefore incomplete. There are of course exceptions to this finding, 
so a preliminary interpretation of this may be that retail banks seek to absorb such 
changes as a result of volatility in market interest rates. In keeping with the 
discussion presented in chapter eight, an interesting question is the implications of 
interest-rate pass through for monetary policy. This is especially relevant, since 
interest-rate pass through appears to be incomplete according to the empirical 
literature. For example, retail banks matter for the purposes of monetary policy 
transmission, especially given their role in financial intermediation. A further 
observation however, is that if interest-rate pass through is limited or incomplete, 
then this implies that monetary policy is effective in so far as official interest rate 
changes are not fully passed through to short-term market interest rates and 
therefore the economy. 
Again, in keeping with chapter eight, the Taylor (1993) principle implies that 
official interest rates must respond by an amount greater than unity in response to 
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changes in the rate of inflation. In other words, if the official interest rate does not 
adjust accordingly, then an expected rise in inflation will result in a decrease in the 
real interest rate, which stimulates aggregate demand. If aggregate demand 
increases, then the result is an increase in inflation. To illustrate this point, we can 
return to the Taylor (1993) rule as a description of monetary policy, presented in 
chapter five. In the original equation, it represents the nominal or official interest 
rate targeted by the central bank, p represents the extent of monetary policy inertia 
and kn and ky represent the response of monetary policy to changes in inflation Trr 
and the output gap yt respectively. Here, the Taylor (1993) principle is satisfied if 
kn is greater than one. Conversely, an increase in the rate of inflation leads to an 
increase in the official interest rate by an amount which is less than unity, thus 
leading to a reduction in the real interest rate. However, Kwapil and Scharler 
(2006) note that even when monetary policy is sufficiently restrictive, retail 
interest rates will not respond such that real interest rates become stable. In this 
instance, the authors suggest a modified Taylor (1993) principle where A 
represents the long-run interest-rate pass through to retail interest rates. To 
illustrate, when the value of A is low there is no change in the official interest rate. 
which is generally absorbed by the banking sector. Therefore if expected inflation 
increases, monetary policy is tightened in order to stabilise aggregate demand. 
When A equals one, interest-rate pass through to retail interest rate is complete in 
the long-run, which helps to derive the Taylor (1993) principle. 
As noted earlier, an objective of this chapter is to determine the implications of 
interest-rate pass through for monetary policy. The studies surveyed above 
suggest that interest-rate pass through from official interest rates to retail bank 
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interest rates in the long-run appears to be higher for the U. S compared to the 
Euro zone. In addition, retail interest rates and therefore the banking sector as a 
whole, have a relatively minor influence on aggregate demand for the U . 
S. See 
for example Allen and Gale (2000). 
9.3 DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
An objective in this section then is to estimate the relationship between the official 
interest rate and a series of retail bank interest rates. There are many studies in the 
academic literature which suggest that official interest rates are integrated of order 
one variables. See for example Hall et al. (1992). This was also confirmed in the 
empirical estimates presented in chapter seven earlier. For our first model, wc 
begin with a consideration of lag structure, in particular the lag length criteria 
required for an estimation of the interest-rate pass through equation. We select a 
default lag length of eight when performing the lag order selection test for the 
VAR, which returns an optimal lag length of two as indicated in Tables 9.5.1 
below. A similar result is obtained for model two which includes a standard 
variable rate mortgage as provided by building societies compared to banks. 
Having determined an optimal lag length of two, we are able to prepare for 
cointegration testing again beginning with model one. For deterministic trend 
selection, we again apply the Pantula (1989) principle as discussed in chapter 
seven. This suggests a cointegration test be performed using a deterministic trend 
assumption whereby we include an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating 
equation and no intercept in the VAR. The results are presented in 9.6.1 and 9.6. ' 
below. For our first model, the trace test indicates one cointegrating equation at 
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the 5% level of significance and this is also confirmed by the maximum 
eigenvalue test. For our second model, we were unable to identify a cointegrating 
vector according to both trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics. We present a 
normalised cointegrating equation in table 9.7.1 below which suggests that the 
long-run response coefficient on standard variable rate mortgages from banks is 
1.3. Although this is correctly signed and large. it remains statistically 
insignificant. We observed similar patterns for the loans variable which reports a 
long-run response coefficient of 0.098 which again is statistically insignificant. 
The long-run response coefficient on bank deposits is negatively signed where the 
point estimate is 0.323 and again statistically insignificant. Table 9.7.2 reports the 
results of a vector error correction model for our first equation. Here we find that 
the standard variable rate mortgage as offered by banks and deposit interest rates 
are positive, small in magnitude and statistically significant. Returning to our 
second equation where the official interest rate responds to changes in standard 
variable rate mortgages as offered by building societies, interest rates on deposits 
and interest rates on loans, it was noted earlier that we were not able to identify a 
cointegrating vector. Therefore the analysis proceeds along the lines of an 
unrestricted VAR in first differences. This is estimated as: 
INTR = 1.21748756185 *INTR (-1) - 0.295 496069439 *INTR (- 2) + 
0.314168293514 *SVRS(-1) - O. 24631 739456 *SVRS(-2) - 
0.00432710961534 *DPST(-1) - 0.0138003070358 *DPST(-2) + 
0.0228795023071 *LOAN(-]) - 0.019675-16,11605 *LOAN(-2) - 
0.0423896709931 
The results from this VAR suggests that the standard variable rate mortgage 
variable responds with a magnitude of 0.3 at one lag. The t-statistic on this 
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variable is 2.64 and statistically significant. At two lags, the standard variable rate 
mortgage building societies is negatively signed. The deposit rate at both lags one 
and two is again negatively signed, small and statistically insignificant. We also 
find that the loan rate variable is small, positive at one lag, negative at two lags 
and statistically insignificant in both cases. 
9.4 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Table Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test results 
9.4.1 (Januar y 1995 to December 2007) 
Unit-root tests in levels 
Variables Constant Constant and trend 
Interest rate (Rt) 0.865 0.185 
Bank mortgage rate (BRt) 0.677 0.1 6 
Building society mortgage rate (SRt) 0.783 0.210 
Personal loan rate (LRt) 1.314 0.246 
Deposit rate (DRt) 0.619 0.229 
Unit-root tests in first differences 
Variables Constant Constant and trend 
Interest rate (Rt) 0.103 0.076 
Bank mortgage rate (BRt) 0.136 0.064 
Building society mortgage rate (SRt) 0.192 0.073 
Personal loan rate (LRt) 0.170 0.062 
Deposit rate (DRt) 0.179 0.052 
Notes: * Denotes significance at the 5% level and rejection of the null hypothesis 
of stationarity. Critical values obtained from Fuller (1976) are 0.463 and 0.146 
for the first and second model respectively. Optimal lag lengths chosen 
automatically using the AIC. 
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Table Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results AIC 
9.4.2 (January 1995 to December 2007) Criterion 
Unit-root tests in levels 
Variables Constant Constant and trend None 
Interest rate (Rt) -2.382 -2.799 -0.456 
Bank mortgage rate (BRt) -2.689 -2.706 -0.49- 
Building society rate (SRt) -2.448 -2.322 -0.650 
Personal loan rate (LRt) -2.499 -1.826 -1.753 
Deposit rate (DRt) -2.546 -2.285 -0.956 
Unit-root tests in first differences 
Variables Constant 
Interest rate (Rt) -4.23 7* 
Bank mortgage rate (BRt) -3.388 * 
Building society rate (SRt) -3.265 * 
Personal loan rate (LRt) -4.108* 
Deposit rate (DRt) -3.640 * 
Constant and trend : ti One 
-4.172* -4.250* 
-3.499* -3.395* 
-3.431 * -3.264 * 
-4.453 * 
-3.822 * 
-3.848* 
-3.646* 
Notes: * Denotes significance at the 5% level and rejection of the null hypothesis 
of stationarity. Critical values obtained from Fuller (1976) are -2.881, -3.441 and 
-1.943 for the first, second and third model respectively. Optimal lag lengths 
chosen automatically using the SBC. 
9.5 LAG LENGTH DETERMINATION 
Table VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
9.5.1 (January 1995 to December 2007) 
Endogenous variables: INTR SVRB LOAN 
DPST 
Exogenous variables: C 
Sample: 1995M01 2007M12 
Included observations: 148 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -399.4680 NA 0.002742 5.452271 5.533276 5.485183 
1 420.4992 1584.531 5.24e-08 -5.412151 -5.007123 -5.247589 
135.7447 2.45e- - - - 
2 492.7661 * 08* 6.172516* 5.443464* 5.876304* 
3 506.8397 25.67468 2.52e-08 -6.146482 -5.093408 -5.718620 
4 515.7666 15.80306 2.78e-08 -6.050900 -4.673802 -5.491388 
5 526.5462 18.50005 2.99e-08 -5.980353 -4.279233 -5.28919-' 
6 540.7842 23 66592 08e-08 3 -5.956543 -3.931400 -5.133? 
2 
7 555.9677 . 24.41676 . 3.14e-08 -5.945510 -3.596343 -4.991049 
8 572.6538 25.93114 3.14e-08 -5.954782 -3.281592 -4.8686; 
1 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
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Table VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
9.5.2 (January 1995 to December 2007) 
Endogenous variables: INTR SVRS LOAN 
DPST 
Exogenous variables: C 
Sample: 1995M01 2007M12 
Included observations: 148 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -434.1201 NA 0.004379 5.920542 6.001547 5.953454 
1 320.8785 1458.984 2.02e-07 -4.065926 -3.660897 -3.901363 
7.25e- - - - 
2 412.5911 172.2710 08* 5.089069* 4.360018* 4.792857* 
3 426.7525 25.83483 7.44e-08 -5.064222 -4.011148 -4.636361 
4 434.2515 13.27529 8.36e-08 -4.949344 -3.572247 -4.3898 33 
5 445.4306 19.18578 8.96e-08 -4.884197 -3.183077 -4.193036 
35.02294 
6 466.5013 * 8.41e-08 -4.952720 -2.927577 -4.129909 
7 482.0158 24.94903 8.53e-08 -4.946160 -2.596993 -3.991699 
8 496.6996 22.81941 8.77e-08 -4.928373 -2.255184 -3.84226-3 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
9.6 DETERMINISTIC TRENDS 
Table 9.6.1 The Pantula Principle for Interest Rate Pass Through, k=2 
(January 1995 to December 2007) 
Ho rn-r Model 2 Model 3 
X max test 
03 32.26728* 32.02747 
12 12.39316 12.37313 
218.471204 8.395329 
306.231944 3.685051 
? trace test 
03 59.36358* 56.48098 
12 27.09631 24.45351 
21 14.70315 12.08038 
306.231944 3.685051 
Note: * indicates the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 95% 
significance level. 
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Table 9.6.2 The Pantula Principle for Interest Rate Pass Through, k=2 
(January 1995 to December 2007) 
H0 r n- r Model 2 Model 3 
k max test 
03 16.43155 16.14362 
12 13.18791 13.18521 
21 8.664019 6.145208 
30 3.494319 3.394192 
?, trace test 
03 41.77780 33.86823 
12 25.34625 22.72461 
21 12.15834 9.539400 
303.494319 3.394192 
Note: * indicates the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 95% 
significance level. 
9.7 COINTEGRATING VECTORS 
Table 9.7.1 Cointegration Test Based on Johansen's Maximum Likelihood Method, 
k=2 
(January 1995 to December 2007) 
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis 
Value (95%) 
Critical 
k max rank tests k max rank value 
Ho: r=0 Hp: r>0 32.26728* 
Hoy: r<1 HQ: r>1 12.39316 
Ho: r<2 HQ: r>2 8.471204 
HO: r<3 Ha: r> 3 6.231944 
k trace rank tests ? trace rank value 
HO: r=0 Ha: r= 1 59.36358* 
HO: r= 1 Ha. r=2 27.09631 
HO: r=2 HQ: r=3 14.70315 
Ho: r=3 Ha. r=4 6.231944 
Normalised cointegrating coefficients (standard errors in parentheses): 
INTR = -4.735233 (0.43116)*C + 1.301327 (0.08923)*SVRB + 0.098562 
(0.01270)*LOAN - 0.323015 (0.11152)*DPST 
Notes: -464 observations from 1970M1 to 2008M6. *indicates rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 5%. 
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Table 9.7.2 Summary Results from the VECM and Diagnostic Tests 
(January 1995 to December 2007) 
AINTR 
ECM 0.135096 
(1.46171) 
R2 0.293081 
S. E. of Regression 0.129883 
ASVRB ADPST JLOAN 
0.194622 0.171733 -0.301074 
(5.54998) (2.75719) (-1.44201) 
0.883699 0.550087 0.153644 
0.049280 0.087530 0.293409 
Note: * Rejects null hypothesis at 5% significance level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
9.8 CONCLUSION 
The results here might be contrasted with existing empirical studies such as Mizen 
and Hofmann (2002). In this study, initial unit root tests suggest that non- 
stationarity cannot be rejected according to the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests. 
This is followed by a cointegration test after Johansen as illustrated above. The 
VAR specifications in this study also restrict the constant thus assuming that there 
is no deterministic trends in the interest rate variable. The optimal lag length is 
also determined in a similar manner to that used in this chapter, namely a SBC 
information criteria. In keeping with the results presented in this chapter, Mizen 
and Hofmann (2002) also find that a lag order of two for and deposits and 
mortgage rates, although they find a lag order of three for building society retail 
interest rates. The authors find that the null of no cointegration is rejected in all 
cases. The hypothesis in each case here, is that the long-run pass through is 
complete, in other words that the long-run coefficient on base rates equals one. 
This hypothesis is rejected for bank mortgage interest rates but imposed in all 
other cases. The authors also found that according to t-statistics. the official 
interest rate is considered to be weakly exogenous. This is illustrated by the fact 
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that the adjustment coefficient of the base rate to the long-run relationship is 
always insignificant. Authors such as Johansen (1995) and Bosww-ijk (1996) note 
that if a model parameter is weakly exogenous, then this implies that the long-run 
relationship is excluded from the marginal process and a model consisting of the 
remaining endogenous variables can be used to estimate the parameters. The 
authors use Johansen's weak exogeneity test to determine whether or not the base 
rate is exogenous and whether retail interest rates are endogenous variables. This 
is confirmed in the Mizen and Hofmann (2002) study. A second test by the 
authors to confirm cointegration, includes the use of an ARDL model to estimate 
long-run coefficients. This incorporates a series of unit root test statistics of long- 
run residuals obtained from conventional Phillips-Perron tests and also the t- 
statistics of error correction coefficients. The authors show that the results 
obtained from ARDL estimates are very similar to those provided by the Johansen 
cointegration approach. 
In conclusion, it might be noted that monetary policy operates through changes in 
official interest rates which are then used to influence short term interest rates. An 
assumption in the academic literature seems to be that there exists a complete 
transmission of official interest rate changes to short term interest rates within a 
short period of time. If interest-rate pass through is complete, then monetary 
policy is more efficient in controlling inflation. Models of interest-rate pass 
through in the academic literature test for this relationship using a variety of 
approaches including linear or asymmetric adjustment processes. This chapter has 
sought to apply a conventional OLS time series approach using cointegration and 
error correction methods. Preliminary estimates of the relationship between the 
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level of each type of retail interest rate suggests that complete interest-rate pass 
through is not the long run norm for mortgage interest rates offered by either 
banks or building societies, or for loans and deposits. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter presents a conclusion to the thesis. It begins with a re-statement 
of aims and objectives in section two below, followed by a discussion of the 
conclusions drawn from the research. These can broadly be defined in terms of 
the theoretical readings and policy analysis. The former relate to the development 
of monetary policy, money in an endogenous framework, inflation targeting and 
monetary policy rules The latter relate to initial econometric analysis of the time 
series properties of Taylor (1993) monetary policy reaction functions, their 
implications for central bank decision making and the extent of pass through from 
official interest rates to market instruments. Section three outlines the original 
contributions made to existing knowledge from stationarity, cointegration and 
error correction estimates, and also discusses some of the shortcomings associated 
with the techniques adopted in this regard Section four summarises the chapter 
with an overall conclusion. 
10.2 RE-STATEMENT OF AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Returning to the introduction and outline plan of study in chapter one, the aim of 
this study was to present an overview of monetary policy in the UK over the last 
three to four decades. It sought to do this in terms of an analysis of expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies and also competition and credit control measures. It 
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further aimed to determine the theoretical origins of monetary policy as «ell as the 
various types of monetary policy targets and rules adopted. In addition the thesis 
aimed to analyse inflation targeting and instrument independence at the bank of 
England. A further aim was to develop the theoretical basis of research and this 
was done with readings in endogenous money theory. The objective here being to 
discover the new consensus in monetary policy as well as the transmission 
channels. The thesis also aimed to look at endogenous money from a Keynesian 
perspective and a further objective was to introduce monetary policy rules as a 
means of estimating Taylor type reaction functions in forthcoming chapters and 
these are presented in chapter four. The objective here was to determine some of 
the modelling issues that may or may not be encountered in chapters seven, eight 
and nine. A further objective was to consider inflation targeting in the new 
consensus framework and the objective here was to further discover theoretical 
aspects such as the nominal anchor, real and monetary factors, the causes of 
inflation and also inflation and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The 
objective here was to introduce further empirical evidence on inflation targeting 
which covered macro-econometric modelling and also inflation targeting in terms 
of single equation techniques. The next objective was to determine the data and 
research method to be used for this study. This included various different 
measures of Taylor type policy parameters, the important issue of periodisation or 
breaking the data into manageable regimes, and the use of descriptions from the 
academic literature as well as econometric techniques such as structural break 
analysis. The aim then was to present an initial econometric analysis in chapter 
seven, the objective being to determine the underlying time series properties of 
Taylor (1993) type policy rules as applied to the UK. This was followed by a 
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discussion of the implications of such findings for monetary policy. Here it was 
noted that the estimation of Taylor type monetary policy rules for the sub-periods 
under consideration is problematic and that therefore any conclusion that may be 
drawn on the behaviour of central bank policy making is subject to doubt. The 
next aim was to determine the extent of interest-rate pass through in the UK and 
the objective here was to review the literature and provide some further analysis. 
This suggested that interest-rate pass through is not complete in the UK. 
10.2.1 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM RESEARCH 
It has been shown from chapter two, that the theoretical origins of monetary 
policy targets can be traced back to analyses by Friedman (1960), Poole (1970), 
Friedman (1975), Simons (1936), Friedman (1948 and 1953), Phelps (1967), 
Friedman (1968), Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott (1977). In each of these 
studies the debate concerns the rate of growth of the money supply being constant 
and equal to the underlying rate of productivity growth as in Friedman (1960). 
Poole (1970) on the other hand places greater importance on income stability 
relative to the control of inflation, and Simons (1936) argued that monetary policy 
rules exist to prevent monetary policy being subject to political bias. Friedman 
(1948,1953) furthered debate by introducing the importance of policy lags as a 
means of destabilising discretionary monetary policy and Phelps (1967) and also 
Friedman (1968) who suggested that monetary policy is only effective in the short 
run. For Lucas (1972) it was argued that monetary policy is not effective even in 
the short run whereas Kydland and Prescott (1977) argued strongly for the use of 
monetary policy rules or targets using a time inconsistency- approach. More 
254 
Chapter Ten. Conclusion. 
contemporary conclusions were offered by Bean (1998) and suggested that an 
operationally independent central bank is a solution to the problem of time 
inconsistency. A further outcome was that three specific types of pre-announced 
monetary policy targets were adopted in the UK over the last ý0 years and these 
were monetary, exchange rates and inflation rate targets as illustrated by Cobham 
(2002). The second set of findings drawn from the research concern monetary 
policy rules. Here monetary rules were defined as "instrument rules" which allow 
for changes in the monetary policy instrument in response to economic events. 
This definition was attributed to Svensson (1999) and illustrated by McCallum 
(1988) using the monetary base growth as an example of achieving a target level 
of nominal income. A further outcome regarding monetary policy rules was the 
importance of controlling the monetary base, a policy not adopted in the UK but 
as Goodhart (1994) noted, a risky policy prescription. In addition, the Taylor 
(1993) rule is perhaps the most popular monetary policy rule of recent times in 
which the policy interest rate responds to deviations of inflation from target and of 
output from trend. The conclusion of this section was that the Taylor (1993) rule 
has subsequently been adopted and modified in a variety of studies, examples 
being Clarida et al. (1999) and Ball (1999). Critiques and assessments of this rule 
include Svensson (2000) and Nelson (2001). The next set of outcomes concern 
the development of monetary policy in the UK between 1975 and 2008. The main 
conclusion here was that the UK has experienced a variety of monetary policy 
regimes over this period. These include monetary targeting, boom and bust, 
Deutschemark shadowing, membership of the ERM, and inflation targeting. 
further point on inflation targeting was the fact that policy was initially adopted by 
the government in 1992 with operational independence being granted to the Bank 
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of England in 1997. The overall conclusion of chapter two is that a large number 
of monetary policy regimes have been experimented with in the UK. each with 
varying degrees of success. 
The next objective was to consider the role of monetary policy in controlling 
inflation in an endogenous money framework. The importance of money in a 
Keynesian framework was illustrated in terms of this variable being bank money 
rather than an exogenously controlled stock. More importantly, the role of 
endogenous money as an illustration of the current inflation targeting framework 
in the UK was illustrated. Here the new consensus and the Keynesian approach to 
bank money were represented as two schools of thought treating money as 
endogenous. The main difference between the two was illustrated in terms of the 
endogeneity of money, namely that money is created endogenously in the new 
consensus framework, the stock of money being a residual based on the demand 
for money, and the stock of money not having a causal relationship with inflation. 
The rate of interest on the other hand is bank rather than market determined. 
Conversely, in the Keynesian approach money was shown to be determined by the 
banking sector in the sense that the central bank determines the discount rate and 
supplies reserves to commercial banks. Such loans are then supplied by 
commercial banks with a markup over the discount rate, this being determined by 
several factors including the market power of banks, liquidity preference and also 
risk assessment. In contrast to the new consensus approach, the Keynesian 
method was shown to emphasise the importance of loan and deposit creation and 
removal, and also the causal relationship between investment spending and loan 
creation, and inflation and the creation of money. In both schools of thought 
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monetary policy is interest-rate oriented however with some differences in 
interpretation between the two. The new consensus model following \lever 
(2001) was shown to be based on several assumptions. Firstly that the stock of 
money is not a model parameter though its nature was illustrated in an equation 
which relates the stock of money to output, the rate of interest and inflation. This 
raised the further question of how to determine money in terms of the money 
stock having an effect on economic activity. On the other hand. it was also noted 
that money might be reinstated in terms of three further assumptions these being 
that money is one of several wholesale market assets, that money has wealth 
effects and that many also includes credit frictions. Having said this, it is also 
important to note that the new consensus analysis of Meyer (2001) does not 
indicate the value of monetary growth. For example, it was noted that the amount 
of money in circulation is determined by the demand for money and that this in 
turn depends on past and contemporaneous values of prices incomes and so on. 
Therefore, it might be argued that the stock of money is not a significant variable 
unless the demand for money is a function of expected future prices and incomes. 
This being so the stock of money may hold information which reflects such 
expectations. A further conclusion was noted in terms of McCallum (2001) which 
reflects the volume of money required to complete the monetary policy rule in the 
new consensus framework. A difference being that the new consensus framework 
should be interpreted to allow for some central bank control over the one period 
nominal interest rate since it is able to control the quantity of base money in the 
economy. The difference between McCallum (2001) and Meyer (2001) therefore, 
is the inclusion of a fourth money demand equation with some further 
modifications. A further conclusion of this chapter was that endogenous money 
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may be distinguished from exogenous money by splitting endogenous money into 
passive and active variables. Here, passive money is consistent with the original 
new consensus framework, but the stock of money is a residual which does not 
determine output or inflation. Similarly interest rates are the instrument of 
monetary policy. It was also noted however that this approach might be 
somewhat uncertain given Hendry's (1995) observation that this approach to 
money may well be deficient since it includes a "non-trivial passive element to 
money's role in that mechanism. " A further conclusion of this chapter was the 
interpretation of endogenous money in terms of the relationship between asset 
prices and real economic activity, with an emphasis on frictions in the credit 
markets and the balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission. This 
approach following Bernanke and Gertler (1995) gives importance to two ratios, 
namely capital-to-asset and debt-to-asset. A further assumption is that credit 
markets display friction in the form of "problems of information incentives and 
enforcement in credit relationships. " The main conclusion of this approach was 
that borrowers with strong financial credentials would be able to access credit 
more easily and at a lower cost than those who are not as credible. In this 
situation it was also noted that frictions in credit markets mean that cash flow and 
balance sheet positions are more important in determining the ability of 
individuals to borrow and lend. As a result of such frictions it was noted that the 
supply of collateral to borrowers results in external finance becoming 
prohibitively expensive to obtain relative to internal finance. This phenomenon 
was defined as the "external finance premium " which represents the difference in 
cost between borrowing externally and the opportunity cost of borrowing from 
internal firm funds. Returning to the Keynesian perspective on endogenous 
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money, four further conclusions were reached and these concern questions over 
the ability of official interest rates to actually reduce an economy- wide 
equilibrium where demand and supply are in balance and inflation is on target. 
First, it was noted that the equilibrium rate of interest may be either positive or 
negative but still low enough to be unattainable. This is similar to the liquidity 
trap except that market rates are low and prices are high in the liquidity trap and 
thereby dissuade bond purchases in case of capital loss. The second point was the 
fact that interest rates may only have a very small influence on the levels of saving 
and investment, thereby making monetary policy relativ elv ineffective in 
balancing the two. It was also noted that there is a lack of consensus in the 
empirical literature over the sign and relationship between savings and the rate of 
interest. The effect of interest rates on investment was also questioned following 
Bernanke et al. (1999). A third conclusion was that domestic interest rates may 
not be compatible with international interest rates or may at least pose some 
difficulties for the current account of the balance of payments. For example. in 
terms of interest rate parity the domestic to international interest rate differential 
will equal the expected rate of change of the exchange rate. The most appropriate 
domestic interest rate that is required for international capital movements however 
might be a market determined interest rate which is set with reference to the 
official interest rate. The lack of empirical consensus on interest-rate parity was 
illustrated, however on the other hand, it was also noted that there may be some 
relationship between domestic relative to international interest rates and exchange 
rates. A fourth conclusion was the difficulty in determining an official 
"equilibrium rate " of interest given the lack of information, a constantly changing 
inflation target or even issues relating to competence and credibility. :A further 
-, ý9 
Chapter Ten: Conclusion. 
assumption of monetary policy in an endogenous money framewvork, was that the 
macro economy is viewed somewhat differently in the Keynesian perspective 
relative to the new consensus framework. As noted earlier inflation may be 
determined by factors such as cost push considerations in the Keynesian position 
such as wages, import prices, income levels or productive capacity. In the new 
consensus framework however inflation may be the result of excess demand and 
expected inflation in the economy. A further distinction was that in the Keynesian 
approach the macro economy is subject to supply and demand shocks and also 
fluctuations in the level of overall economic activity over the business cycle. 
Overall then it was noted that the central bank determines the official interest rate 
in an endogenous money framework. This in turn leads to a transmission effect on 
market interest rates where the stock of money is determined endogenously and 
independently of the central bank. The role of interest-rates as an instrument of 
monetary policy was also discussed since this raised questions over the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Here, limitations in the use of interest rates 
were acknowledged especially the fact that they can become negative and 
constrained by the level of international interest rates. 
The main conclusion from chapter four concerning monetary policy rules, was the 
fact that central banks can quantify the response of monetary policy decisions to 
changes in the level of economic activity in a variety of ways. More specific 
conclusions drawn from this research relate to preliminary modelling issues or in 
other words problems that may or may not be encountered when estimating Taylor 
type monetary policy rules. These include the various differences in measuring 
inflation, estimating the equilibrium real interest rate and also potential output. It 
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was further noted that the robustness of estimated rules would also be vulnerable 
to sensitivity in data selection. A further outcome was the fact that the timing` of 
data availability from the central bank may influence the monetary policy reaction 
function specifications and therefore their estimated outcomes. Additionally. 
inflation and the output gap may be modelled as contemporaneous observations in 
interest-rate rules but also as lagged variables. It was also shown that revised data 
is a common component in estimated policy rules especially those tracing 
historical developments, though real-time data has also been used. Furthermore, it 
was also shown that the Taylor (1993) formulation, maybe adapted to include 
error correction mechanism terms which capture central bank interest rate 
smoothing. This was represented by Judd and Rudebusch (1998). Such monetary 
policy rules can also be adapted to include a forward-looking element and this was 
illustrated by McCallum (2001) and also Kozicki (1999). Many Taylor type 
monetary policy rules use single equation techniques which are not necessarily 
robust given small changes in their underlying properties such as the 
measurements used for inflation or potential output. It was shown that these may 
lead to wide variations in policy recommendations. On the other hand it as not 
noted that despite such problems monetary policy rules of this nature are generally 
useful descriptors of the behaviour of monetary policy. A further conclusion was 
that the channel of monetary policy transmission specified in any interest rate 
reaction function plays a key role in the construction of policy rules. This was 
because the parameters of an optimal rule are subject to influence from price and 
output persistence, interest rate elasticity of demand, transparency, expectations, 
and also the identification of such channels of transmission is a prerequisite to an 
efficient instrument rule. This was illustrated in terms of a backward looking 
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structural model identified by Ball (1999) With regard to the specification of 
monetary policy rules and their parameters, the research showed that a reasonable 
assumption in model specification is that central banks determine official interest 
rates based on expectations of future economic activity. This may be reflected in 
either a forward-looking or forecast based specification of monetary policy rules 
which may be preferred over backward looking or contemporaneous 
specifications. To this end we use the example of Batini and Haldane (1999). The 
exchange rate may also play a role in monetary policy reaction function 
specifications, as illustrated by Ball (1997) and the stability condition is also 
important for Taylor type monetary policy rules as illustrated by Woodford 
(2002). It was shown that this may be modelled in terms of a forw ard-looking 
IS/Phillips curve model. 
The overall conclusion of chapter four then, was that modelling Taylor type 
monetary policy reaction functions, require that the official interest-rate is a 
function of deviations in contemporaneous inflation from a pre-selected target and 
also deviations of contemporaneous real output from the potential level of output. 
The size of the interest rate response to shocks was determined by the relative 
weights which may be assigned to the inflation and output gap parameters of the 
rule concerned. It was shown that monetary policy reaction functions are simple 
and tractable, though they do nevertheless describe the essential workings of 
monetary policy in central banks. This chapter showed that estimates of Taylor 
type rules are not robust for a variety of reasons, including as mentioned earlier. 
estimated relative weights for model parameters, the changing nature of monetary 
policy and the availability and treatment of data. In chapter five, the main 
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conclusion was the close relationship between inflation targeting and the new 
consensus macroeconomics as theoretical and policy parameters. The chapter 
notes that inflation targeting is advocated for monetary policy. For example, 
Mishkin (1999). A further conclusion of this chapter, is that the importance of 
inflation targeting as a theoretical and policy measure is illustrated by the fact that 
it has been adopted in over twenty countries as illustrated by Fracasso et al. 
(2003). Further outcomes of this chapter are that the theoretical basis of inflation 
targeting can be deconstructed, the mechanisms through which inflation targeting 
is used to control inflation are subject to reservations, and that the empirical 
evidence on inflation targeting adopts structural macroeconomic, as well as single 
equation models to measure Taylor type policy rules. We now look at each of 
these in turn. An outcome of inflation targeting was that official inflation targets 
and ranges are announced publicly, and low and stable levels of inflation are 
acknowledged as their primary concerns of monetary policy in the long run. It 
was shown that an advantage of this framework is the presence of clear 
communication between the central bank and also public-private and market 
agents which allows for a disciplined, accountable, transparent and flexible 
approach to monetary policy. The primary objective of price stability is supported 
by three further additional objectives, which are trust, flexibility and an optimal 
response to unanticipated shocks. Inflation targeting can be achieved through 
"constrained discretion" where inflation targeting can be used as a nominal anchor 
for monetary policy. A further implication of this was the fact that inflation 
targeting can be used to reduce the possibility of deflation. Additional 
conclusions of this chapter were that fiscal policy is not treated as an instrument of 
macroeconomic policy, given its sensitivity to slow and uncertain legislative 
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issues. Also, low and stable inflation rates are preferred since they induce stron, 
rates of economic growth, with monetary policy being used to achieve this. In 
terms of the theoretical aspects of inflation targeting, it was shown that there 
exists an argument for combining monetary and fiscal policy to measure economic 
outcomes rather than inflation targeting as a stand-alone measure. Problems with 
using inflation targeting as a standalone policy include the arguments by Palley 
(2003). Furthermore, the role of the monetary policy committee in inflation 
targeting may prove controversial as argued by Blinder (1998) where the main 
issue was that a chairman who needs to build consensus may have to move more 
slowly than if he were acting alone. A further outcome concerns the role of the 
nominal anchor which was criticised for leaving very little room for stabilising 
output and that although this is feasible in the short run it is not a requirement in 
the long run since output returns to equilibrium. The next finding in this chapter 
concerns real and monetary factors and here it was shown that a preference for 
low inflation is also related to a distinction between real and monetary factors in 
the economy. In other words, monetary policy being on the nominal side of the 
economy targeting inflation, with supply-side policies of the real side of the 
economy targeting unemployment. However, a further implication here was that 
supply-side policies do not necessarily need to be an inherent characteristic of 
inflation targeting as illustrated by King (1997). A further conclusion of this 
section concerns the causes of inflation and here it was shown that inflation might 
be controlled through official interest rates which act to induce demand deflation. 
This concept of demand deflation then raised three further questions. Firstly. that 
the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing inflation through aggregate 
demand may be ineffective as argued by a Arestis and Sawyer (20022). Secondly. 
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the appropriateness of monetary policy in influencing aggregate demand and 
demand inflation in terms of the Phillips curve equation was also questioned with 
Arestis and Sawyer (2002) showing that this may pose problems with fiscal policy 
presented as the most appropriate instrument of policy. The third outcome being 
the lack of importance given to sustain cost-push and other non-demand related 
inflation in the new consensus. The next set of findings concern inflation and the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Here it was noted that a single 
interest rate does not account for feed through effects of the policy instrument on 
long-term interest rates as argued by former chairman of the Federal reserve 
Volcker (2002). With regard to the empirical evidence on inflation targeting, it 
was shown that this can broadly be defined in terms of macroeconometric models 
and single equation techniques. We discuss both of these broad conclusions in 
further detail below. 
The first conclusion here was that the effects of monetary policy transmission 
through conventional channels cannot always be measured in a quantitative 
manner. A primary reason for this was the fact that no single transmission 
channel is mutually exclusive and also that the effects of official interest rate 
changes on economic activity are determined by an interaction of such channels. 
Since these channels operate interdependently and simultaneously, any 
determination of the effects of monetary policy on the rate of inflation becomes 
difficult to measure. In addition, the identification of change. magnitude or 
relevance of transmission over time can be explained in a similar vein to inflation 
targeting and macroeconometric models. where the relativ eltiy long time taken for 
monetary policy transmission effects to become apparent were discussed by 
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Kuttner and Mosser (2002). The authors illustrated the continuously changing 
relationship between monetary policy and the real economy. A further conclusion 
relates to inflation targeting in single equation models with the main outcome here 
being that of all the major economies adopting inflation targeting. the UK was 
shown to have the best performance even though its rate of inflation was higher 
than the inflation target of most other countries. The overall conclusion of chapter 
five is that there is a close relationship between inflation targeting and the new 
consensus macroeconomics. The theoretical foundations of the latter were shown 
to have several shortcomings. The empirical evidence on such models was shown 
to be varied and lacking in consensus. 
The main outcome of the data and research method in chapter six is that the 
Taylor (1993) rule is a generalised description of central bank behaviour and that 
therefore the variables that might be used for estimation are not fixed. To this end 
several disparate versions of the policy instrument, the rate of inflation and the 
output gap can be used. This is followed by a series of more specific conclusions 
which include use of the bank rate, the minimum lending rate, and the official 
bank rate as measures of the policy instrument. Primarily, it was shown that the 
purpose of using monthly data observations was to reflect the fact that monetary 
policy committee decisions are often made on a monthly basis though sometimes 
there is no change. For the rate of inflation, the retail price prices index was 
adopted and modified to excluding mortgage interest payments when they became 
available. The aim here being to map the initial inflation target measure under the 
regime of instrument independence. An initial conclusion here was that inflation 
might be interpreted as backward looking in the sense that the data relate to 
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percentage changes in the variable over the preceding 12 months. It was noted 
however that there is no firm consensus in the academic literature whether this is 
the most appropriate measure of inflation. Alternatively therefore. 
contemporaneous and forward-looking measures of inflation were also adopted to 
reflect rational expectations views of anticipated inflation, as well as a forward- 
looking specification. For the output gap parameter. the main conclusion was that 
unemployment might be included by using the claimant count rate though it was 
acknowledged that there may be minor concerns relating to the reliability of this 
variable. For example, unemployment figures not being subject to final revision 
whereas output gap figures are. To overcome this it was also noted that an 
alternative relative claimant count measure might be used which was calculated by 
taking the difference between current period and thirty-six month moving-average 
period observations. As far as the output gap is concerned, the main conclusion 
here was that a variety of specifications are presented for this variable in the 
academic literature without any firm consensus on any particular one. In this 
study therefore, the main conclusion of the output gap was that the variable 
representing industrial production may be used since it is a close approximation to 
GDP and also the variable which reflects the frequency of monetary policy 
committee decisions. This was smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to help 
make the trend more sensitive to long-term rather than short-term fluctuations. 
The next conclusion from this chapter relates to determining the most appropriate 
periods for time series analysis. To this end, two periodic descriptions were used 
to illustrate the fact that changes in monetary policy regime are widely described 
in the academic literature, two examples being Cobham (2002) also Nelson 
(2001). These cover regimes where the exchange rate was floated. monetary 
267 
Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
targeting was adopted with various degrees of discretion. the medium term 
financial strategy, Deutschemark shadowing, exchange rate mechanism 
membership and also inflation targeting. As a result of these periodic 
considerations of monetary policy, a outcome of the research was that eight 
specific policy regimes were identified for the purposes of estimation. These 
represent the full sample period, the start of the sample period up until the last 
month of the floating of the exchange rate, monetary targeting with various 
degrees of discretion, the medium term financial strategy. Deutschemark 
shadowing, membership of the ERM, inflation targeting, and inflation targeting 
with instrument independence. 
The further conclusion from this chapter considers the research methods, in other 
words the process of estimation using the data concerned. The first implication of 
this section is that a smaller number of quarterly observations are available for the 
purposes of estimating Taylor type policy rules. As a result, some of the time 
periods need to be combined to offer a longer data run. Furthermore, an 
implication for the research method is that a VAR lag order selection criteria can 
be used to determine the optimal number of lags as a starting point for the 
estimation procedure. This is followed by the Pantula (1989) principle, in which a 
cointegration test for the number of long run parameters is performed and the 
normalised cointegrating coefficients determined. In addition, a vector error 
correction mechanism was also applied where required. 
In chapter seven, the main conclusion surrounds the importance of testing 
for the 
underlying time series properties of the variables concerned since these haN e 
been 
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overlooked substantially in the academic literature. To this extent. a preliminary- 
outcome is that the order of integration has been determined to avoid the problem 
of spurious regression and it was shown that ADF and Phillips-Perron tests may 
be appropriate for achieving this. The chapter also illustrated the importance of 
determining an appropriate trend for model selection, in other words whether an 
intercept or trend should be included in the short run model, the long run model or 
both. It was noted that this is a key ingredient for cointegration testing. From a 
modelling perspective, cointegrating vectors or long run relationships can be 
determined using trace and maximum eigenvalue tests and that these might be 
consolidated with further tests of weak exogeneity, parameter stability and 
structural break tests. The overall summary to this section being that a thorough 
series of underlying econometric time series properties tests are required. More 
specific conclusions for chapter seven are as follows and these begin with testing 
for the order of integration. It was shown that the majority of macroeconomic 
time series are trended and therefore often non-stationary. This position was 
illustrated with reference to Asterious and Hall (2007) and also Osterholm (2005) 
who noted the theoretical objections regarding Taylor type monetary policy rules 
and how these translated into suspicions of mis-specification. In addition, the 
empirical literature on the stationarity of Taylor type monetary policy variables 
does not benefit from any firm consensus, with some studies finding widely' 
differing results for these variables. Nevertheless, a formal modelling procedure 
was identified in terms of testing for stationarity and cointegration. Also. it was 
shown that forward-looking inflation does not reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity when a constant and trend are included in a Taylor type monetary 
policy rule. This anomaly was discussed with regard to the possible diminishing 
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power of the ADF test. Overall however, the main conclusion of ADF testin_ in 
this chapter is that each variable is non-stationary when defined in levels. After 
taking first differences however, the non-stationaritv component is removed and 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is clearly rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. As a result, the implication here is that each variable is integrated of 
order one. A further outcome was that the output gap as measured by relative 
unemployment and also industrial production, were stationary when measured in 
levels though this was not surprising given their prior construction. Also, : \DF 
testing was confirmed using Phillips-Perron tests which were not fundamentally 
different from ADF results. Therefore, an implication here is that tests clearly 
point to the presence of unit roots in all cases except for relative unemployment 
and industrial production measures of the output gap. After taking first 
differences the null hypothesis of stationarity was rejected and each variable was 
shown to be integrated of order one. Chapter seven also discussed determination 
of the appropriate lag length for cointegration. Here the main finding was that an 
ECM or error correction mechanism was developed and selected for specific 
reasons, these being that it is a convenient measure for determining the correction 
from disequilibrium from a previous time period and that therefore this allows for 
a meaningful economic interpretation. The ECM method was also adopted 
because in the presence of cointegration a first difference specification of the 
ECM have helped to eliminate trends from the variables and therefore removed 
spurious regression. Thirdly the ECM was easily adapted to fit the general to 
specific approach used in this study and this related very well to the generalised 
nature of monetary policy reaction functions. Finally the disequilibrium error 
term was shown to be a stationary variable given cointegration with an implication 
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of this being the existence of some adjustment process which minimises errors in 
the long relationship. In addition, cointegration and the error correction 
mechanism could be modelled using a two-variable ARDL specification. 
The next conclusion for chapter seven concerns the selection of deterministic 
trends for model estimation. The main finding here was that five separate models 
were available for determining the presence of trends in estimated models. These 
were then reduced down to three models which were used for the purposes of 
analysis. This was achieved using the Pantula (1989) principle which allowed for 
a move from the most restrictive model, at each stage comparing trace test 
statistics to their critical values and stopping only when it was not possible to 
conclude for the first time that the null hypothesis of cointegration was not 
rejected. A further outcome of the research considers the determination of the 
number of cointegrating vectors and here it was shown that the Johansen 
maximum likelihood test was the most appropriate means of determining this. 
The main implications here are that nine different specifications of a Taylor type 
monetary policy rule were estimated, the parameters of which are explained 
chapter six. Furthermore, an optimum lag length ranging from one to two was 
determined. When different Taylor type variables were used, such as 
contemporaneous inflation and relative unemployment, the lag length was shown 
to be three and when a backward looking inflation and contemporaneous measure 
of inflation with industrial production were used, the optimal lag length was also 
three. Similar findings were obtained using quarterly data. A further outcome 
relates to testing for weak exogeneity and also linear restrictions. Hence when 
applying the following restrictions on the coefficient of the inflation parameter of 
ý' ,1 
Chapter Ten: Concl us in 
1.5 and a linear restriction of 0.5 on the output gap to mimic the original Taylor 
rule we were able to determine that these variables were statistically insignificant 
and weakly exogenous to the models being estimated. With regard to tests for 
parameter stability using the Quandt-Andrews approach, the summary statistics 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no structural breaks within all the possible 
dates tested. 
For chapter eight, the overall conclusion and implication for monetary policy, is 
that Taylor type monetary policy reaction functions do not adequately capture the 
behaviour of central bank monetary policy making. There appear to be several 
reasons for this including those cited in the empirical literature by Nelson (2001), 
Goodhart (1989), Barrow (1977) and others mentioned in chapter eight. Some of 
the reasons for this may be the fact that historical breaks in policy regime are 
difficult to model. A chapter finding which meets with the empirical literature is 
that Taylor type monetary policy reaction functions can only be described as 
approximate representations of central bank behaviour which are aimed at trying 
to characterise a very complex process using only a small number of variables. 
We now offer a series of conclusions relating to the individual policy regimes 
estimated in chapter eight. For the first regime which runs from January 1970 to 
June 1976, the main outcome is that there exists a very weak and statistically 
insignificant long run estimated response to inflation. We observe similar 
findings for the second monetary policy regime which runs from July 1976 to 
April 1979. In this regime a vector error correction model was also used to try 
and ratify results which showed that a backward looking Taylor type monetary 
policy rule appeared both positively signed but small in magnitude. For the next 
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monetary policy regime which runs between May 1979 and February 198 , 
inclusive it is again empirically not possible to determine whether inflation control 
is an objective of monetary policy. For the March 1987 to September 1990 
monetary policy regime, the main conclusion again is that a Taylor type monetary 
policy raise rule does not capture the behaviour of central bank policy making. 
For inflation targeting beginning in 1992 and also inflation targeting with 
operational independence, it might be argued that one would expect a closer 
representation of monetary policy in terms of a Taylor type monetary policy rule. 
Again, the main conclusion of this section is that it is difficult to find an estimated 
long run response to inflation and the output gap, which mirrors the behaviour of' 
central bank decision-making. A further conclusion of this chapter is one which 
reinforces a previous point, namely that Taylor type monetary policy rules are 
better treated as simple estimates of monetary policy reaction functions rather than 
actual descriptions of central bank behaviour. Overall then, the main conclusion 
from chapter eight is that the empirical analysis aimed to characterise the 
behaviour of central bank monetary policy making between 1970 and 2008 using 
a variety of specifications and data sets of monthly and quarterly data. The main 
outcome of these is that the results do not correspond to an original Taylor (1993) 
type monetary policy rules and do not correspond with similar estimates in other 
studies. 
The overall conclusion from chapter nine is that the essential link between official 
interest rates and the rest of the wider economy is the transmission of base rates to 
market interest rates. This includes bank loans. asset prices and savings accounts 
where the exact nature of the relationship is unclear. Furthermore. an appropriate 
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relationship between nominal and market interest rates can be determined 
following Mariscal and Howells (2002). The concept of the flow of funds 
identity, which decomposes changes in the money stock into credit counterparts 
and changes in bank lending, into non-bank private sector which is a primary' 
source of monetary growth. Also, an observation from the empirical literature is 
that the degree of base rate pass through is incomplete. In addition, a limited 
degree of interest rate pass through has some effect on the so-called Taylor (1993) 
principal. When complete interest-rate pass through is achieved then a further 
implication of the Taylor principle was that official interest rates increase by more 
than unity in response to an increase in expected inflation. When base rate pass 
through was not complete, official interest rates responded by an amount greater 
than unity. It might be noted again that the focus of chapter nine was on the 
relationship between official interest rates and market interest rates, such as bank 
and building society interest rates on mortgages, loan rates and also deposit rates. 
The chapter also identified two further approaches to interest-rate pass through 
and these were the cost of funds approach following Sander and Kleimeier (2004) 
and also the monetary policy approach. In the cost of funds approach, it was 
shown that the pricing decisions of banks are largely concerned with the 
opportunity costs associated with issuing loans and the costs of financing deposits. 
Under the monetary policy approach on the other hand, the emphasis was shown 
to be more on official interest rate decisions and their impact on retail interest 
rates without a major focus on other explanatory variables. A further outcome 
was that retail interest rates and official interest rates are generally integrated of 
order one, which necessitates a modelling process in first differences so as to 
avoid the problem of spurious regression. The chapter explains changes in the 
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retail bank interest rates in terms of changes in official interest rates. persistence in 
the changes of retail bank interest rates and also error correction mechanisms 
which accounted for long run relationships between retail bank interest rates and 
official base rates. From an empirical perspective, a further conclusion regarding 
the data and model specification was that the default lag lengths for estimating 
base rate pass through was eight when performing a lag order selection using, a 
VAR model. This in turn became an optimum lag length of two as indicated in 
the tables in chapter nine. A similar conclusion was reached for the standard 
variable rate mortgage for building societies compared to banks. The next 
conclusion from the modelling sequence was that the cointegration procedure 
included a deterministic trend assumption which includes an intercept but no trend 
in the cointegrating equation and no intercept in the VAR. The estimation 
procedure identified one cointegrating relationship at the 5% level of significance 
which was also confirmed by the maximum eigenvalue test. In a further model, a 
cointegrating vector was not identified using trace and maximum eigenv, alue test. 
As a result, a normalised cointegrating equation was estimated to determine the 
long response coefficient on standard variable rate mortgages from banks. This 
was this was shown to have a magnitude of 1.3 which is correctly signed and 
large, but statistically insignificant. A further conclusion relates to the loans 
variable which was shown to report a long response coefficient of less than 0.1 
which was again statistically insignificant. When the standard variable rate 
mortgage parameter for banks and deposit interest rates were estimated. they were 
shown to be positive, small in magnitude and statistically significant. The overall 
conclusion from chapter nine on interest-rate pass through is therefore: one. that 
the empirical evidence can be compared with existing, studies such as \lizen and 
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Hofmann (2002), which suggests that non-stationarity cannot be rejected using 
conventional tests. As a result, cointegration testing restricted the constant and 
assumed no deterministic trends in the interest-rate variable. An overall lag order 
of four for deposit and mortgage interest rates was found, and an overall like order 
of three for building society interest rates. In summary then, it might be noted that 
monetary policy decisions impact short-term interest rates through changes in 
official interest rates. The academic literature assumes a complete transmission of 
official interest rates to short-term interest rates within a short period of time. 
Here, the assumption being that complete interest-rate pass through implies 
efficient monetary policy in controlling inflation. The chapter aimed to apply 
OLS time series methods using or cointegration and error correction techniques to 
each type of retail interest rate, which suggested that interest-rate pass through is 
not complete in the long-running for mortgage interest rates offered by either 
banks or building societies. A similar conclusion being reached for deposits and 
loans. 
10.3 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis provides an up-to-date overview of the main historical developments 
concerning monetary policy in the UK over the last three to four decades. In 
particular, the theoretical origins of monetary policy targets and also the 
development of monetary policy rules in the UK. A greater emphasis has also 
been placed on the nature of inflation targeting in the UK, particularly with regard 
to inflation targeting and operational independence. Secondly, it contributes to the 
debate on monetary policy in an endogenous money framework by presenting 
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further evidence on the new consensus model of monetary policy. which includes 
the transmission channels of monetary policy and also the relationship bet« ccn 
monetary policy and aggregate demand. It also extends the debate by, considering 
endogenous money in a Keynesian framework. 
Perhaps the greatest contributions to existing knowledge of this thesis come from 
the discussions on monetary policy rules and inflation targeting, which form the 
basis of the three original chapters. To this end, another major contribution 
concerns that of issues and concerns relating to the modelling of Taylor type 
monetary policy rules. This thesis has contributed by demonstrating that there 
exist a variety of ways in which Taylor type monetary policy rules may be 
measured, for example, the nature of contemporaneous measures of inflation and 
the output gap compared to lagged data used by central banks. It has also been 
shown that as far as optimal monetary policy rules are concerned, then there exist 
significant trade-offs and shocks from demand and supply and that there are also 
issues concerning the nature of stability and the output gap in Taylor type 
monetary policy rules. A further contribution to existing knowledge comes from 
the data and research method adopted in this study. For example, whether the data 
is a real time or another measure. Secondly, there are also technical shortcomings 
in some of the estimation methods used. For example, unit root tests that have 
been used in this study have also been shown to be sensitive to structural change 
over long sample periods as discussed in chapter seven. Determining the 
appropriate lag length for cointegration testing was also covered in this chapter 
using a variety of methods. For example, the Hannan-Quinn criterion, the Akaike 
Information Criterion or the Schwarz criterion. Although these are Nvel1-kno' n 
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and respected measures of optimal lag order, there are studies in the empirical 
literature which suggest that these might also be sensitive to sample size and the 
variables included. Indeed it has also been shown in Appendix Three that such 
measures of lag order are not always consistent. A further shortcoming concerns 
the use of deterministic trends for model selection. Although the Pantula (1989) 
principle was adopted to determine the number of trends required it is also 
acknowledged here that this is not the only measure available in the empirical 
literature and that other methods may also be used. Similarly when determining 
the number of cointegrating vectors, both for Taylor type monetary policy rules 
and also interest-rate pass through in chapter nine, it has also been acknowledged 
that the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics may not always return the correct 
number of cointegrating vectors. Once again this is largely due to the fact that the 
data may be sensitive to sample size. 
Hence it might be suggested that as far as a further work in this field is concerned, 
an emphasis might be placed on the theoretical and statistical properties of unit 
root tests employed. In addition, lag length criteria, methods for determining the 
number of friends in variables and also cointegration tests. On a more general 
note, the thesis might also be used to disseminate knowledge on the role of 
monetary policy. More specifically, the effectiveness of monetary policy has been 
questioned in this thesis and it has also been shown that monetary policy rules are 
not necessarily the best descriptions of monetary policy, having said this, a further 
article might then be to consider the role of monetary policy in the economy as a 
whole. For example, it was discussed in chapters three and five that monetary 
policy may also be adopted in conjunction with fiscal policy. Therefore a wider 
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research outcome of this thesis might be to consider the role and nature of 
monetary policy as conducted by central banks in the current financial climate. 
10.4 OVERALL CONCLUSION 
This study has presented an analysis of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in the UK. Historically speaking, the UK has experimented with a number 
of distinct regimes over the last thirty to forty years, with various degrees of 
success. A new consensus in monetary policy has emerged over this period, one 
which has implications for the nature and role of monetary policy in an 
endogenous framework. In addition, inflation targeting underpins niam, 
conventional monetary policy reaction functions and this has been used as a basis 
for performing econometric analysis of policy rules. The underlying time series 
properties of such rules require further investigation since these determine 
descriptions about central bank behaviour. Furthermore, the extent of interest rate 
pass through in the UK is limited and this leaves open a further question over why 
this is the case. 
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